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<title>Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco publications</title>
<description>Economic research and commentary from Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco</description>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/search?facets[]=provider_literal_array:Federal+Reserve+Bank+of+San+Francisco</link>
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<pubDate>Mon, 11 May 2026 11:39:01 +0000</pubDate>
<item>
<title>What Do Financial Officers Predict for Price Growth?</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfel/103117</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Survey responses from chief financial officers and other financial decisionmakers yield a new measure of inflation expectations. Rather than asking about expectations for overall inflation, this survey asks about expected price growth at each respondent’s business. Aggregating survey responses provides an economy-wide indicator that tracks well with actual core consumer price index inflation. Survey responses collected before and during the recent oil shock imply that core inflation could remain elevated this year if the historical relationship between financial officer expectations and realized core inflation persist.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfel/103117</guid>
<dc:creator>Singh, Sanjay R.; Fried, Stephie; Graf, Tobin; Malhotra, Simar</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-05-04</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>6</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>inflation; consumer price index; inflation expectations</dc:subject>
<bibo:volume>2026</bibo:volume>
<bibo:issue>11</bibo:issue>
<bibo:series>FRBSF Economic Letter</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Measuring Inflation Shock Momentum</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfwp/103112/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[We develop a non-parametric filter that identifies sustained directional runs in shocks to monthly inflation—a concept we define as “inflation shock momentum.” By assessing the shocks to over 100 disaggregated Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) inflation categories, we isolate the share of categories experiencing positive or negative inflation shock momentum in a given month. We define the “Inflation Shock Momentum” (ISM) index as the net positive momentum share of expenditure-weighted categories (positive minus negative) in a given month. We show that the ISM index helps to forecast aggregate PCE inflation at horizons of 1 to 3 years, even after controlling for a variety of other inflation predictor variables. The ISM index is particularly useful in capturing emerging disinflationary pressure and can be used to help forecast future inflation movements in real time.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfwp/103112/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Shapiro, Adam Hale; Lansing, Kevin J.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-04-30</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>41</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>PCE Inflation; Non-parametric filter; Forecasting</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>2026-10</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.24148/wp2026-10</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Working Paper Series</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Stabilization vs. Growth</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfwp/103111/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Should firms in financial distress be saved to stabilize an economy, even if less productive ones are kept alive, possibly reducing economic growth? To assess this fundamental stabilization-vs. growth trade-off, we develop a new dynamic general equilibrium model with business cycles, endogenous growth, and innovation externalities. We discipline key parameters using microeconomic data and an instrumental-variable approach that links firm productivity growth to R&D expenditure. Based on the calibrated model, we find that economies that save distressed firms with credit guarantees, debt restructuring, or loan evergreening experience lower volatility but also slower growth. Even though welfare is higher in an economy without such interventions, the various “soft credit” regimes can still arise as equilibrium outcomes when a benevolent government intervenes in credit markets under discretion.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfwp/103111/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Sanchez, Juan M.; Faria-e-Castro, Miguel; Paul, Pascal</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-04-29</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>71</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>business cycles; endogenous growth; financial frictions</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>2026-09</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.24148/wp2026-09</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Working Paper Series</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Investing in a Durable Economic Future</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfsp/103110</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Speech to the Anchorage Economic Summit, Anchorage, Alaska, August 6, 2025, 12:10 p.m. AKT, by Mary C. Daly, President and Chief Executive Officer, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfsp/103110</guid>
<dc:creator>Daly, Mary C.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-08-06</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>6</rdau:hasExtent>
<bibo:series>Speech</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Regionalism at the Federal Reserve: Many Voices, One Purpose</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfsp/103063</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Speech to the St. George Area Chamber of Commerce, St. George, Utah, April 8, 2026, 11:00 a.m. PT, by Mary C. Daly, President and Chief Executive Officer, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfsp/103063</guid>
<dc:creator>Daly, Mary C.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-04-08</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>8</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>Federal Reserve; regional banks</dc:subject>
<bibo:series>Speech</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>From Volcker to the Pandemic Era: History Dependent Anchoring of Short-Run Expected Inflation</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfwp/103061/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[We develop an endogenous measure of anchoring for short-run expected inflation in a New Keynesian model with full-information rational expectations. Specifically, we allow the fraction of non-reoptimizing firms that index prices to the inflation target, rather than lagged inflation, to depend on observed inflation persistence. The model with endogenous indexation generates a scatter plot of persistence and volatility measures for inflation that approximates the convex pattern observed in quarterly U.S. data. With endogenous indexation, the equilibrium anchoring measure exhibits history dependence. To illustrate this idea, we perform a series of disinflation simulations where the model inflation target declines to 2% at different speeds, starting from around 8% in 1980.Q1. The Volcker disinflation simulation exactly replicates the U.S. data using the model-implied anchoring measure and model-implied shock sequences. We show that a slower disinflation mitigates output losses but results in a weaker anchoring measure over subsequent decades. The Volcker disinflation produces a more severe recession in 1982 but leads to a stronger anchoring measure that renders inflation more resilient to subsequent shocks, such as those that arrive during the Great Recession and the pandemic era.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfwp/103061/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Jørgensen, Peter Lihn; Lansing, Kevin J.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-04-08</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>43</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>anchored inflation expectations; Philips curve; Endogenous indexation; Great Recession; Pandemic era; History dependence.</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>2026-08</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.24148/wp2026-08</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Working Paper Series</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Real Effects of Nominal Interest Rates</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfwp/103060/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Nominal interest rates have real effects. Residential mortgages and other real world debt contracts require a sequence of constant nominal payments. Combined with payment-to-income constraints, these nominal payments force borrowers to take on less debt when nominal interest rates rise, regardless of the behavior of the real interest rate. Survey data shows that conditional on the real rate, higher nominal mortgage interest rates reduce home buying sentiment. And increases in nominal mortgage rates reduce mortgage origination more in cities where payment to-income constraints are more likely to bind. We explore the macroeconomic implications of payment-to-income constraints in a new Keynesian model modified to include a credit good. The payment-to-income constraint amplifies the effect of current short-term nominal interest rates on output and inflation, making the model less forward-looking than the standard new Keynesian model.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfwp/103060/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Wieland, Johannes F.; Leahy, John V.; Hausman, Joshua; Mondragon, John</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-04-06</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>37</rdau:hasExtent>
<swpo:hasNumber>2026-07</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.24148/wp2026-07</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Working Paper Series</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Can Models with Idiosyncratic Risk Solve the Equity Premium Puzzle? Redux</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfwp/103059/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Can idiosyncratic risk explain the equity premium? We revisit this question using a novel measure of imperfect risk sharing, implied by a large class of heterogeneous-agent models, constructed using household-level panel data. We identify a group of households – with relatively high income but low net worth – whose consumption is sufficiently volatile and risky to explain 94% of the observed U.S. Sharpe ratio. In contrast, the consumption dynamics of high net-worth individuals predict a negative Sharpe ratio and so do not constitute the relevant pricing factor, consistent with models featuring wealth motives.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfwp/103059/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Kozliakov, Gleb; Singh, Sanjay R.; Marin, Emile A.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-03-31</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>43</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>uninsurable idiosyncratic risk; heterogeneous agents; wealth dynamics; equity premium</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>2026-06</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.24148/wp2026-06</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Working Paper Series</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Regionalism at the Federal Reserve: Many Voices, One Purpose</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfel/103058</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Public institutions like the Federal Reserve must evolve to meet new challenges and allow for new possibilities. At the Fed, we have modernized and innovated over time, always grounding ourselves in our founding principles—to be regional in our work, independent in our thinking, and accountable to those we serve. The following is adapted from remarks by the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco to the St. George Area Chamber of Commerce, in St. George, Utah, on April 8.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfel/103058</guid>
<dc:creator>Daly, Mary C.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-04-13</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>5</rdau:hasExtent>
<bibo:volume>2026</bibo:volume>
<bibo:issue>10</bibo:issue>
<bibo:series>FRBSF Economic Letter</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Monetary Policy Through the Lens of Market-Based Inflation</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfel/103057</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Some goods and services prices are not directly observed and must be indirectly derived for measuring inflation. This nonmarket-based inflation category has been an important factor keeping headline inflation elevated over the past two years. Because indirectly deriving prices introduces measurement uncertainty, one monetary policy approach would be to focus solely on directly observable prices. Applying this through a well-known monetary policy rule suggests a notably lower federal funds rate. However, other rules that account for the implicit uncertainty that policymakers face would leave the federal funds rate essentially unchanged.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfel/103057</guid>
<dc:creator>Leduc, Sylvain; Oliveira, Luiz E.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-04-06</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>6</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>monetary policy; Monetary policy and inflation</dc:subject>
<bibo:volume>2026</bibo:volume>
<bibo:issue>09</bibo:issue>
<bibo:series>FRBSF Economic Letter</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Fed Communications and Inflation Expectations</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfel/102976</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Monetary policy surprises—changes in various interest rates around central bank communication events—reflect new information in monetary policy actions and communications. For the Federal Reserve, surprises around Federal Open Market Committee statements and post-meeting press conferences have, in recent years, often led to meaningful market surprises that capture policy news. Event-study analysis provides new market-based evidence of monetary policy transmission: Hawkish policy surprises lower market-based inflation expectations, while dovish surprises raise them, in line with standard monetary transmission. These effects are especially strong at longer horizons.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfel/102976</guid>
<dc:creator>Bauer, Michael D.; Wasserburger, Wesley</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-03-31</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>6</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>monetary policy; communications; Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)</dc:subject>
<bibo:volume>2026</bibo:volume>
<bibo:issue>08</bibo:issue>
<bibo:series>FRBSF Economic Letter</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>The Effects of Tariffs on the Components of Inflation</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfel/102966</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Tariffs are usually applied to imported goods—but in an interconnected economy, their effects can be felt in the prices of other goods and services. Estimates using data across multiple advanced economies show that inflation declines right after tariffs are imposed. This initial decline reflects decreased demand, visible in declining prices for energy such as oil, a primary commodity typically exempt from tariffs. After the initial tariff shock, inflation gradually picks up, driven first by goods and later by services, one of the more persistent categories of inflation.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfel/102966</guid>
<dc:creator>Nechio, Fernanda; Halbersleben, Naomi; Jordà, Òscar</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-03-30</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>6</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>tariffs; inflation</dc:subject>
<bibo:volume>2026</bibo:volume>
<bibo:issue>07</bibo:issue>
<bibo:series>FRBSF Economic Letter</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Financial Conditions and Capital Investment Choices</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfwp/102910/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[We show, both theoretically and empirically, that tight financial conditions shift investment toward cheaper but less energy-efficient capital. In a small open-economy model with vintage capital, higher financing costs reduce the present value of future energy savings, tilting firms’ choices along a cost efficiency frontier. Using 150 years of macroeconomic and energy data from 17 advanced economies, we find that tighter financial conditions reduce output, capital, and total energy consumption, but raise the amount of energy per unit of capital (energy intensity), a composition effect that persists for 6 to 8 years. Tight financial conditions lower energy use in the short run by depressing activity, but increase energy use in the medium run through worse energy efficiency.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfwp/102910/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Nechio, Fernanda; Schwartzman, Felipe; Jordà, Òscar; Phan, Toan</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-02-26</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>53</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>energy efficiency; capital vintages; monetary policy; interest rates; local projections; small open economy</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>2026-05</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.24148/wp2026-05</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Working Paper Series</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>The AI Moment? Possibilities, Productivity, and Policy</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfsp/102798</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Speech to the Silicon Valley Leadership Group, San Jose, California, February 17, 2026, 11:30 a.m. PT, by Mary C. Daly, President and Chief Executive Officer, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfsp/102798</guid>
<dc:creator>Daly, Mary C.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-02-17</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>12</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>artificial intelligence (AI)</dc:subject>
<bibo:series>Speech</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>The AI Moment? Possibilities, Productivity, and Policy</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfel/102797</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[AI adoption and use are still evolving, and the technology itself is changing rapidly. What we know about AI and its impact on productivity growth and the economy remains uncertain. Transformations take time. We need to look for early indicators in the data and in business to get monetary policy right. 

The following is adapted from remarks by the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco to the Silicon Valley Leadership Group and San Jose State University in San Jose, California, on February 17.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfel/102797</guid>
<dc:creator>Daly, Mary C.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-02-23</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>8</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>artificial intelligence (AI)</dc:subject>
<bibo:volume>2026</bibo:volume>
<bibo:issue>06</bibo:issue>
<bibo:series>FRBSF Economic Letter</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Unauthorized Immigration Effects on Local Labor Markets</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfel/102450</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[The large increase and subsequent decline of unauthorized immigrant workers in recent years have raised questions about the impact of these changes on local labor markets across the United States. New analysis linking immigration data with employment data for specific areas suggests that the rapid rise in unauthorized immigrant worker flows increased local employment roughly one-for-one. Extending the analysis to the industry level further suggests that the slowdown of net immigration had a large negative impact on local employment, particularly for construction and manufacturing.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfel/102450</guid>
<dc:creator>Zhou, Xiaoqing; Wilson, Daniel J.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-02-17</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>5</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>immigration; labor markets; unauthorized immigration</dc:subject>
<bibo:volume>2026</bibo:volume>
<bibo:issue>05</bibo:issue>
<bibo:series>FRBSF Economic Letter</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Is the PPPLF Still Encouraging Small Business Lending?</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfel/102418</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[The Federal Reserve designed its Paycheck Protection Program Liquidity Facility to ease liquidity issues and support small business lending during the pandemic. The liquidity facility allowed banks to pledge Paycheck Protection Program loans as risk-free collateral during the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic. Analysis shows that, although the program has essentially ended, the positive effects on small business lending have persisted, particularly among small banks with lower liquidity, in keeping with the intent of the program.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfel/102418</guid>
<dc:creator>Dufresne, Lora; Spiegel, Mark M.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-02-09</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>5</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>PPPLF; small businesses; small business lending  (SBL)</dc:subject>
<bibo:volume>2026</bibo:volume>
<bibo:issue>04</bibo:issue>
<bibo:series>FRBSF Economic Letter</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>ChatMacro: Evaluating Inflation Forecasts of Generative AI</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfwp/102407/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Recent research suggests that generic large language models (LLMs) can match the accuracy of traditional methods when forecasting macroeconomic variables in pseudo out-of-sample settings generated via prompts. This paper assesses the out-of-sample forecasting accuracy of LLMs by eliciting real-time forecasts of U.S. inflation from ChatGPT. We find that out-of-sample predictions are largely inaccurate and stale, even though forecasts generated in pseudo out-of-sample environments are comparable to existing benchmarks. Our results underscore the importance of out-of-sample benchmarking for LLM predictions.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfwp/102407/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Boyle, Shane; Alam, M.Jahangir; Sekhposyan, Tatevik; Li, Huiyu</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-02-05</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>24</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>large language models; generative AI; inflation forecasting</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>2026-04</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.24148/wp2026-04</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Working Paper Series</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>A Market-Based Assessment of the Outlook for Inflation Expectations and Monetary Policy in South Africa</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfwp/102406/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Using a novel arbitrage-free dynamic term structure model of nominal and real bond prices that accounts for bond-specific liquidity risk premia, this paper provides estimates of bond investors’ inflation expectations and associated inflation risk premia in South African sovereign bonds. The results suggest that investors’ long-term inflation expectations have gradually been declining towards the tolerance band adopted by the South African Reserve Bank in 2000. Although volatile, the estimated inflation risk premia have declined significantly since 2021, while a market-based estimate of the natural real rate has remained stable and slightly negative. A related measure of the stance of monetary policy is currently assessed to be mildly restrictive. Leveraging the estimated model’s rich dynamics to assess the outlook for these key variables suggests that expected inflation is likely to gradually fall further, while monetary policy is projected to ease towards neutral in the context of a stable natural real rate.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfwp/102406/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Steenkamp, Daan; Christensen, Jens H. E.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-02-05</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>31</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>term structure modeling; inflation risk; liquidity risk; financial market frictions; emerging bond markets</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>2026-03</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.24148/wp2026-03</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Working Paper Series</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>The Work-from-home Wage Premium</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfwp/102384/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Using administrative data from France, we document that within the same detailed occupation, industry, and commuting zone, workers who work from home earn on average 12% higher hourly wages than fully on-site workers. Approximately half of this wage premium is accounted for by observable worker characteristics (such as education, gender, and age) and firm characteristics (such as size and productivity). The remaining 6% wage premium largely reflects selection: workers who work from home after the COVID-19 pandemic already earned higher wages before the pandemic.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfwp/102384/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Sauvagnat, Julien; Li, Huiyu; Schmitz, Tom</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-02-02</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>29</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>wage premium</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>2026-02</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.24148/wp2026-02</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Working Paper Series</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Housing Affordability and Housing Demand</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfel/102383</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Understanding housing demand dynamics through two indicators, income growth and population growth, provides important insights into housing affordability. Research shows that average U.S. income growth is strongly related to rising house prices but is essentially unrelated to changes in the supply of housing units across metropolitan areas. Instead, greater population growth translates into greater housing supply growth, with housing supply generally outpacing population, even in expensive markets. Thus, differences in affordability across areas may reflect differences in the growth and type of housing demand rather than different housing supply constraints.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfel/102383</guid>
<dc:creator>Najjar, Rami; Louie, Schuyler; Mondragon, John; Wieland, Johannes F.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-02-02</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>5</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>housing affordability; housing demand; income growth; population growth</dc:subject>
<bibo:volume>2026</bibo:volume>
<bibo:issue>03</bibo:issue>
<bibo:series>FRBSF Economic Letter</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>The Recent Slowdown in Labor Supply and Demand</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfel/102320</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[The pace of job growth cooled through mid-2025, while the unemployment rate rose relatively little. This seeming puzzle is explained by an even stepdown of labor supply and demand, meaning slowing labor force growth coincided with a slowdown in job growth. The recent decline in job growth is broad based across industries, suggesting a widespread softening of labor demand. For the labor force, recent declines are driven by changes in immigration flows and declining labor force participation. Together, these factors may signal some underlying fragility in the labor market.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfel/102320</guid>
<dc:creator>New-Schmidt, Addie; Chen, Ingrid; Bengali, Leila; Petrosky-Nadeau, Nicolas</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-01-12</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>6</rdau:hasExtent>
<bibo:volume>2026</bibo:volume>
<bibo:issue>02</bibo:issue>
<bibo:series>FRBSF Economic Letter</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>The Quiet Revolution and the Decline of Routine Jobs</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfwp/102313/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[What is the contribution of changes in female labor supply to the decline of employment in routine jobs observed in the U.S. between 1970 and 2000? While typically attributed to changes in labor demand, the decline of routine employment has been larger for women than for men, as women moved out of routine clerical roles and into high-skill professions. This paper assesses the contribution of the Quiet Revolution—a concurrent shift in women’s life-cycle labor supply from intermittent to continuous—to the reallocation of aggregate employment from routine to abstract jobs over this period. The Quiet Revolution plausibly contributed to women’s movement out of routine and into abstract occupations because the latter feature stronger human capital dynamics, offering returns to continuous work. I develop and calibrate an equilibrium model of the labor market that incorporates both the Quiet Revolution and changes in production technology. Counterfactual analyses reveal that while the Quiet Revolution accounts for 12% to 22% of the drop in the aggregate routine employment share, technology is the dominant force in explaining changes in the overall distribution of employment. Nonetheless, the Quiet Revolution is essential for gender-specific trends: without it, women would neither have entered the labor force nor transitioned into abstract occupations to the extent observed.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfwp/102313/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Uniat, Lindsey</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-01-09</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>60</rdau:hasExtent>
<swpo:hasNumber>2026-01</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.24148/wp2026-01</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Working Paper Series</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>A New Labor Market Stress Indicator</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfwp/102306/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Recessions are periods where the labor market deteriorates rapidly. Supporting business conditions to prevent such deterioration is a core objective of policymakers. In this paper we construct a labor market stress indicator (LMSI) primarily based on state-level unemployment insurance claims data that are observable as often as at weekly frequency. By examining both the geographical spread and the depth of labor market stress buildup, we provide an early indicator whose main function is to alert policymakers of potential economic slowdowns. Because the majority (but not all) of these slowdowns coincide with NBER recessions, the LMSI is also a useful signal of whether the economy is in recession. The paper then evaluates this feature of the LMSI compared with other recent indicators and highlights the strengths and weaknesses of each.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfwp/102306/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Garimella, Rohit; Jordà, Òscar; Singh, Sanjay R.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2025-12-31</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>30</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>labor market indicator; recession; receiver operating characteristic curve</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>2025-31</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.24148/wp2025-31</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Working Paper Series</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>What Can History Tell Us About Tariff Shocks?</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfel/102299</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[The change in the average U.S. tariff rate in 2025 was the largest in the modern era. One way to assess the effects of such a large shock on unemployment and inflation is by looking at data from pre-World War II periods with tariff rate changes of a similar magnitude. Analysis shows that previous tariff hikes raised unemployment and reduced both economic activity and inflation. Uncertainty may be a factor behind these effects: A large tariff increase raises uncertainty, which can depress overall demand and lead to lower inflation.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedfel/102299</guid>
<dc:creator>Barnichon, Régis; Singh, Aayush</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-01-05</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>5</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>tariffs; uncertainty; monetary policy</dc:subject>
<bibo:volume>2026</bibo:volume>
<bibo:issue>01</bibo:issue>
<bibo:series>FRBSF Economic Letter</bibo:series>
</item>
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