Working Paper
Some implications of increased cooperation in world oil conservation
Huntington, Hillard G.; Brown, Stephen P. A. (1996)
Working Papers , Paper 9608

Working Paper
Assessing the economic cost of unilateral oil conservation
Huntington, Hillard G.; Brown, Stephen P. A. (1993)
Working Papers , Paper 9337

Journal Article
Some implications of increased cooperation in world oil conservation
Huntington, Hillard G.; Brown, Stephen P. A. (1998-04)
In this article, Stephen Brown and Hillard Huntington combine recent studies of world oil markets and the nascent literature on damage estimates from carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions to derive cost and benefit curves for the reduction of these emissions through cooperative programs of oil conservation. Their analysis shows that the desirability of extending cooperation in global energy conservation policies is essentially an empirical issue rather than a conceptual one. The current evidence suggests that over the next two decades, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development will ...
Economic and Financial Policy Review , Issue Q II , Pages 2-9

Journal Article
Terms of trade and OECD policies to mitigate global climate change
Huntington, Hillard G.; Brown, Stephen P. A. (2003)
Previous economic research has identified two ways policy to mitigate global climate change could be implemented without minimizing world costs. Costs are boosted when agreements to reduce greenhouse gas emissions are limited to a subset of countries or deadlines for reducing emissions force the premature retirement of energy-using capital equipment. Stephen Brown and Hillard Huntington identify a third way global warming policy could prove more costly from a world perspective-by countries using criteria other than a fuel's greenhouse gas content when determining how to reduce their ...
Economic and Financial Policy Review

Working Paper
Unilateral OECD policies to mitigate global climate change
Huntington, Hillard G.; Brown, Stephen P. A. (2000)
This article offers an alternative perspective for thinking about climate change policy when the developing countries are not participating. If industrialized countries cooperate with each other to reduce their emissions, but comply at levels below those required under the Kyoto protocol, they will have incentives to adopt policies that are more costly to the world than a carbon tax. These incentives result from terms-of-trade gains that result if conservation lowers world prices lower for fuels the industrialized countries import. We consider cases where the industrialized countries act ...
Working Papers , Paper 0003