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Discount window stigma during the 2007-2008 financial crisis
We provide empirical evidence for the existence, magnitude, and economic cost of stigma associated with banks borrowing from the Federal Reserve?s Discount Window (DW) during the 2007-08 financial crisis. We find that banks were willing to pay a premium of around 44 basis points across funding sources (126 basis points after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers) to avoid borrowing from the DW. DW stigma is economically relevant as it increased some banks? borrowing cost by 32 basis points of their pre-tax return on assets (ROA) during the crisis. The implications of our results for the provision ...
Recent Borrowing from the U.S. Discount Window: Some Cases
The Fed's discount window makes loans to depository institutions on a regular basis. Recent publicly available transaction-level data permit a closer look at the particular circumstances under which some of those loans happened. The analysis of nine specific cases produces some general insights that can be useful in evaluating whether the discount window should be open to making loans during periods of relatively calm financial conditions.
Who Borrows From the Discount Window in "Normal" Times?
New rules mandate the release of transaction-level data on loans at the Federal Reserve's discount window. This higher level of transparency has created an opportunity to learn more about the role of the discount window outside of crisis periods. These data show that larger and less liquid banks use the discount window more actively and that holdings of bank reserves are negatively correlated with discount window borrowing. Access to the discount window affects bank portfolio decisions, in particular holdings of reserves, in subtle ways.