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<title> publications</title>
<description>Economic research and commentary from </description>
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<pubDate>Thu, 13 Aug 2026 06:32:35 +0000</pubDate>
<item>
<title>Does the Equity Term Structure Respond to Monetary Policy Shocks?</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednls/103636</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[A long-standing body of research, inspired by Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), has documented the effects of Fed interest rate surprises on stock markets. While stock markets provide valuable information about the investor risk premium and dividend growth expectations, researchers have only recently developed more comprehensive tools to estimate the term structure of equity risk premia and dividend growth expectations across a broad range of maturities. In this post, we investigate the impact of monetary policy surprises (or shocks) on short- and long-term estimates of risk premia and growth expectations through the lens of the Giglio, Kelly, and Kozak (2024) model.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednls/103636</guid>
<dc:creator>Dyer, Henry; Jankauskas, Tomas</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-08-12</dc:date>
<dc:subject>equity term structure; monetary policy surprises</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>20260812</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.59576/lse.20260812</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Liberty Street Economics</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>When Oil Prices Drop, Why Do Gasoline Prices Stay Elevated?</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/l00001/103635</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Why do gasoline prices rise quickly but fall slowly when oil prices drop? Learn the economics behind the "rockets and feathers" effect on pump prices.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/l00001/103635</guid>
<dc:creator>Owyang, Michael T.; Hathhorn, Brooke</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-08-11</dc:date>
<dc:subject>oil prices; gasoline prices</dc:subject>
<ebucore:publicationChannel>On the Economy</ebucore:publicationChannel>
</item>
<item>
<title>How Distressed Are Consumers? Reconciling Diverging Credit Card Delinquency Measures</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednls/103634</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Total debt balances declined slightly by $13 billion in the second quarter of 2026, according to the latest Quarterly Report on Household Debt and Credit from the New York Fed’s Center for Microeconomic Data. Mortgage and student loan balances saw a small decline, while there were increases across other debt products. Delinquency rates across most products remained fairly stable. Still, between 2022:Q3 and 2026:Q1, the percentage of credit card balances 90+ days delinquent rose from 7.6 percent to 12.8 percent, prompting concerns that Americans are falling behind on their debt payments at rates not seen since the Great Recession. Yet the flow delinquency rate—which captures the rate of new delinquencies—has remained relatively stable for almost two years. In this post, we use data from the New York Fed Consumer Credit Panel (CCP) to better understand the state of the consumer, and to explain the difference between our two measures of delinquency. We find that the stock delinquency rate is rising because of a pool of stale, charged-off debts that lenders have been reporting for longer durations, rather than a fundamental worsening in the incidence of delinquency.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednls/103634</guid>
<dc:creator>Lee, Donghoon; Mangrum, Daniel; Scally, Joelle; Sinha, Tejas; Van der Klaauw, Wilbert</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-08-11</dc:date>
<dc:subject>household finance; Consumer Credit Panel (CCP); credit cards</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>20260811</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.59576/lse.20260811</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Liberty Street Economics</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Worker Types, AI Exposure and the Recent Decline in Job-Finding Rates</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedreb/103633</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[The recent decline in unemployment outflow rates is concentrated among specific groups of workers, rather than spread evenly across the labor force.
Strongly attached workers — those with stable employment histories — have experienced the largest decline in job-finding rates.
Workers in occupations highly exposed to artificial intelligence have seen larger declines in job-finding rates, pointing to AI affecting the labor market.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedreb/103633</guid>
<dc:creator>Borovickova, Katrina; Macaluso, Claudia</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-08-12</dc:date>
<dc:subject>Employment and Labor Markets</dc:subject>
<bibo:volume>26</bibo:volume>
<bibo:issue>26</bibo:issue>
<bibo:series>Richmond Fed Economic Brief</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>On-the-Job Search in Europe and the U.S.: Precautionary vs. Job Ladder Motives</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedlwp/103531/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[While employer-to-employer (E2E) transitions are by now well-documented, these data alone cannot reveal what drives mobility: who searches, why, and how search translates into transitions. Using novel panel data from the ECB and NY Fed consumer expectations surveys, we provide the first systematic cross-country analysis of on-the job search (OJS) and E2E transitions across eleven euro area countries and the U.S. Our data uniquely include direct measures of OJS and its motives (job loss expectations for precautionary, pay satisfaction for job ladder) for all workers, not just searchers. We find that OJS is widespread, making employed workers the majority of searchers, and it strongly predicts E2E transitions. Motives differ dramatically: precautionary search dominates in Europe, while the job ladder motive dominates in the U.S. OJS is highly persistent, with 40% continuing to search even after starting a new job.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedlwp/103531/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Bick, Alexander; Dias da Silva, António; Weißler, Marco</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-06-30</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>69 pages</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>job search; expectations; labor market transitions</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>2026-015</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.20955/wp.2026.015</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Working Papers</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Financial Markets, Oil Prices, and Supply-Side Risks</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfel/103632</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[The relation between stocks and bonds indicates whether supply or demand shocks dominate the risks to economic activity. After two decades of concerns primarily about changes in demand, the stock-bond correlation recently flipped, suggesting that the perceived source of risk to the economy has shifted towards supply shocks. Other financial correlations, such as the stock-oil correlation, also changed accordingly and thus agree with this interpretation. In line with this evidence, financial market pricing now indicates that elevated oil prices and potential inflation are prominent sources of risk.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfel/103632</guid>
<dc:creator>Mertens, Thomas M.; Wasserburger, Wesley</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-08-10</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>6</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>oil prices; financial markets</dc:subject>
<bibo:volume>2026</bibo:volume>
<bibo:issue>21</bibo:issue>
<bibo:series>FRBSF Economic Letter</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Reaching for Duration</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfwp/103631/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Using historical data on U.S. commercial bank balance sheets, we show that banks’ maturity mismatch has more than tripled since the mid-1980s, moving in close lockstep with declining interest rates and term premia. We rationalize these trends in a model of bank portfolio choice in which banks must cover operating costs out of current earnings. When term premia or short-term rates decline, banks extend the duration of their assets to remain profitable. This “reaching for duration” effect is convex in the degree of term premium compression. The resulting maturity mismatch renders banks increasingly vulnerable to self-fulfilling runs by uninsured depositors. Consistent with the model, less profitable banks subsequently raise their asset maturities, particularly in periods of low term premia and large Federal Reserve asset holdings. Quantitative easing, designed to remove duration risk from the private sector, may thus paradoxically concentrate it on bank balance sheets and undermine financial stability.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfwp/103631/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Mertens, Thomas M.; Paul, Pascal; Schneider, Andrés</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-08-10</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>105</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>maturity mismatch; term premium; quantitative easing; financial stability; bank runs; deposit franchise</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>2026-16</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.24148/wp2026-16</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Working Paper Series</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Will AI Intensify or Weaken Market Competition?</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfwp/103630/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[We study how AI affects market competition based on a general equilibrium framework with heterogeneous firms facing idiosyncratic productivity and variable markups. Firms choose the AI technology subject to fixed costs, where AI production requires data and energy inputs. Our model predicts a non-monotonic relation of AI diffusion with industry concentration. As AI usage rises from an initially low level, large incumbent users gain market share. When AI usage is sufficiently diffused, entry of new and smaller adopters erodes the market share of incumbents, reducing industry concentration. The non-monotonic relations are robust when firms can complement AI with their own data. Our calibrated model predicts that industry concentration is likely to fall if AI adoption increases relative to the current level. In comparison, the relation of AI with the average markup depends on whether increased AI usage is driven by demand or supply factors. Our model also predicts that a modest subsidy of about 3 percent for AI adopter revenues maximizes social welfare, reflecting a tradeoff between aggregate productivity and the average markup associated with AI usage.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfwp/103630/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Firooz, Hamid; Leduc, Sylvain; Liu, Zheng</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-08-10</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>47</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>artificial intelligence; data; heterogeneous firms; industry concentration; markup; productivity; welfare</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>2026-15</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.24148/wp2026-15</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Working Paper Series</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>The Erosion of Public Capital in Portugal</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedlwp/103629/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[This article documents the erosion of Portugal’s public capital stock since 2013 and assesses its macroeconomic implications. I extend the IMF capital series through 2027 using European Commission data and construct scenarios through 2035 for alternative infrastructure-project pipelines. In 2026, the stock is projected to remain 12.2 percent below its 2013 peak, while its ratio to GDP is projected to fall from 77.2 percent in 2013 to 52.6 percent. Short-horizon regressions show positive co-movement between public-capital and labor-productivity growth. A calibrated production-function exercise suggests that the capital decline may reduce 2026 GDP per capita by 0.7–5.3 percent, with a central estimate of 1.4 percent. Announced investment projects slow, but do not reverse, the projected decline in the capital-to-GDP ratio.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedlwp/103629/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Faria-e-Castro, Miguel</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-08-10</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>26 pages</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>public investment; public capital; infrastructure; Portugal; fiscal policy</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>2026-016</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.20955/wp.2026.016</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Working Papers</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Stripping STRIPs Trading Activity</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednls/103628</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[In March 2020, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) began reporting aggregate trading volume for securities issued by the U.S. Treasury Department. The public data do not, however, include information about the trading activity of Separate Trading of Registered Interest and Principal of Securities (STRIPS). STRIPS are created from existing Treasury securities and offer risk management benefits, yield curve insights, and investment opportunities for a diverse range of market participants. In this post, we provide the first detailed analysis of STRIPS trading activity using FINRA’s Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) transactions data.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednls/103628</guid>
<dc:creator>Fleming, Michael J.; Shachar, Or</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-08-10</dc:date>
<dc:subject>Separate Trading of Registered Interest and Principal of Securities (STRIPS); Treasury securities; trading; TRACE</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>20260810</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.59576/lse.20260810</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Liberty Street Economics</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>What Ties Us Together?  Explaining Synchronized GDP Volatility</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedbwp/103627/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Amid heightened policy uncertainty, understanding the drivers of global macroeconomic instability becomes increasingly critical. This paper studies the determinants of output volatility synchronization using data for 42 economies worldwide. We construct a bilateral time-varying index of volatility synchronization and infer its drivers using Bayesian model averaging, complemented by weighted average least squares (WALS) and least absolute shrinkage and selection operator (LASSO) regression. We find that differences in total factor productivity, interest rate, and fiscal policy volatility robustly explain cross-country synchronization, with nuances between developed and developing countries. Overall, the results highlight the role of technological divergence and macroeconomic policy uncertainty in shaping the international co-movement of output volatility.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedbwp/103627/original</guid>
<dc:creator>López Artero, Javier Adrián; Ductor Gómez, Lorenzo; Leiva-León, Danilo</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-01</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>16</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>macroeconomic volatility; Bayesian model averaging; total factor productivity; interest rate volatility; output volatility</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>26-10</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.29412/res.wp.2026.10</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Working Papers</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>How do Consumers View Future Government Debt? A Primer on Debt-Growth Expectations</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedcec/103626</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[We analyze consumers’ expectations for growth in government debt before and after the COVID-19 pandemic, its breakdown by different income groups, and its relation to inflation expectations. We find that debt-growth expectations rose immediately during the pandemic recession and started to return to their prepandemic levels at the end of 2024. We also observe that consumers in the bottom 40 percent of the household-income distribution have higher debt-growth expectations than their counterparts in the middle 40 percent and top 20 percent of this distribution. A regression analysis indicates that government debt-growth expectations are positively correlated with inflation expectations in the post-pandemic recession period.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedcec/103626</guid>
<dc:creator>Walker, Christopher J.; Luduvice, Andre</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-08-03</dc:date>
<bibo:volume>2026</bibo:volume>
<bibo:issue>16</bibo:issue>
<identifiers:doi>10.26509/frbc-ec-202616</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Economic Commentary</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>The &quot;Low-Hire, Low-Fire&quot; Labor Market</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedcec/103625</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Hires and quits have been low during the strong labor market over the past year or so, when layoffs have also been low. This combination is historically unusual. However, it is likely a continuation of long-term trends rather than something unique to the current period.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedcec/103625</guid>
<dc:creator>Fallick, Bruce</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-08-04</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>6</rdau:hasExtent>
<bibo:volume>2026</bibo:volume>
<bibo:issue>17</bibo:issue>
<identifiers:doi>10.26509/frbc-ec-202617</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Economic Commentary</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Financial and Production Integration in the Macroeconomy</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedcwq/103624/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[This paper studies how integration between the financial sector and production networks shapes business cycle transmission. We develop a dynamic model in which banks provide asset-based financing to firms embedded in supply chains. The model highlights two margins of bank–supply chain integration with opposite macroeconomic implications. Extensive-margin integration—captured by firms’ access to banks specializing in different supply chain segments—amplifies negative banking shocks. By contrast, intensive-margin integration—captured by the diffusion of factoring and invoice discounting—attenuates banking disruptions. The model reveals that the stabilizing effects of integration dominate when firm production linkages are tight. The predictions are consistent with matched bank–firm data from Italy.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedcwq/103624/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Brancati, Emanuele; Cao, Qingqing; Minetti, Raoul; Yi, Nicholas Jaehyun</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-08-03</dc:date>
<dc:subject>banks; financial integration; production networks; factoring</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>26-19</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.26509/frbc-wp-202619</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Working Papers</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>What the Iran War Teaches Us about the Price Elasticity of Oil Supply</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/feddwp/103623/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[We draw on evidence from the 2026 Iran War to assess the validity of estimates of the short-run price elasticity of oil supply reported in the literature. Our analysis confirms that the one-month and one-quarter U.S. oil supply elasticity is effectively zero, consistent with estimates in Newell and Prest (2019). The data strongly reject the much higher elasticity estimates reported by more recent studies. This finding is consistent with evidence from surveys of oil company executives and with industry data about how long it takes to complete a well and start pumping oil. It is also consistent with theoretical arguments that the short-run oil supply elasticity is zero if adjusting oil production is costly, as is the case in practice. Our results have important implications for the construction and credibility of structural VAR models of the global oil market.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/feddwp/103623/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Kilian, Lutz; Patel, Kunal</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-08-06</dc:date>
<dc:subject>Iran War; oil price; supply elasticity; oil production; well completions; shale oil</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>2625</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.24149/wp2625</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Working Papers</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>The Incidence of Fuel-Price Shocks and Tax Holidays: Evidence from the 2026 Oil Shock</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/feddwp/103622/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[We measure the distributional incidence of U.S. motor-fuel tax holidays using transaction records from ∼13,200 gasoline stations linked to neighborhood income. The 2026 Iran War raised gasoline expenditure shares 2.9 times more in the lowest- than highest-income census tracts. Pre-shock exposure accounts for 89% of the gap while the residual heterogeneity widens rather than offsets it. State-level tax holiday lowered retail prices but offset the same fraction (28%) of the per-gallon burden across quintiles. A counterfactual federal holiday preserves this incidence. Per-gallon relief is burden-proportional as it attenuates the shock’s level without correcting its regressive income gradient.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/feddwp/103622/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Bradt, Jacob T.; Taylor, Reid</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-08-06</dc:date>
<dc:subject>gasoline tax holidays; pass-through; tax incidence; energy price shocks; distributional analysis</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>2624</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.24149/wp2624</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Working Papers</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Optimal Second-best Menu Design: Evidence from Residential Electricity Plans</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/feddwp/103621/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Utilities increasingly sell electricity using complex menus of time-constant and time-varying price schedules. We study how to design such a menu to maximize social welfare in a second-best environment where the marginal private and external costs of generating electricity vary over time, institutional constraints prevent mandating time-varying pricing and consumer behavior is distorted by frictions. We develop a model of plan choice, consumption and intertemporal substitution with time-varying marginal social costs and estimate it using administrative data from a large utility. We provide evidence of substantial intertemporal substitution in response to time-varying price incentives and selection across plans based on multidimensional heterogeneity. While the current menu’s time-varying plans substantially shift consumption from high-price to low-price hours, we find that they reduce social welfare. This loss is mitigated by information frictions. We show how to redesign the menu to simultaneously improve outcomes for consumers, the utility and the environment.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/feddwp/103621/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Garcia-Osipenko, Maria; Kuminoff, Nicolai V.; Perry, Spencer; Vreugdenhil, Nicholas</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-08-05</dc:date>
<dc:subject>electricity pricing; time-of-use pricing; menu design; consumer choice; social welfare</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>2623</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.24149/wp2623</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Working Papers</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>The Effects of U.S. Public R&amp;D on Global Growth</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/feddwp/103620/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[This paper provides the first causal estimates of the global social returns to U.S. public R&D. We use a narrative identification strategy to quantify the effects of exogenous shocks to U.S. R&D appropriations on the dynamic TFP response of 69 foreign economies from 1980–2019. A U.S. R&D appropriations shock equal to 1 percent of the federal R&D capital stock raises foreign TFP by approximately 1 percent after 12 years. This response is driven primarily by nondefense rather than defense R&D and is concentrated in non-OECD economies. These patterns are most consistent with diffusion occurring through openly accessible scientific content, capital-embodied trade and technological leapfrogging by economies further from the global frontier. A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that the global social returns to U.S. public nondefense R&D are roughly twice as large as the domestic returns, meaning the U.S. captures about half of these productivity benefits.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/feddwp/103620/original</guid>
<dc:creator>de Souza, Gustavo; Nath, Ishan; Mertens, Karel; Fieldhouse, Andrew J.; Ramey, Valerie A.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-08-04</dc:date>
<dc:subject>Public R&amp;D; International R&amp;D Spillovers; Social Returns to R&amp;D; Productivity; Technological Diffusion</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>2622</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.24149/wp2622</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Working Papers</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Subnational Bilateral Remittance Flows in the U.S.-Mexico Corridor: A Multi-Source Imputation and Validation</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/feddwp/103619/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[More than $65 billion annually flows through Mexico’s remittance corridor, the largest such pathway in the Western Hemisphere. Yet, the distribution of these flows across regions and the implications for financial inclusion—or alternatively, perpetuating inequality—remain poorly understood. This paper exploits bilateral remittance flows between U.S. and Mexican states during 2013–25 to construct and validate a multi-source origin–destination framework linking Banco de México’s U.S.-state outflows with Mexican state-level receipts. We develop allocation matrices from consular registrations, household surveys, and transaction records and validate them against official state-level inflows. Validation against official Mexican state-level receipts yields a clear hierarchy, suggesting that matrices based on consular records explain more than four-fifths of cross-sectional variance in official receipts, outperforming survey-based and transaction-based alternatives, as the matrices preserve the concentrated geography of the settled diaspora. Using the preferred specification, we recover the bilateral structure of the U.S.–Mexico remittance system and analyze its evolution during a period that includes the COVID-19 shock. At the national level, growth in remittance inflows is largely explained by scale effects. However, at the regional level, the South-Southeast is the only region where remittance growth exceeds scale predictions. Shifts in migrant composition drive this divergence, particularly an increasing share of migrants from Southern-origin states in the United States, as well as the rising importance of specific origin states such as Oaxaca. These results highlight the importance of accounting for bilateral flow structures when studying remittances. By preserving spatial concentration, our framework provides new insights into how external shocks transmit unevenly across regions and how remittances shape subnational development trajectories in Mexico.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/feddwp/103619/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Flores, Miguel; Cañas, Jesus</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-08-03</dc:date>
<dc:subject>remittances; bilateral imputation; subnational flows; Mexico; migration corridors; Matrículas Consulares; ENADID; matrix entropy; COVID-19</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>2621</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.24149/wp2621</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Working Papers</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>How USMCA compliance cushioned the 2025 tariff shock</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/d00001/103618</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Despite regional sourcing and compliance costs, USMCA-based firms enjoy an edge over competitors outside North America facing higher U.S. tariffs.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/d00001/103618</guid>
<dc:creator>Martínez García, Enrique; Mau, Ron</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-08-04</dc:date>
<dc:subject>USMCA; United States; Mexico; Canada; trade; tariffs</dc:subject>
<ebucore:publicationChannel>Dallas Fed Economics</ebucore:publicationChannel>
</item>
<item>
<title>Inflation Uncertainty and Endogenous Planning Horizons</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedgfe/103617/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[We develop a finite-horizon planning model in which firms choose how far ahead to plan when setting prices. Planning further ahead improves a firm's pricing decision but requires cognitive effort. We derive analytical solutions for a firm's chosen planning horizon and show that large and persistent aggregate demand or supply disturbances induce firms to plan further ahead, making inflation more sensitive to shocks and generating endogenous movements in inflation uncertainty. Quantitatively, we show that the model matches the positive relationship between the size of inflation forecast revisions and inflation uncertainty observed in the data.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedgfe/103617/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Gust, Christopher J.; Herbst, Edward P.; López-Salido, J. David</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-08-06</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>47 p.</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>inflation uncertainty; finite-horizon planning; inflation expectations</dc:subject>
<identifiers:doi>10.17016/FEDS.2026.055</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Finance and Economics Discussion Series</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>The Price of Bank Funding Behind Private Credit: Evidence from Business Development Companies</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedgfn/103616</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Private credit is often described as credit provided outside the banking system. In many cases, this description is accurate: private credit lenders originate loans directly to firms, hold those loans on their balance sheets, and do not rely on deposits in the way banks do. But private credit is not fully separate from banks.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedgfn/103616</guid>
<dc:creator>Haque, Sharjil M.; Wang, Jessie Jiaxu</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-08-07</dc:date>
<swpo:hasNumber>2026-08-07</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.17016/2380-7172.4142</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>FEDS Notes</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Examining the Sensitivity of Regional Banks to Macroeconomic Shocks</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedgfn/103615</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Following the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), banking supervision and regulation became more stringent for largest banks, particularly systemically important institutions and those with at least $100 billion in consolidated total assets. However, the 2023 stress period following the default of the Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) highlighted that problems at regional banks, which we define as banks between $10 billion and $100 billion in assets, may also cause broader banking system stress.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedgfn/103615</guid>
<dc:creator>Achugamonu, Faith; Afanasyeva, Elena; Schmidt-Eisenlohr, Tim; Seay, Matthew P.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-08-04</dc:date>
<swpo:hasNumber>2026-08-04</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.17016/2380-7172.4097</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>FEDS Notes</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Monetary Policy and Productivity: Promoting Growth vs. Stabilizing Prices</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedlps/103613</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[St. Louis Fed President Alberto Musalem delivered a speech titled "Monetary Policy and Productivity: Promoting Growth vs. Stabilizing Prices," in which he discussed the possibility that monetary policy doesn't merely respond to productivity growth but helps determine it. He examined pros and cons of pursuing easier-than-warranted monetary policy in an effort to foster productivity growth.

He spoke at the Centro de Debate de Políticas Públicas (Center for Public Policy Debate) in São Paulo, Brazil. Following his speech, he participated in a Q&A moderated by Mário Mesquita.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedlps/103613</guid>
<dc:creator>Musalem, Alberto G.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-08-06</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>9 pages</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>artificial intelligence (AI); productivity; monetary policy easing</dc:subject>
<bibo:series>Speech</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Early Warning Signals in Private Credit?  What BDC Portfolios Reveal about Emerging Risks</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedbcq/103612</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Private credit—lending by nonbank financial institutions—has grown to over $1 trillion in the United States, yet most of it remains opaque to investors and policymakers because private credit funds are not required to publish their holdings. Business development companies (BDCs) are an exception and provide a window into this segment of the credit markets. All BDCs are publicly registered investment vehicles that must file periodic reports with the Securities and Exchange Commission, including quarterly and annual filings. We analyze these disclosures to detect trends in the pricing of BDC loans, borrowers’ creditworthiness, and the industry composition of BDC loan portfolios.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedbcq/103612</guid>
<dc:creator>Fillat, José; Shen, Leslie Sheng; Wang, J. Christina</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-08-05</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>10</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>private credit; Business development companies (BDCs); financial stability; credit risk; payment-in-kind; middle-market lending</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>26-6</swpo:hasNumber>
<bibo:series>Current Policy Perspectives</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Why Do Fewer Renters Expect to Move?</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednls/103611</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Americans are moving less than they used to. Moving rates have declined steadily for decades, falling from close to 20 percent annually in the mid-1980s to below 10 percent by 2019. This decline has persisted through business cycles and has been evident across all regions, and has affected a broad range of demographic groups. Falling mobility matters because moving helps households access job opportunities, adjust to changing circumstances, and improve their housing situations. In this post, we show that the decline in mobility also holds for renters, with growing challenges to owning a home being an important contributing factor.  We use data from the annual New York Fed SCE Housing Survey to study renters’ expected mobility and the factors that shape it. Renter mobility is important as renters account for roughly a third of U.S. households and, unlike homeowners, are not subject to mortgage rate lock-in. Since expected mobility predicts actual moving behavior, it provides an early signal of where residential mobility is headed before moves occur.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednls/103611</guid>
<dc:creator>Gresh, Christopher; Haughwout, Andrew F.; Lee, Eungik; Van der Klaauw, Wilbert</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-08-06</dc:date>
<dc:subject>residential mobility; renters; moving expectations</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>20260806</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.59576/lse.20260806</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Liberty Street Economics</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Outlook for the U.S. and Alaskan Economies: A speech at the 2026 Economic Luncheon of the Anchorage Economic Development Corporation, Anchorage, Alaska., August 05, 2026</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedgsq/103610</link>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedgsq/103610</guid>
<dc:creator>Cook, Lisa D.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-08-05</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>10</rdau:hasExtent>
<bibo:series>Speech</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>High Costs and Uncertainty Will Likely Keep Cattle Inventories Low and Beef Prices Elevated for Some Time</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedkeb/103609</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Food-at-home inflation has ticked up in 2026, driven partly by higher beef prices. Beef prices have increased as U.S. consumption of beef has outpaced domestic supply. Despite favorable market signals, supply constraints may keep beef prices elevated for some time. Growing uncertainty in the conditions for raising cattle have prevented ranchers from meaningfully expanding herds to increase domestic supply. Continued uncertainty may stall herd rebuilding, further constraining the beef supply and driving up prices.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedkeb/103609</guid>
<dc:creator>Scott, Francisco</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-08-05</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>4</rdau:hasExtent>
<bibo:series>Economic Bulletin</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>From Barrier to Bridge: Approaches to Address Benefits Cliffs</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/a00034/103608</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Working families can experience a variety of financial barriers that limit economic mobility. One significant barrier occurs when career advancement puts a family above the income-eligibility threshold for public assistance programs. Career advancement, and the wage gains that come with it, can create a scenario in which a family is financially worse off due to the partial or complete loss of benefits–a phenomenon known as a benefits cliff. In other instances, the loss of benefits may largely erase (but not entirely offset) the financial gains associated with career advancement, a dynamic known as a benefits plateau. Both situations can curtail economic mobility.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/a00034/103608</guid>
<dc:creator>Rees, John; Barnes, Keith; Birken, Brittany</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-08-04</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>14</rdau:hasExtent>
<swpo:hasNumber>2026-3</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.29338/wc2026-03</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Workforce Currents</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Spreading Out Across Expanding Idea Space</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedpwp/103607/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Over nearly two centuries, U.S. inventions have become increasingly dissimilar: not just fewer head-to-head collisions between inventors, but growing distance between neighboring inventions. We document this secular decline in similarity using validated neural language models applied to the full text of claims in over 11 million U.S. patents (1836–2023), corroborated by a 98 percent decline in patent interference rates, a measure of independent simultaneous invention. Measuring this correctly requires validation, since different representations of the same patent text can yield opposite conclusions about whether inventions are converging or spreading out. Our validation framework, the first systematic comparison for patent text, selects among these locations in idea space. The model explains spreading out and connects it to several independently documented patterns — rising R&D investment per inventor, increasing patent values, weakening knowledge spillovers, and declining research productivity. The mechanism is spatial; as inventors spread out to capture new territory, inventions become more valuable but also more costly for others to absorb. In doing so, the model turns spillover intensity, innovation step size, and research productivity from fixed primitives into outcomes of inventor positioning. A calibrated decomposition attributes roughly 40 percent of the long-run decline in U.S. research productivity to these spatial forces, alongside traditional explanations such as fishing out and the burden of knowledge. Where inventors stand relative to each other in idea space matters as much for growth as how many of them there are.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedpwp/103607/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Ganguli, Ina; Lin, Jeffrey; Meursault, Vitaly; Reynolds, Nicholas</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-08-05</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>109</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>Idea Space; Knowledge Spillovers; Research Productivity; Endogenous Growth; Technological Distance; Patent Embeddings</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>26-39</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.21799/frbp.wp.2026.39</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Working Papers</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>The Ins and Outs of Long-Term Unemployment</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedreb/103606</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[The recent rise in long-term unemployment is almost entirely accounted for by a decline in unemployment outflow rates, especially the rate at which unemployed workers find jobs.
Inflows into unemployment from employment remain low by historical standards, indicating that the rise is not driven by increased layoffs.
Outflow rates have fallen most for workers already unemployed 27 weeks or longer, widening the duration gap and signaling that current dynamics are different because such widening has previously only occurred if the economy was in a recession.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedreb/103606</guid>
<dc:creator>Borovickova, Katrina; Macaluso, Claudia</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-08-06</dc:date>
<dc:subject>Employment and Labor Markets</dc:subject>
<bibo:volume>26</bibo:volume>
<bibo:issue>25</bibo:issue>
<bibo:series>Richmond Fed Economic Brief</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Capital and AI Investment in the Fifth District</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/r00001/103605</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, much of the recent growth in private sector investment in the U.S. economy has been technology related, from investment in information processing equipment and intellectual property products to exponential growth in data centers. In addition, many firms have been spending on services like subscriptions or training to determine how they can best employ artificial intelligence (AI) technology. In June, we asked over 250 firms in the Richmond Fed's Fifth District about their capital investment, AI adoption, and factors such as employment and prices. While there have been high levels of both capital investment and AI adoption in recent months, most firms are still determining how to use AI in their businesses and where or when gains from the technology will be realized.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/r00001/103605</guid>
<dc:creator>Ngo, Drew; Waddell, Sonya Ravindranath</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-08-06</dc:date>
<dc:subject>Business Surveys; Artificial intelligence; Production and Investment</dc:subject>
<bibo:series>Regional Matters</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>What Businesses Are Saying: Steady Overall With Pockets of Stress</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/r00001/103604</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Through our economic sensing efforts, we meet with businesses across the Fifth District each month to understand current economic conditions. This provides us with real-time information on our regional economy. In this post, we draw from dozens of conversations with businesses from mid-June to mid-July.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/r00001/103604</guid>
<dc:creator>Bauer, Andrew; Haltom, Renee Courtois; Martin, Matthew</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-31</dc:date>
<dc:subject>Business Cycles; Employment and Labor Markets; Production and Investment</dc:subject>
<bibo:series>Regional Matters</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>How Do Sectoral Shocks Shape Future GDP?</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedrwp/103603/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[A production sector's size, as measured by its Domar weight, captures the contemporaneous aggregate effect of its productivity shocks. However, the presence of investment means that these aggregate effects can persist over time. We derive a dynamic generalization of Hulten's theorem in an environment that features sectoral linkages in both intermediate-inputs and investment. This generalization follows from production efficiency alone, and decomposes each sector's Domar weight into an impact and a propagation component. The relative size of these components then determines how persistent the aggregate effects of sectoral shocks are, but cannot be known absent information on the economy's production structure. We show in a tractable structural model that future GDP responses to sectoral shocks can alternatively be described as weighted sums of all sectors' Domar weights, with weights primarily dictated by the network positions and capital shares of downstream sectors. Quantifying the model with U.S. production data, we find that i) Domar weights become progressively less informative about the aggregate effects of sectoral shocks as the horizon lengthens and ii) over a three-year horizon, goods-producing sectors have larger cumulative aggregate effects than service-producing sectors, despite goods only accounting for less than one-third of GDP. Model-free local projections of U.S. GDP growth on sectoral TFP growth confirm these findings.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedrwp/103603/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Ho, Paul; Lashkari, Danial; Sarte, Pierre-Daniel G.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-08-03</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>59</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>sectoral shocks; production networks; investment linkages; dynamic propagation</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>26-11</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.21144/wp26-11</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Working Paper</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>The Future of Monetarism after Milton Friedman</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedlrv/103602</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[On the fiftieth anniversary of Milton Friedman receiving the Nobel Prize in economics, this article describes the legacy of monetarism: At a time of double-digit inflation in the U.S. and abroad, Friedman’s idea revolutionized monetary policymaking and macroeconomics. In the 1960s and 1970s, his approach led to a new paradigm in money/macroeconomics and monetary policy, including the use of monetary aggregates, monetary rules over discretion, inflationary expectations, and systematic policy to achieve credibility for achieving low inflation. He revived the centuries-old quantity theory of money—making it a useful empirical apparatus that challenged and defeated the prevailing Keynesian orthodoxy that “money didn’t matter.” Friedman’s monetarism has carried forward with the Shadow Open Market Committee, an external watchdog over the Fed’s tendency to follow discretionary policies.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedlrv/103602</guid>
<dc:creator>Bordo, Michael D.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-31</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>1-8</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>monetarism; monetary aggregates; monetary policy rules</dc:subject>
<bibo:volume>108</bibo:volume>
<bibo:issue>8</bibo:issue>
<identifiers:doi>10.20955/r.2026.08</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Review</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>What Is Foreign Direct Investment?</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/l00100/103601</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[In an interview, an economist explains what foreign direct investment (FDI) is, how it can boost economic growth, and the potential risks and benefits for countries and investors.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/l00100/103601</guid>
<dc:creator>Hennerich, Heather</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-08-05</dc:date>
<dc:subject>foreign direct investment; tax revenue; employment; technology transfer; skills transfer</dc:subject>
<ebucore:publicationChannel>On the Economy</ebucore:publicationChannel>
</item>
<item>
<title>A Window into Bond Investors’ Uncertainty About R‑Star</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednls/103600</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Monetary policymakers closely monitor the term structure of sovereign bond yields to uncover market participants’ beliefs about the future monetary policy stance, inflation, and activity. A particular object of interest is the natural real rate of return, or “r-star,” which acts as a guide for monetary policy decisions. Numerous papers have questioned how much information investors possess, and how precisely they know r-star. In this post based on a recent Staff Report, we explore what the term structure of interest rates can teach us about r-star and its perception by investors.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednls/103600</guid>
<dc:creator>Roussellet, Guillaume</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-08-04</dc:date>
<dc:subject>r-star; Subjective beliefs; Incomplete information; term structure of interest rates</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>2026804</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.59576/lse.20260804</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Liberty Street Economics</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>What’s Behind the Sharp Drop in Labor Force Participation?</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/l00001/103599</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[In the first half of 2026, the falling labor force participation rate was mostly due to a statistical correction and an aging population. But a sharp drop in prime-age workers also occurred.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/l00001/103599</guid>
<dc:creator>Bick, Alexander</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-08-04</dc:date>
<dc:subject>labor force participation; prime-age workers; statistical corrections</dc:subject>
<ebucore:publicationChannel>On the Economy</ebucore:publicationChannel>
</item>
<item>
<title>ForeComp: An R Package for Comparing Predictive Accuracy Using Fixed-Smoothing Asymptotics</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedpwp/103596/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[We introduce ForeComp, an R package for comparing predictive accuracy using Diebold–Mariano type tests of equal predictive ability with standard and fixed-smoothing inference. The package provides a common interface for loss-differential based testing and includes Plot Tradeoff, a visual diagnostic for bandwidth sensitivity and the size–power tradeoff. We illustrate the toolkit with Survey of Professional Forecasters applications and Monte Carlo evidence on finite-sample performance.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedpwp/103596/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Shin, Minchul; Schor, Nathan</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-08-04</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>46</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>forecast comparison; Diebold–Mariano test; fixed-b asymptotics; fixed-m asymptotics; long-run variance estimation; R package</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>26-38</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.21799/frbp.wp.2026.38</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Working Papers</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Open Banking: A Critical Piece in the Future of Financial Services</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedkpb/103595</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Open banking enables consumers to securely share data from their bank accounts with third-party service providers. By using application programming interfaces, open banking facilitates innovations such as Pay-by-Bank payments, instant bill payments, and cash-flow-based lending. While regulatory efforts are underway at both federal and state levels, technological and operational barriers and a lack of standardization continue to challenge widespread use of open banking in the United States.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedkpb/103595</guid>
<dc:creator>Alcazar, Julian; Baird, Sam</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-08-03</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>5</rdau:hasExtent>
<bibo:series>Payments System Research Briefing</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Job-Finding Anomalies of the Current Expansion</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfel/103594</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Job-finding rates have declined over the past three years for people who are unemployed or are out of the labor force. Analysis shows that the decline in job finding for unemployed people has been pronounced for prime-age and college-educated individuals, while the decline in job finding for people who are out of the labor force has been driven by younger and less-educated individuals. These demographic patterns differ from job-finding rates during typical economic expansions and imply both a cooling and a restructuring within the labor market.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfel/103594</guid>
<dc:creator>Chen, Ingrid; Kudlyak, Marianna; Mikhlin, Riva</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-08-03</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>6</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>job finding; unemployment rate; labor market health</dc:subject>
<bibo:volume>2026</bibo:volume>
<bibo:issue>20</bibo:issue>
<bibo:series>FRBSF Economic Letter</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Mortgage Lock-in: A Review of the Literature</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedawp/103593/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[This paper reviews the rapidly growing literature on mortgage lock-in and its effects on household mobility, labor reallocation, home sales, owner-occupied prices, and spillovers into rental and commercial markets. We then discuss two future research directions: (1) separately identifying lock-in effects from the direct effects of the existing interest rate on the mortgage, which have different implications for household behavior as market interest rates rise, and (2) assessing the general-equilibrium consequences of reduced mobility on labor markets and productivity. We close by discussing policy responses, including portability, broader assumability, and a Danish-style delivery option.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedawp/103593/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Gerardi, Kristopher; Qian, Franklin; Zhang, David Hao</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-08-03</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>26</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>mortgage lock-in; fixed-rate mortgage (FRM); household mobility; house prices; rents</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>2026-11</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.29338/wp2026-11</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>FRB Atlanta Working Paper</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Is Houston's decades-long growth spurt winding down?</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/feddse/103590</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Bill King, a fellow at Rice University’s Baker Institute who follows demographic trends, believes Houston’s sustained, rapid growth may be over. He discusses how the metro area may want to consider a future where new residents no longer strain public services.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/feddse/103590</guid>
<dc:creator>King, Bill</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-31</dc:date>
<dc:subject>Texas economy; Houston; demographics</dc:subject>
<bibo:series>Southwest Economy</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Statement from Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland president Beth Hammack regarding her vote at the Federal Open Market Committee's July 28–29 meeting</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedcsp/103592</link>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedcsp/103592</guid>
<dc:creator>Hammack, Beth</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-31</dc:date>
<bibo:series>Speech</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Structural Estimation with Unstructured Data</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/feddwp/103591/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Standard macroeconomic data do not cleanly separate the systematic and nonsystematic components of monetary policy. We show that incorporating unstructured text data into the structural estimation of a DSGE model can sharpen this distinction. We augment a standard state-space model with a non-core measurement block that links structural shocks to time series derived from FOMC transcripts, using a spike-and-slab prior to let the data select which series are informative. In a medium-scale New Keynesian model for the U.S., incorporating text improves predictive performance and materially alters structural inference: the new model estimates a lower response of the policy rate to inflation, higher price stickiness and lower price indexation, implying a flatter and less backward-looking price Phillips curve.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/feddwp/103591/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Casella, Sara; Fernández-Villaverde, Jesús; Hansen, Stephen; Oishi, Ryohei; Shin, Minchul</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-31</dc:date>
<dc:subject>unstructured data; text as data; DSGE models; spike-and-slab priors; monetary policy; Phillips curve; FOMC transcripts</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>2620</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.24149/wp2620</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Working Papers</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Measuring Macroeconomic Stars: A Framework with Scarring Effects</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedgfe/103589/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Potential output and the natural rate of unemployment are commonly estimated through trend-cycle decompositions, where they are identified as underlying trends reflecting slow-moving supply factors. In this paper, we extend this framework to accommodate the possibility that cyclical disturbances affect trends endogenously through "scarring" effects. Two major changes occur relative to standard specifications. First, a significant share of business-cycle fluctuations is absorbed by endogenous movements in the trends rather than shifts in the cycle. Second, the estimated cycle--relieved of explaining the persistence in real variables--tracks inflation developments more closely, including through a steeper Phillips curve. While this steeper slope implies a strong co-movement between inflation and real activity in response to cyclical shocks, such strong co-movement is rarely apparent in the data. Consequently, the estimation shows a shift toward more sizable changes in the purely supply-driven components of the trends, mirrored by smaller innovations in the cycle process. In turn, this rebalancing entails different historical paths for the activity gaps, carrying important implications for the conduct of monetary policy.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedgfe/103589/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Gonzalez-Astudillo, Manuel; Laforte, Jean-Philippe; Lepetit, Antoine</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-06-29</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>61 p.</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>potential output; natural rates; unobserved components model; Bayesian analysis; scarring</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>2026-054</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.17016/FEDS.2026.054</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Finance and Economics Discussion Series</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>How Firms Form Beliefs and the Implications for Inflation</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedgfe/103588/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Using survey data from U.S. firms, we study the primitive beliefs for pricesetting: firms’ forecasts of their own marginal costs. These forecasts are disconnected from CPI expectations, (over)react to current and past costs systematically, and underreact to aggregate shocks until costs move. We show that under empirically realistic cost beliefs the New Keynesian Phillips curve is steeper and less forward-looking. Supply shocks are more inflationary because they hit costs quickly. Demand shocks are less inflationary because firms fail to anticipate future wage pressure. Forward guidance weakens at long horizons but strengthens in the near term.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedgfe/103588/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Minton, Robert; Monnery, Hugo</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-31</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>83 p.</rdau:hasExtent>
<swpo:hasNumber>2026-053</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.17016/FEDS.2026.053</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Finance and Economics Discussion Series</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Credit Surfaces and Economic Uncertainty</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedgfe/103587/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[The Credit Surface along the leverage dimension gives the bond spread as a function of the loan-to-value ratio. Empirically, we show that uncertainty shocks typically increase spreads and steepen the credit surface, profoundly affecting the supply of credit. Theoretically, we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the convexity of the credit surface, and for changes in the anticipated distribution of collateral prices that lead to steepening of the credit surface. Finally, we show that the credit surface itself fully reveals the entire distribution of collateral prices, thus providing a new and vivid language with which to describe uncertainty and stochastic orders. Credit surface steepening itself is a new stochastic order that may better capture our intuitive notion of more uncertainty.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedgfe/103587/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Geanakoplos, John; Rappoport, David E.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-31</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>82 p.</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>credit surfaces; economic uncertainty; bond pricing; credit spreads; Black-Scholes-Merton model; leverage</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>2026-052</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.17016/FEDS.2026.052</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Finance and Economics Discussion Series</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Monetary Policy Stance and Commodity Cycles in Emerging Economies</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedgfn/103586</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Emerging market economies, particularly those that depend heavily on commodity exports, have long been characterized by more volatile and disruptive business-cycle dynamics than their advanced-economy counterparts. A large literature has studied the drivers of these fluctuations, including total factor productivity shocks, world interest rate shocks, and terms-of-trade disturbances.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedgfn/103586</guid>
<dc:creator>Monterroso, Oscar; Vilán, Diego</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-31</dc:date>
<swpo:hasNumber>2026-07-31</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.17016/2380-7172.4116</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>FEDS Notes</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>AI and Productivity: What Firms Are Saying on Earnings Calls</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/l00001/103585</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[The way firms discuss productivity improvements on earnings calls increasingly involves references to AI, even if its effects aren’t clear in aggregate data.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/l00001/103585</guid>
<dc:creator>Ozkan, Serdar; Kalyani, Aakash; Sullivan, Nicholas</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-31</dc:date>
<dc:subject>artificial intelligence (AI); earnings calls; productivity</dc:subject>
<ebucore:publicationChannel>On the Economy</ebucore:publicationChannel>
</item>
<item>
<title>Banking Analytics: Agricultural Lending by Community Banks Remained Strong in Q1</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/l00001/103584</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[The value of outstanding agricultural loans at U.S. community banks stood at $162.6 billion at the end of the first quarter of 2026, up 4.6% from a year ago.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/l00001/103584</guid>
<dc:creator>Williams, Krista</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-30</dc:date>
<dc:subject>agricultural lending</dc:subject>
<ebucore:publicationChannel>On the Economy</ebucore:publicationChannel>
</item>
<item>
<title>Stablecoins and (Non)Crypto Shocks: A 2026 Update</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednls/103583</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Stablecoins are digital assets whose value is pegged to that of a fiat currency, typically the U.S. dollar at a peg of $1.00 per token.  In a previous blog post, we described the rapid growth of stablecoins through early 2025, highlighted changes in stablecoins’ reserve-asset composition, and examined their reactions to Bitcoin price shocks. In this post, we document the growth of stablecoins since our last post. Then, we examine how shocks from outside the crypto industry can impact the composition of stablecoins’ reserve assets. For our case study, we use the 2023 failure of Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) and its impact on USD Coin (USDC, issued by Circle), the second-largest stablecoin by market capitalization.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednls/103583</guid>
<dc:creator>Anadu, Kenechukwu E.; Azar, Pablo D.; Baker, Sean; Cipriani, Marco; Eisenbach, Thomas M.; Landoni, Mattia; La Spada, Gabriele; Macchiavelli, Marco; Wang, J. Christina</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-31</dc:date>
<dc:subject>stablecoins; fintech; money-like assets; GENIUS Act</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>20260731</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.59576/lse.20260731</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Liberty Street Economics</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Do Actions Match Words? Reassessing the Taylor Rule in an Emerging-Market Context</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedbwp/103582/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Backward-looking Taylor rules, widely used to characterize central bank behavior, can misrepresent policy when central banks base decisions on forecasts. This mischaracterization affects the assessment of credibility, defined as alignment between a central bank’s words and actions. We examine this issue in the context of India’s adoption of flexible inflation targeting (FIT) in 2015. Text analysis shows that the Reserve Bank of India’s (RBI) communication became more inflation-focused and forward-looking after FIT adoption. Yet backward-looking Taylor rules show no robust increase in responsiveness to realized inflation, suggesting lack of credibility. This misalignment disappears when we analyze policy-relevant information through a forward-looking lens. Using the RBI’s real-time inflation and output forecasts, we find significant responsiveness to expected inflation post-FIT. Hybrid reaction functions show that post-FIT policy responds to both expected and realized inflation. The analogous evolution in communication and conduct points to the RBI’s credibility. More broadly, our results demonstrate that hybrid reaction functions may better characterize emerging-market central bank behavior than purely backward- or forward-looking specifications.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedbwp/103582/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Garga, Vaishali; Sengupta, Rajeswari</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-01</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>57</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>commitment; communication; credibility; emerging markets; forecasts; forward-looking; inflation targeting; monetary policy; Reserve Bank of India; Taylor rule</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>26-9</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.29412/res.wp.2026.09</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Working Papers</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>What Unemployment Insurance Claims Can — and Cannot — Tell Us</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedreb/103581</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Fewer people are losing their jobs: New claims for unemployment benefits are down, while the workforce covered by unemployment benefits has grown by 13 million since 2022.
People aren't leaving the benefit rolls faster: The weekly exit rate has been flat near 11.7 percent since early 2025 — which is a quarter below its 2022 level — and a typical insurance spell now runs 8.2 weeks versus 6.5 weeks in 2022.
The recent decline in continuing claims is not necessarily evidence of a recovering labor market. It is explained almost entirely by fewer arrivals, not faster exits. And the share of claimants leaving because they ran out of benefits (rather than because they found work) has more than doubled, from 3.3 percent of all exits in 2022 to 7.3 percent over the 12 months through June 2026.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedreb/103581</guid>
<dc:creator>Macaluso, Claudia</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-31</dc:date>
<dc:subject>employment and labor markets</dc:subject>
<bibo:volume>26</bibo:volume>
<bibo:issue>24</bibo:issue>
<bibo:series>Richmond Fed Economic Brief</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>AI Adoption Among Small Businesses: Qualitative Insights from the Small Business Credit Survey</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfcb/103580</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Nearly 40% of small business respondents to the 2024 Small Business Credit Survey (SBCS) reported either using or planning to use artificial intelligence (AI), revealing a rapidly evolving landscape of adoption among the nation’s smaller firms.

Sentiments around AI adoption ranged from enthusiasm to opposition. Reported applications of AI among small business respondents were just as varied, spanning both core operations and support functions. Common applications included:

-productivity tasks
-marketing, social media, and search engine optimization
-developing written communications
-visuals generation and graphic design
-customer service
-analytics and forecasting
-programming machines and sensors
-developing custom AI tools for specific business needs

The sophistication of these applications varied considerably, from basic task assistance to complex, integrated systems.

Many firms expressed interest in AI adoption but reported facing barriers, including policy and regulatory limitations, financial costs associated with appropriate tools, time and capacity constraints related to staff training and system upgrades, and knowledge gaps regarding implementation strategies. Other firms deliberately opted not to adopt AI, citing concerns about accuracy and intellectual property rights, the centrality of human interaction to their business model, or an absence of perceived applicability to their operations.

These findings from the 2024 SBCS’s initial qualitative inquiry into AI adoption establish a baseline understanding of how small businesses are experiencing this technological transformation and complement forthcoming analysis of the 2025 SBCS, which included a comprehensive supplemental survey module on AI adoption.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfcb/103580</guid>
<dc:creator>Sanchez-Moyano, Rocio; Holmes, Natalie; Simms, Sarah</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-15</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>19</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>artificial intelligence; small business credit; AI adoption</dc:subject>
<bibo:volume>2026</bibo:volume>
<bibo:issue>01</bibo:issue>
<identifiers:doi>10.24148/cdrb2026-01</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Community Development Research Brief</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>CRE Development Potential and the Selection of Opportunity Zones</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedcwq/103569/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Place-based policies are often caught between two potentially conflicting aims: (i) directing aid to needy communities and (ii) spurring investment. We study this tradeoff in the context of the Opportunity Zones (OZ) program. Leveraging unique phase-level microdata on commercial construction projects, we show that US state governors prioritized designating tracts where construction projects were already being planned. About two-thirds of the greater construction growth in OZs can be attributed to this selection. States prioritizing tracts with greater investment opportunities observed larger construction increases in designated tracts. We calibrate a structural model to quantify the effects of the program and examine counterfactuals under alternative preferences or eligibility criteria.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedcwq/103569/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Glancy, David P.; Kurtzman, Robert J.; Loewenstein, Lara</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-15</dc:date>
<swpo:hasNumber>26-17</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.26509/frbc-wp-202617</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Working Papers</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Inference Based on Scale, Label, and Economic Restrictions</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedpwp/103578/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[The results of nearly 100 prominent studies in empirical macroeconomics have been called into question by Baumeister and Hamilton (2018). We show that their concern about distributional asymmetry for a typical question of interest under a uniform prior with respect to the Haar measure is actually driven by an unacknowledged sign restriction. We also demonstrate that such a prior induces symmetric prior distributions over individual impulse responses conditional on the reduced-form parameters, or more generally when the prior over the reduced-form covariance matrix rules out correlation among the residuals, as in the typical implementation of the Minnesota prior. Furthermore, we provide a theory for avoiding the pitfalls of Baumeister and Hamilton’s critique. Key to our theory is a proposition establishing that any restriction can be decomposed into three types: scale, label, and economic. We use this theory to develop an algorithm for inference based on the unit modulus normalization that tackles a practical problem commonly faced by users of Bayesian SVAR methods.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedpwp/103578/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Arias, Jonas E.; Rubio-Ramirez, Juan F.; Waggoner, Daniel F.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-22</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>47</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>structural vector autoregressions; unit modulus normalization</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>26-36</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.21799/frbp.wp.2026.36</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Working Papers</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Is the US Economy K-Shaped? Evidence From the Past Three Decades</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedreb/103577</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[We examine whether the U.S. economy has exhibited "K-shaped" behavior — outcomes for low-income and high-income households moving in opposite directions — over the past three decades.
The U.S. economy has not been persistently K-shaped, though income growth showed K-shaped patterns during the recoveries from the 2001 and 2007-09 recessions.
Even though income growth has not always been K-shaped, growth rates have been substantially larger for high-income households than for low-income households over the 30-year period we examined.
Measured consumption growth has been less divergent than income growth across income groups. Consumption is K-shaped over the 2021-23 period even though income is not.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedreb/103577</guid>
<dc:creator>DeMaria, Kyle; Jones, John Bailey; Mengedoth, Joseph; Neelakantan, Urvi</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2025-07-15</dc:date>
<dc:subject>Business cycles; economic growth</dc:subject>
<bibo:volume>26</bibo:volume>
<bibo:issue>23</bibo:issue>
<bibo:series>Richmond Fed Economic Brief</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>How Have Fuel Prices Changed for Fifth District Consumers?</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/r00001/103576</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Recent supply shocks from the conflict in the Middle East have increased fuel prices across the United States and the Fifth District, but the impact is not uniform. Within the Fifth District, consumer gas prices have long been the highest in Washington, D.C., and the lowest in South Carolina. From June 2025 to May 2026, prices increased the most in Washington, D.C., and West Virginia.

Although prices decreased across the nation through June, these decreases affected states unevenly. For example, within states and jurisdictions, gas prices have differed. Prices increased more in metro areas in the Carolinas and Virginia than they did outside of metro areas. Depending on consumers' ability to change their fuel consumption, sustained fuel price increases can drive up household transportation costs.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/r00001/103576</guid>
<dc:creator>Pessin, Taylor</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-16</dc:date>
<dc:subject>household and consumer finance</dc:subject>
<bibo:series>Regional Matters</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Optimizing Retirement Financial Strategies: Integrating Annuities, Defined Contribution Plans, and Long-Term Care Costs</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedmoi/103575/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Nursing home costs in the United States now exceed $100,000 per year, and government assistance programs such as Medicaid help out only when retirees are largely destitute. Moreover, health shocks driving the need for such care can arise suddenly in old age, are frequently permanent in nature, and can be associated with declining mental and physical abilities. These facts raise the important question of how households can best prepare to finance this final phase of life. Building on past research, we determine how retirees should manage payouts from defined contribution plans to balance trade-offs between consumption and health care cost shocks, using both retirement plan assets and annuitization. Our analysis explicitly integrates the role of taxes, required minimum distributions, bequest motives, and the possibility of retiree insolvency. We conclude that payout annuities, especially deferred and variable annuities, can be quite valuable for retirees, even when they face health shocks in later life.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedmoi/103575/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Horneff, Vanya; Maurer, Raimond; Mitchell, Olivia S.; Odenbreit, Julius</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-17</dc:date>
<dc:subject>Retirement saving; Annuity; Nursing home costs; Medicaid; Health shocks</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>131</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.21034/iwp.131</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Opportunity and Inclusive Growth Institute Working Papers</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Manufacturing Employment Trends in the Fourth District</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/c00003/103574</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[In this District Data Brief, we use data from the Quarterly Workforce Indicators to examine changes in the number of manufacturing jobs and the characteristics of the manufacturing workforce across the Fourth District from 2002 through 2024.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/c00003/103574</guid>
<dc:creator>Barrow, Lisa; Whitbred, Kate</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-14</dc:date>
<identifiers:doi>10.26509/frbc-ddb-20260714</identifiers:doi>
<ebucore:publicationChannel>
</ebucore:publicationChannel>
</item>
<item>
<title>SORCE Insights: Tracking Operating Margins in the Fourth District</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/c00003/103573</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[The Cleveland Fed's Survey of Regional Conditions and Expectations (SORCE) fielded from June 18 through June 25, 2026, included a set of special questions focused on firms' operating margins. This District Data Brief discusses the top-line results from these questions.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/c00003/103573</guid>
<dc:creator>Huettner, Brett</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-15</dc:date>
<identifiers:doi>10.26509/frbc-ddb-20260715</identifiers:doi>
<ebucore:publicationChannel>
</ebucore:publicationChannel>
</item>
<item>
<title>Earnings Gaps in the Aftermath of COVID-19</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedcec/103572</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[This Economic Commentary examines differences between the earnings of white men and those of Black and Hispanic men before and after the COVID-19 pandemic. Following larger initial employment losses for Black and Hispanic men, after the pandemic this group experienced a narrower earnings gap relative to white men, bringing the median log hourly earnings gap to its lowest level of the twenty-first century. The analysis shows that this narrowing extends across both the earnings distribution and occupation groups and is not driven by changes in workforce age or education composition. The evidence indicates that the post-pandemic narrowing reflects broad-based relative changes in earnings rather than effects confined to lower-earning workers or to economy-wide earnings compression alone.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedcec/103572</guid>
<dc:creator>Dicandia, Vittoria</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-13</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>12</rdau:hasExtent>
<bibo:volume>2026</bibo:volume>
<bibo:issue>15</bibo:issue>
<identifiers:doi>10.26509/frbc-ec-202615</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Economic Commentary</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Macroeconomic Parameter Instability in Auto Loan Loss Models</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedcwq/103571/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[We estimate a discrete-time Markov transition model of auto loan performance over the 2000-2025 period using multinomial logistic regressions. Using rolling pseudo out-of-sample forecasts, we document persistent declines in the sensitivity of the probability of default to an unemployment shock in both the global financial crisis and Covid recessions. The estimated effect of a 1 percentage point increase in unemployment on default risk declined from 16 percent in 2006 to 3 percent post-2020. Two-year cumulative default forecasts over 2020-2021 using pre-pandemic parameters overstate actual defaults by 100 basis points (25 percent), with forecast errors largest in absolute terms for subprime borrowers and largest in relative terms for prime borrowers. The instability persists after controlling for forbearance usage and pandemic-period dummy variables, and is driven primarily by changes in macroeconomic relationships rather than borrower composition. These findings have implications for stress testing models and loss forecasting practices that rely on stable unemployment-default relationships.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedcwq/103571/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Fritsch, Nicholas; Prescott, Edward Simpson</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-16</dc:date>
<swpo:hasNumber>26-18</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.26509/frbc-wp-202618</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Working Papers</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Do You Even Crypto, Bro? Cryptocurrencies in Household Finance</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedcwq/103570/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Using repeated large-scale surveys of US households, we study the cryptocurrency investment decisions and motives of households relative to other financial assets. Cryptocurrency holders tend to be young, male, and more libertarian relative to non-crypto holders. Crypto holders expect much higher rates of return for crypto and perceive it as relatively safer than non-holders do. For those holding cryptocurrencies, changes in Bitcoin prices translate into their purchases of durable goods. Finally, information about historical returns of cryptocurrencies in an information provision experiment embedded in the survey leads individuals to increase their desired crypto holdings and increases their actual cryptocurrency purchases subsequently. We compare these views and behaviors to those of households toward other financial assets and argue that cryptocurrency is unique in many of these respects.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedcwq/103570/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Weber, Michael; Candia, Bernardo; Coibion, Olivier; Gorodnichenko, Yuriy</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-14</dc:date>
<swpo:hasNumber>26-16</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.26509/frbc-wp-202616</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Working Papers</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Measuring Overtime Exemption Status: A Task-Based Approach</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedcwq/103568/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[This paper introduces new measures of the overtime exemption status of individual tasks measured by O*NET. Task-based measures reveal that about 60 percent of salaried workers are in occupations in which either all or no O*NET tasks are exempt. While workers with higher earnings tend to be employed in occupations in which a larger share of tasks are exempt, there is substantial variation in exempt task shares across occupations at all levels of earnings. The task content of job ads shows a similar pattern. Incorporating task-based exemption measures into extensions of prior work reveals that workers in high-exemption occupations were more likely to transition out of salaried jobs affected by changes to state overtime rules, and managerial jobs just above the federal salary level test threshold have exempt task content similar to those just below it.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedcwq/103568/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Rinz, Kevin</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-13</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>45</rdau:hasExtent>
<swpo:hasNumber>26-15</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.26509/frbc-wp-202615</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Working Papers</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Remarks on inflation, employment and monetary policy</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/feddsp/103566</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Dallas Fed President Lorie Logan shares her views on the economy and monetary policy outlook. She delivered these remarks prior to a moderated conversation at the Dallas Fed's Houston Branch.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/feddsp/103566</guid>
<dc:creator>Logan, Lorie</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-16</dc:date>
<bibo:series>Speeches and Essays</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Rig count no longer a reliable bellwether for risk in oil and gas services lending</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/d00067/103565</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[For decades, commercial lenders relied on a simple rule when evaluating credit risk in oil and gas support services: follow the U.S. rig count. But a portfolio classification of oil and gas support services now encompasses businesses with radically different risk profiles.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/d00067/103565</guid>
<dc:creator>Byun, SungJe; Gonzalez, Mario A.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-16</dc:date>
<dc:subject>banking and finance; energy</dc:subject>
<ebucore:publicationChannel>Dallas Fed Banking</ebucore:publicationChannel>
</item>
<item>
<title>Tokenized deposits use blockchain structure in traditional banking framework</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/d00001/103564</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Commercial banks have begun exploring adoption of tokenized deposits, traditional deposits that rely on blockchain technology and allow payments to settle almost instantaneously.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/d00001/103564</guid>
<dc:creator>Dunbar, Seth; Sagnanert, Pon; Saretto, Alessio; Venkatu, Guhan</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-14</dc:date>
<ebucore:publicationChannel>Dallas Fed Economics</ebucore:publicationChannel>
</item>
<item>
<title>Oil Prices and Container Shipping Costs</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/l00001/103563</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Oil-price shocks are also fuel- and shipping-cost shocks, but their effect can vary depending on a container ship’s age, size and how long it spends at sea.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/l00001/103563</guid>
<dc:creator>Leibovici, Fernando; Chinagorom-Abiakalam, Dawn</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-17</dc:date>
<dc:subject>oil prices; oil shocks; shipping costs; container ships</dc:subject>
<ebucore:publicationChannel>On the Economy</ebucore:publicationChannel>
</item>
<item>
<title>Transmission Growth-at-Risk: How Foreign Financial Vulnerabilities Shape U.S. Growth Prospects</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedgif/103562/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[We develop a Transmission Growth-at-Risk (TGaR) framework that incorporates foreign financial vulnerabilities as predictors of U.S. downside growth risk. We distinguish financial conditions, which measure current tightness in credit markets, from financial vulnerabilities, which measure structural fragilities that can amplify shocks. Elevated foreign financial vulnerabilities are associated with lower U.S. growth-at-risk, with transmission through both trade linkages and dollar integration channels. Asset valuation pressures and financial sector leverage abroad have the largest estimated amplification effects. Financial conditions primarily affect near-term tail risk, while foreign vulnerabilities weigh on U.S. GDP at a medium-term horizon. Out of sample, adding foreign vulnerabilities raises the predictive score by 53 percent at the 8-quarter horizon. Crisis-episode evidence points to the same interpretation. These findings show that monitoring foreign financial vulnerabilities is important for gauging U.S. growth prospects.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedgif/103562/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Ma, Sai; Stebunovs, Viktors; Temesvary, Judit</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-17</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>55 p.</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>growth-at-risk; financial vulnerabilities; international transmission; risk assessment</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>1442</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.17016/IFDP.2026.1442</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>International Finance Discussion Papers</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Hidden Leverage in Nonfinancial Corporations</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedgif/103561/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[A substantial portion of corporate debt remains hidden from balance sheets. I document two forms of off-balance-sheet leverage in nonfinancial corporations: operating leases (pre-2019) and intraperiod borrowing—short-term debt issued and repaid within reporting periods, which I am the first to study in nonfinancial firms. Approximately 29 percent of publicly traded firms used substantial operating leases and 12 percent show evidence of substantial intra-period borrowing, with a disproportionate subset using both types of hidden debt. Firms using substantial hidden leverage are generally smaller, more reliant on short-term funding, are less monitored by sophisticated market participants, and report lower leverage, suggesting they use off-balance-sheet debt to project false leverage profiles. When accounting changes in 2019 revealed substantial operating leases, affected firms subsequently cut capital expenditures by 25 percent and R&D by 14 percent, faced heightened risks of executive turnover and stakeholder scrutiny, and experienced more frequent accounting problems. Critically, revelation of substantial operating leases caused these exposed firms to curtail their intra-period borrowing and to raise their reported non-lease leverage.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedgif/103561/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Kallen, Cody</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-16</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>48 p.</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>off-balance-sheet; lease financing; capital structure; disclosure of off-balance-sheet financing</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>1441</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.17016/IFDP.2026.1441</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>International Finance Discussion Papers</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>The Last Taxi: LCR Buffers and Bank Liquidity Provision</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedgfe/103560/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[This paper examines whether regulatory liquidity buffers enable banks to support corporate borrowers during financial stress. Using confidential bank-firm credit data and handcollected Liquidity Coverage Ratio regulation (LCR) disclosures during COVID-19, we find that banks with higher LCR buffers above the regulatory minimum provided significantly more credit to firms with large undrawn credit lines in March 2020. Critically, only buffers, not overall LCR levels, matter, revealing that the regulatory minimum operates as a binding constraint during stress. The effect is concentrated among high-quality borrowers with clean credit profiles and disappears by mid-2020, confirming that LCR buffers provide selective, temporary liquidity insurance during acute stress.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedgfe/103560/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Darst, Matt; Gurrieri, Lucia; Lubis, Arazi; Vardoulakis, Alexandros</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-17</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>28 p.</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>liquidity regulation; credit lines; bank lending; financial crises; regulatory buffers</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>2026-051</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.17016/FEDS.2026.051</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Finance and Economics Discussion Series</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Demand Shocks and Endogenous Uncertainty</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedgfe/103559/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[This study examines how fluctuations in firm-level uncertainty arise over the business cycle and how they influence aggregate economic activity. To do so, it develops a general equilibrium incomplete-markets model in which heterogeneous, risk-averse firms face idiosyncratic demand uncertainty and aggregate shocks to consumer credit conditions. A change in aggregate credit affects not only the expected level of firm demand, but also the cross-sectional dispersion of sales per worker by shifting the probability that firms operate at capacity. Thus, first-moment shocks give rise to endogenous second-moment effects. The model is disciplined using U.S. Compustat data on firm sales and employment and proprietary customer traffic data. The calibrated economy reproduces key cross-sectional moments and business-cycle comovements, including countercyclical dispersion in firm outcomes. Quantitatively, endogenous uncertainty accounts for roughly one quarter of the output response and one third of the employment response to aggregate credit shocks. The results suggest that uncertainty is not only an independent source of aggregate fluctuations, but also an endogenous propagation mechanism through which changes in demand conditions amplify business cycles.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedgfe/103559/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Vilán, Diego</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-16</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>62 p.</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>uncertainty; heterogeneous firms; cross-sectional firm dynamics</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>2026-050</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.17016/FEDS.2026.050</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Finance and Economics Discussion Series</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>The AI Buildout and the Economy: Publicly Available Data to Assess AI's Impact</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedgfn/103558</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[This note presents publicly available indicators that can help researchers and policymakers track the evolution of the generative AI buildout and its potential impact on the economy on a timely basis. We organize the indicators into three categories: capabilities and costs; firm investment and adoption; and productivity and labor.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedgfn/103558</guid>
<dc:creator>Soto, Paul E.; Thieu, Mason; Allen, Jeffrey S.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-17</dc:date>
<swpo:hasNumber>2026-07-17-2</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.17016/2380-7172.4119</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>FEDS Notes</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Vietnam's Export Boom to the U.S.: The Role of Chinese Firms</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedgfn/103556</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[In recent years, Vietnam has attracted considerable attention as a potential major beneficiary of the 2018-19 U.S.-China tariff increases, reflecting substantial trade diversion as exports shifted away from China (Alfaro and Chor, 2023; Freund et al., 2024). As shown in the left panel of Figure 1, U.S. imports from China declined sharply after the 2018-19 tariffs, while imports from Vietnam tripled by 2025.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedgfn/103556</guid>
<dc:creator>Hoang, Trang T.; Van Leemput, Eva; Avalos, Chris A.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-17</dc:date>
<swpo:hasNumber>2026-07-17-1</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.17016/2380-7172.4117</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>FEDS Notes</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Fifth Conference on the International Roles of the U.S. Dollar: Stablecoins, Digital Payments, and the International Role of the U.S. Dollar</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedgfn/103555</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[The U.S. dollar continues to occupy a central role in the global economy. It remains the most widely used currency in foreign exchange transactions and cross-border payments, the leading currency in official reserve holdings, and the dominant currency of denomination for international debt securities and loans. This dominant position reflects several enduring features of the U.S. economy and financial system, including the size and strength of U.S. economy, the depth and liquidity of U.S. financial markets, and enduring confidence in U.S. institutions.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedgfn/103555</guid>
<dc:creator>Correa, Ricardo; Goldberg, Linda S.; Keerati, Ritt; Londono, Juan M.; Ravazzolo, Fabiola</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-16</dc:date>
<swpo:hasNumber>2026-07-16</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.17016/2380-7172.4140</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>FEDS Notes</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Technology Shocks, the AI Boom, and the U.S. Current Account</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedgfn/103554</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[The current artificial intelligence (AI) investment boom in the United States provides a powerful boost to imports of high-technology capital goods. The AI buildout bears the hallmarks of an investment-specific technology shock—a process in which rapid technological progress makes each new generation of capital equipment significantly cheaper and more powerful than the last, but where reaping those efficiency gains requires continuous and substantial investment to acquire and deploy the new vintage of capital goods.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedgfn/103554</guid>
<dc:creator>Fiori, Giuseppe; Lipa, Colleen; Nuenninghoff, Erik</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-14</dc:date>
<swpo:hasNumber>2026-07-14</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.17016/2380-7172.4106</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>FEDS Notes</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Long-Run Intergenerational Effects of Social Security</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedawp/103553/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Both historically and today, support of aging parents has largely taken the form of in-kind transfers that require physical proximity, such as housing and caregiving. If Social Security substitutes for such support, it can relax constraints on where recipients' children live and work. We investigate the long-run intergenerational effects of the early Social Security program, exploiting within-occupation, cross-industry differences in coverage, and a new dataset linking parents to their children's later-life outcomes. We find that sons whose parents had greater predicted coverage moved farther from their childhood homes, earned more, and lived in better neighborhoods late in life. We find no such effects for daughters, who tended to provide forms of support less easily replaced by Social Security. The gains considerably exceeded the associated Social Security benefits for the average family, with migration to better-matched labor markets a likely key driver. We propose that the early program enabled families to realize gains from migration that were back-loaded, uncertain, and difficult to contract on.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedawp/103553/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Fetter, Daniel; Lockwood, Lee; Mohnen, Paul</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-16</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>117</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>Social Security; social insurance; old-age support; intergenerational transfers; coresidence; geographic mobility; internal migration; intergenerational mobility; linked census data; New Deal; public pensions</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>2026-10</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.29338/wp2026-10</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>FRB Atlanta Working Paper</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Attention-Dependent Monetary Transmission to Household Beliefs</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedawp/103552/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[The expectations channel of monetary policy is state dependent because households endogenously adjust attention to macroeconomic conditions. We develop a behavioral framework in which attention trades off forecast accuracy against cognitive cost, so monetary policy operates through an expectations multiplier. Using the Michigan Survey, we proxy attentiveness from whether households’ reading of business conditions matches realized outcomes, measured before identified policy shocks arrive. Policy news moves inflation beliefs primarily among attentive households, especially those with greater economic exposure; others barely respond. In the aggregate, pass-through scales with attentiveness and strengthens in recessions and high-uncertainty periods, making monetary transmission nonlinear.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedawp/103552/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Jeong, Jaemin; Ma, Eunseong; Yang, Choongryul</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-14</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>84</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>inflation expectations; monetary policy transmission; rational inattention; state dependence; expectations multipliers</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>2026-9</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.29338/wp2026-09</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>FRB Atlanta Working Paper</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Rethinking Central Bank LSAPs: The Power of Market Functioning Purchases</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedkrw/103551/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[We show that operationally similar central bank asset purchases can have markedly different effects. Combining security-level data on the Federal Reserve’s duration-adjusted asset holdings with narrative event-based identification reveals that purchases made for accommodation strongly affect yields, while purchases made for market functioning primarily enhance liquidity. We advance a partial equilibrium model of an intermediated bond market that can reconcile these findings. When trading flow is orderly, large-scale asset purchases (LSAPs) operate through the expected supply of duration with large effects on yields. When trading flow is disorderly, LSAPs reduce dealer inventories, improve liquidity, and compress bid-ask spreads.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedkrw/103551/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Smith, Andrew Lee; Valcarcel, Victor J.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-17</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>44</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>monetary policy; balance sheet policy; SOMA; quantitative easing; primary dealers; market making; narrative restrictions; structural VAR; liquidity; intermediation</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>RWP 26-05</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.18651/RWP2026-05</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Research Working Paper</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Prices and Monetary Policy: The Role of Financial Constraints</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfwp/103550/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Firm heterogeneity in financial constraints is a quantitatively important driver of how monetary policy transmits to inflation. Using detailed microdata on Swedish public and private firms, and high-frequency monetary policy surprises around Riksbank announcements, we document that smaller, financially constrained firms adjust prices significantly less than larger firms in response to changes in monetary policy. This heterogeneous price response materially dampens the aggregate PPI inflation response to monetary policy. Models of customer markets and financial frictions can explain our findings: because the external finance premium rises after a monetary contraction, constrained firms cut prices less to preserve cash flows, sacrificing future market share. Additional evidence on heterogeneous sales, debt, marginal cost, and markup responses further supports this channel. We consider several alternative explanations, including differences in price adjustments, working capital, market share, and export share, but these cannot rationalize our main heterogeneity result.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfwp/103550/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Bauer, Michael D.; Czarnota, Alexander; Klein, Mathias</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-17</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>58</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>prices; monetary policy; financial constraints; firm heterogeneity</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>2026-13</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.24148/wp2026-13</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Working Paper Series</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Recency Effects in Perceived Uncertainty</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfwp/103549/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Firms frequently revise not only their expectations, but also how uncertain they feel about those expectations. Using the U.S. Survey of Business Uncertainty, we study perceived uncertainty about firms’ own sales and employment growth. Reported uncertainty rises after larger revisions to firms’ point forecasts, with the strongest response to the most recent revision. This recency pattern remains visible outside elevated sectoral-volatility episodes. We develop a model in which agents learn about a constant-volatility process but recall older observations noisily. Noisy recall gives recent surprises disproportionate influence, even when objective volatility is constant.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfwp/103549/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Acosta, Miguel; Sung, Yeji</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-10</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>50</rdau:hasExtent>
<swpo:hasNumber>2026-12</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.24148/wp2026-12</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Working Paper Series</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Navigating Economic Shocks: A Monetary Policymaker’s Perspective: A speech at  the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, Stanford University, Stanford, California., July 16, 2026</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedgsq/103548</link>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedgsq/103548</guid>
<dc:creator>Jefferson, Philip N.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-16</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>23</rdau:hasExtent>
<bibo:series>Speech</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Nonbank Subsidiaries and the Hidden Fragility of Internal Capital Markets Reallocation</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednls/103547</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Banks became safer after Basel III. Whether it made the broader organization safer is less clear. We document that bank subsidiaries accumulated capital, improved asset quality, and reduced risk. But holding companies built that capital largely by drawing on their nonbank affiliates. Did the reallocation reduce risk for the organization as a whole or merely move it to a less visible part of the firm? Our evidence points to the latter: the same internal capital markets that helped banks meet tighter requirements left nonbank affiliates with thinner buffers and riskier business models, and a greater capacity to transmit distress back to the organizations that own them.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednls/103547</guid>
<dc:creator>Cetorelli, Nicola; Kundu, Shohini</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-17</dc:date>
<dc:subject>banks; nonbanks; bank holding companies (BHCs); regulation; arbitrage; boundaries of the firm</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>20260717</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.59576/lse.20260717</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Liberty Street Economics</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Capitalizing on Nonbanks: Regulatory Arbitrage Within Bank Holding Companies</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednls/103533</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[When economists and policymakers talk about nonbank finance, they usually have in mind activity that takes place outside the banking system in institutions that compete with banks for the provision of financial intermediation services, such as fintech lenders, money market funds, private credit vehicles, insurers, and broker-dealers. A substantial share of U.S. nonbank financial activity, however, takes place inside bank holding companies (BHCs), conducted by nonbank subsidiaries that operate alongside regulated commercial banks under common ownership and integrated management. In this first post of our three-part series, we document the scale of nonbank activity within BHCs and describe the balance-sheet features that, as the remainder of the series shows, make these subsidiaries a vehicle for regulatory arbitrage.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednls/103533</guid>
<dc:creator>Kundu, Shohini; Cetorelli, Nicola</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-15</dc:date>
<dc:subject>banks; nonbanks; bank holding companies (BHCs); regulation; arbitrage; boundaries of the firm</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>20260715</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.59576/lse.20260715</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Liberty Street Economics</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>How Basel III Changes Where Capital Sits: Nonbank Subsidiaries as Equity Reservoirs</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednls/103545</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[When Basel III’s binding capital minimums took effect for U.S. banks in January 2015, a bank holding company (BHC) whose depository subsidiary fell short of the new standards had two options. It could raise fresh equity in external markets, a costly option. Or, if it owned equity-rich nonbank affiliates, it could simply move capital from one subsidiary to another. The second route satisfies the regulator, avoids issuance costs, and leaves consolidated equity exactly where it was. In this second post of our series, we show that this is precisely what organizationally complex BHCs did in response to higher capital requirements.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednls/103545</guid>
<dc:creator>Cetorelli, Nicola; Kundu, Shohini</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-16</dc:date>
<dc:subject>banks; nonbanks; bank holding companies (BHCs); regulation; arbitrage; boundaries of the firm</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>20260716</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.59576/lse.20260716</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Liberty Street Economics</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Bank Runs With and Without Bank Failure</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednsr/103544</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[We study the causes and consequences of bank runs. By applying large language models to historical newspapers, we create a comprehensive database of bank runs in U.S. history with information on 3,984 runs on individual banks from 1863 to 1934. Our novel data allow us to establish that runs are considerably more likely in weak banks but also occur in strong banks, especially in response to negative news about the real economy or the broader banking system. However, runs typically only result in failure for banks with poor fundamentals. Strong banks survive runs through various mechanisms, including signaling strength, interbank cooperation, and temporary suspension. At the local level, runs on banks with poor fundamentals translate into substantially larger declines in deposits, lending, and manufacturing activity than runs on strong banks. Our findings imply that poor fundamentals are central to explaining both when runs occur and when they have severe economic effects, tempering the view that small shocks can generate discontinuous jumps to bad equilibria through self-fulfilling run dynamics.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednsr/103544</guid>
<dc:creator>Correia, Sergio A.; Luck, Stephan; Verner, Emil</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-01</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>143</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>bank runs; bank failures; banking crises; financial stability; financial history; artificial intelligence (AI)</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>1198</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.59576/sr.1198</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Staff Reports</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Welcoming Remarks and Introduction of Guest Lecturer Jason Furman</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedlps/103543</link>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedlps/103543</guid>
<dc:creator>Musalem, Alberto G.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-15</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>2 pages</rdau:hasExtent>
<bibo:series>Speech</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>New Survey Findings on AI Adoption and Its Effects on Employment and Productivity</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/l00001/103542</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Survey data show how firms across the Fed’s Eighth District are using AI to boost efficiency and expand capacity—plus what’s holding back nonadopters.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/l00001/103542</guid>
<dc:creator>Gutkowski, Violeta A.; Gascon, Charles S.; Silvanus, Rehann</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-16</dc:date>
<dc:subject>survey data; technology adoption; artificial intelligence (AI); Federal Reserve District, 8th</dc:subject>
<ebucore:publicationChannel>On the Economy</ebucore:publicationChannel>
</item>
<item>
<title>Between Headline and Core: Inflation Excluding Energy Goods</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/l00001/103541</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Economists often use price indexes that exclude food and energy prices in order to get a better sense of underlying inflation. This blog post looks at an alternative measure.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/l00001/103541</guid>
<dc:creator>Martin, Fernando M.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-15</dc:date>
<dc:subject>headline inflation; price indexes; personal consumption expenditures (PCE); core inflation</dc:subject>
<ebucore:publicationChannel>On the Economy</ebucore:publicationChannel>
</item>
<item>
<title>Economic Outlook: A speech at The Exchequer Club of Washington D.C., Washington, D.C., July 15, 2026</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedgsq/103540</link>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedgsq/103540</guid>
<dc:creator>Cook, Lisa D.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-15</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>8</rdau:hasExtent>
<bibo:series>Speech</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Responsible Innovation and Financial Inclusion: A speech at Next-Gen Financial Inclusion,” the third annual Financial Inclusion Conference hosted by the Federal Reserve Board, Washington, D.C. (via pre-recorded video)., July 14, 2026</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedgsq/103539</link>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedgsq/103539</guid>
<dc:creator>Bowman, Michelle W.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-14</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>5</rdau:hasExtent>
<bibo:series>Speech</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Will Artificial Intelligence Broadly Raise Living Standards or Drive Income and Wealth Inequality?., A speech at Next-Gen Financial Inclusion,” the third annual Financial Inclusion Conference hosted by the Federal Reserve Board., July 14, 2026</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedgsq/103538</link>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedgsq/103538</guid>
<dc:creator>Barr, Michael S.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-14</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>13</rdau:hasExtent>
<bibo:series>Speech</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress: A speech at Before the Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives., July 14, 2026</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedgsq/103537</link>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedgsq/103537</guid>
<dc:creator>Warsh, Kevin M.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-14</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>6</rdau:hasExtent>
<bibo:series>Speech</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Monetary Policy at a Crossroads: A speech at the New York Association for Business Economics, New York, New York., July 13, 2026</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedgsq/103536</link>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedgsq/103536</guid>
<dc:creator>Waller, Christopher J.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-13</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>11</rdau:hasExtent>
<bibo:series>Speech</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Stability of Thy Times</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednsp/103535</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Remarks at the Partnership for New York City, New York, New York.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednsp/103535</guid>
<dc:creator>Williams, John C.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-15</dc:date>
<dc:subject>inflation; stability; resilience; monetary policy; labor market; artificial intelligence (AI); technology</dc:subject>
<bibo:series>Speech</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Are U.S. Consumers Ready to Use Pay-by-Bank at the Point of Sale?</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedkpb/103534</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Pay-by-Bank, a direct transfer from individuals’ bank accounts to merchants’, is gaining popularity as a point-of-sale payment method in countries around the world. Although Pay-by-Bank has yet to become available at points of sale in the United States, data suggest that U.S. consumers are increasingly ready to use this method.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedkpb/103534</guid>
<dc:creator>Toh, Ying Lei</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-15</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>5</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>account-to-account (A2A) transfers; payment methods; tap-and-pay; point-of-sale payments</dc:subject>
<bibo:series>Payments System Research Briefing</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>The Dynamics of Ample Reserves</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedpwp/103530/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[How monetary policy is implemented can have significant implications for the dynamics of the central bank’s balance sheet. If liquid deposits increase the demand for reserves (Lopez-Salido and Vissing-Jorgensen 2025), then the “ample” level of reserves needed to close the spread between the policy rate and interest on reserves is itself a function of liquid deposits. The supply of reserves will continue to normalize after first reaching ample levels and until liquid deposits return to trend as well. Furthermore, if the supply of reserves encourages deposit creation (Acharya et al. 2024), then a feedback loop arises that can amplify the persistence of elevated deposits and even lead to explosive dynamics. An off-the-shelf calibration exercise finds that even modest amounts of intrinsic deposit persistence could trigger explosive dynamics. Attenuating the response of ample reserves to deposits removes the risk of instability at a modest cost in terms of rate deviations. Simulations with stable roots show that reserves first reach ample earlier and at a higher level than expected by the demand of reserves alone. However, the supply of reserves may decrease further thereafter, at least relative to trend, as liquid deposits remain elevated in the transition period.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedpwp/103530/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Armenter, Roc</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-15</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>18</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>monetary policy; liquid deposits; ample reserves; policy rate</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>26-34</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.21799/frbp.wp.2026.34</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Working Papers</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>The Baby Bust: How Economics Can Explain Demographic Changes</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedlpo/103529</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Learn how economic forces and opportunity costs help explain declining birth rates in wealthy nations.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedlpo/103529</guid>
<dc:creator>Kaiman, Mike; Vandenbroucke, Guillaume</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-10</dc:date>
<dc:subject>birth rates; productivity; opportunity cost; per capita income</dc:subject>
<bibo:series>Page One Economics Newsletter</bibo:series>
</item>
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