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Author:Blume, Andreas 

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Learning from failure

We study decentralized learning in organizations. Decentralization is captured through a symmetry constraint on agents? strategies. Among such attainable strategies, we solve for optimal and equilibrium strategies. We model the organization as a repeated game with imperfectly observable actions. A fixed but unknown subset of action profiles are successes and all other action profiles are failures. The game is played until either there is a success or the time horizon is reached. For any time horizon, including infinity, we demonstrate existence of optimal attainable strategies and show that ...
Staff Report , Paper 299

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