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Rational bias in macroeconomic forecasts
This paper develops a model of macroeconomic forecasting in which a forecaster's wage is a function of his accuracy as well as the publicity he generates for his firm by being correct. In the resulting Nash equilibrium, forecasters with identical models, information, and incentives nevertheless produce a variety of predictions, consciously biasing them in order to maximize expected wages. In the case of heterogeneous incentives, the forecasters whose wages are most closely tied to publicity, as opposed to accuracy, produce the forecasts that deviate most from the consensus. We find empirical ...
Report
Rational bias in macroeconomic forecasts
This paper develops a model of macroeconomic forecasting in which the wages firms pay their forecasters are a function of their accuracy as well as the publicity they generate for their employers by being correct. In the resulting Nash equilibrium, forecasters with identical models, information, and incentives nevertheless produce a variety of predictions in order to maximize their expected wages. In the case of heterogeneous incentives, the forecasters whose wages are most closely tied to publicity, as opposed to accuracy, produce the forecasts that deviate most from the consensus. We find ...
Journal Article
Risk management by structured derivative product companies
In the early 1990s, some U.S. securities firms and foreign banks began creating subsidiary vehicles--known as structured derivative product companies (DPCs)--whose special risk management approaches enabled them to obtain triple-A credit ratings with the least amount of capital. At first, market observers expected credit-sensitive customers to turn increasingly to these DPCs. However, the authors find that structured DPCs--despite their superior ratings--have failed to live up to their initial promise and have yet to gain a competitive edge as intermediaries in the derivatives markets.