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<title>Federal Reserve Bank of New York publications</title>
<description>Economic research and commentary from Federal Reserve Bank of New York</description>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/search?facets[]=provider_literal_array:Federal+Reserve+Bank+of+New+York</link>
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<pubDate>Tue, 21 Jul 2026 11:09:33 +0000</pubDate>
<item>
<title>Nonbank Subsidiaries and the Hidden Fragility of Internal Capital Markets Reallocation</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednls/103547</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Banks became safer after Basel III. Whether it made the broader organization safer is less clear. We document that bank subsidiaries accumulated capital, improved asset quality, and reduced risk. But holding companies built that capital largely by drawing on their nonbank affiliates. Did the reallocation reduce risk for the organization as a whole or merely move it to a less visible part of the firm? Our evidence points to the latter: the same internal capital markets that helped banks meet tighter requirements left nonbank affiliates with thinner buffers and riskier business models, and a greater capacity to transmit distress back to the organizations that own them.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednls/103547</guid>
<dc:creator>Cetorelli, Nicola; Kundu, Shohini</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-17</dc:date>
<dc:subject>banks; nonbanks; bank holding companies (BHCs); regulation; arbitrage; boundaries of the firm</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>20260717</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.59576/lse.20260717</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Liberty Street Economics</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Capitalizing on Nonbanks: Regulatory Arbitrage Within Bank Holding Companies</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednls/103533</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[When economists and policymakers talk about nonbank finance, they usually have in mind activity that takes place outside the banking system in institutions that compete with banks for the provision of financial intermediation services, such as fintech lenders, money market funds, private credit vehicles, insurers, and broker-dealers. A substantial share of U.S. nonbank financial activity, however, takes place inside bank holding companies (BHCs), conducted by nonbank subsidiaries that operate alongside regulated commercial banks under common ownership and integrated management. In this first post of our three-part series, we document the scale of nonbank activity within BHCs and describe the balance-sheet features that, as the remainder of the series shows, make these subsidiaries a vehicle for regulatory arbitrage.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednls/103533</guid>
<dc:creator>Cetorelli, Nicola; Kundu, Shohini</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-15</dc:date>
<dc:subject>banks; nonbanks; bank holding companies (BHCs); regulation; arbitrage; boundaries of the firm</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>20260715</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.59576/lse.20260715</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Liberty Street Economics</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>How Basel III Changes Where Capital Sits: Nonbank Subsidiaries as Equity Reservoirs</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednls/103545</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[When Basel III’s binding capital minimums took effect for U.S. banks in January 2015, a bank holding company (BHC) whose depository subsidiary fell short of the new standards had two options. It could raise fresh equity in external markets, a costly option. Or, if it owned equity-rich nonbank affiliates, it could simply move capital from one subsidiary to another. The second route satisfies the regulator, avoids issuance costs, and leaves consolidated equity exactly where it was. In this second post of our series, we show that this is precisely what organizationally complex BHCs did in response to higher capital requirements.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednls/103545</guid>
<dc:creator>Cetorelli, Nicola; Kundu, Shohini</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-16</dc:date>
<dc:subject>banks; nonbanks; bank holding companies (BHCs); regulation; arbitrage; boundaries of the firm</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>20260716</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.59576/lse.20260716</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Liberty Street Economics</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Bank Runs With and Without Bank Failure</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednsr/103544</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[We study the causes and consequences of bank runs. By applying large language models to historical newspapers, we create a comprehensive database of bank runs in U.S. history with information on 3,984 runs on individual banks from 1863 to 1934. Our novel data allow us to establish that runs are considerably more likely in weak banks but also occur in strong banks, especially in response to negative news about the real economy or the broader banking system. However, runs typically only result in failure for banks with poor fundamentals. Strong banks survive runs through various mechanisms, including signaling strength, interbank cooperation, and temporary suspension. At the local level, runs on banks with poor fundamentals translate into substantially larger declines in deposits, lending, and manufacturing activity than runs on strong banks. Our findings imply that poor fundamentals are central to explaining both when runs occur and when they have severe economic effects, tempering the view that small shocks can generate discontinuous jumps to bad equilibria through self-fulfilling run dynamics.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednsr/103544</guid>
<dc:creator>Verner, Emil; Luck, Stephan; Correia, Sergio A.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-01</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>143</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>bank runs; bank failures; banking crises; financial stability; financial history; artificial intelligence (AI)</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>1198</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.59576/sr.1198</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Staff Reports</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Stability of Thy Times</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednsp/103535</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Remarks at the Partnership for New York City, New York, New York.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednsp/103535</guid>
<dc:creator>Williams, John C.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-15</dc:date>
<dc:subject>inflation; stability; resilience; monetary policy; labor market; artificial intelligence (AI); technology</dc:subject>
<bibo:series>Speech</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>The International RBC Model Finally Works!</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednsr/103524</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[We show that incorporating uninsurable countercyclical income risk into a standard international RBC model can qualitatively and quantitatively account for the quantity puzzles in open-economy macro, namely (i) the Backus-Smith puzzle, (ii) the Backus-Kehoe-Kydland puzzle, and (iii) the weak correlation between the trade balance and the exchange rate. We also show that our model can simultaneously account for the Fama puzzle and the evidence that high interest rate countries have stronger currencies—which representative-agents models that rely only on financial or demand shocks cannot jointly account for. Crucially, our model resolves all these puzzles while relying solely on productivity shocks and thus generates the observed domestic and cross-country macroeconomic comovement.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednsr/103524</guid>
<dc:creator>Challe, Edouard; Acharya, Sushant; Coulibaly, Louphou</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-01</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>59</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>incomplete markets; countercyclical risk; exchange rate; open-economy macro puzzles; macroeconomic comovements</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>1197</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.59576/sr.1197</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Staff Reports</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Repo Market Structure and Monetary Policy Implementation</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednsp/103510</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Remarks at The Future of Market Liquidity and Functioning Workshop, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York City.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednsp/103510</guid>
<dc:creator>Perli, Roberto</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-09</dc:date>
<dc:subject>Repo market; ample reserves; Central Clearing; monetary policy; money market conditions; reserve management purchases (RMPs)</dc:subject>
<bibo:series>Speech</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Effect of Tariffs on U.S. Small Businesses</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednls/103509</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[How has the recent implementation of tariffs affected small businesses? Due to lack of data, little is known about this issue. In this Liberty Street Economics post, we use data from the 2025 edition of the Small Business Credit Survey (SBCS) to explore this question for businesses nationally and in the Second District (defined, for the purpose of this study, as New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut). We find that the majority of national firms in the goods and retail sectors reported experiencing financial challenges due to tariffs in 2025, with even larger shares of regional firms doing so. In response, about 80 percent of national and regional firms passed on at least some of the higher costs of imported inputs to customers, while about 60 percent absorbed some of the costs, as many firms did some of both. Firms that faced greater tariff challenges in 2025 were more pessimistic about employment and revenues in 2026.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednls/103509</guid>
<dc:creator>Aarons, Will; Sarkar, Asani</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-09</dc:date>
<dc:subject>tariffs; small business performance; Second District</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>20260709</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.59576/lse.20260709</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Liberty Street Economics</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>The Value of Central Bank Relationships</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednsp/103506</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Remarks at the Deutsche Bundesbank Representative Office 40th Anniversary Reception.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednsp/103506</guid>
<dc:creator>Nordstrom, Anna</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-07</dc:date>
<dc:subject>Central Banks; collaboration; Cooperation; global financial markets</dc:subject>
<bibo:series>Speech</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>More Tariff Pass‑Through Is in the Pipeline</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednls/103505</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[The past year brought dramatic changes to U.S. trade policy, including sweeping new tariffs, as well as a Supreme Court decision that further reshaped the tariff landscape. Many businesses saw their costs increase significantly and faced complex decisions about whether to absorb the tariffs through lower profit margins, raise their prices to recover the higher costs, or some combination of the two. Last year, we found that most businesses had passed on at least some of these higher costs to their customers through higher prices. Now, over a year later, have businesses finished adjusting prices, or do further tariff-induced price increases lie ahead? Our latest regional business surveys reveal that nearly half of firms that have paid tariffs still plan additional price increases to offset these costs, with some expecting to raise prices six months or more in the future.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednls/103505</guid>
<dc:creator>Montalbano, Nick; Abel, Jaison R.; Amiti, Mary; Deitz, Richard; Heise, Sebastian</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-08</dc:date>
<dc:subject>tariffs; pass-through; imports; prices</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>20260708</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.59576/lse.20260708</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Liberty Street Economics</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>What Do Over 3,000 Bank Runs Teach Us About Banking Crises?</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednls/103502</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Runs on financial institutions are one of the salient markers of financial crises. But the role of runs in crises is a topic of longstanding debate. Runs can be seen as the key turning point, whereby even small shocks can generate severe crises with widespread bank failures. Another view is that runs are mainly a symptom of deeper rot in the financial system, exacerbating crises rather than being their primary cause. Understanding this debate has first order implications for how to think about financial crises and the appropriate policy responses. In this post, we use a new database of more than 3,000 bank runs (introduced in our companion post) to show that poor fundamentals are central to explaining both when runs occur and when they have severe economic effects. We argue that this evidence tempers the view that small shocks can have outsized real effects through self-fulfilling run dynamics.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednls/103502</guid>
<dc:creator>Luck, Stephan; Correia, Sergio A.; Verner, Emil</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-07</dc:date>
<dc:subject>banking; bank runs; bank failures; banking crises; financial crises; deposit insurance</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>20260707b</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.59576/lse.20260707b</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Liberty Street Economics</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Using AI to Let History Speak About Bank Runs</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednls/103501</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Banking crises are commonly associated with bank runs and banking panics, yet our empirical understanding of bank runs is constrained by a lack of bank-level data. In a new paper, we use large language models (LLMs) to extract information on bank runs from millions of digitized historical newspaper pages, creating the most comprehensive database of bank runs in U.S. history. Every bank run episode that we identify is documented on a companion website where users can browse and examine individual episodes, and read the original newspaper articles. In this post, we describe how we built this dataset and discuss what its basic features reveal.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednls/103501</guid>
<dc:creator>Verner, Emil; Correia, Sergio A.; Luck, Stephan</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-07</dc:date>
<dc:subject>bank runs; banking crises; bank failures; deposit insurance; liquidity; solvency; artificial intelligence (AI)</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>20260707a</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.59576/lse.20260707a</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Liberty Street Economics</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>The Disappearing Overnight Drift</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednls/103479</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[In a 2021 Liberty Street Economics post, we documented the “overnight drift”—a large, persistent return to holding U.S. equity futures in the narrow window between 2:00 and 3:00 a.m. Eastern time, when European equity markets open. Five additional years of data later, that pattern appears to have faded: the 2:00–3:00 window that previously generated roughly 3.7 percent per annum has averaged close to zero since 2021. In this post, we revisit the overnight drift in light of the post-publication sample and use our inventory-risk framework to ask which of three observable channels—the dispersion of closing order imbalances, the level of return variance, or the risk-bearing capacity of liquidity providers—accounts for the change.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednls/103479</guid>
<dc:creator>Boyarchenko, Nina; Larsen, Lars C.; Whelan, Paul</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-01</dc:date>
<dc:subject>overnight drift; closing order imbalances</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>20260701</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.59576/lse.20260701</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Liberty Street Economics</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Liquidity Fades as Treasuries Age</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednls/103473</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[More than $30 trillion U.S. Treasury debt is outstanding. Less than 4 percent of this amount, which is associated with the most recently issued Treasuries, called on-the-run securities, accounts for 65 percent of average daily trading volume. The remaining portion of the amount outstanding is accounted for by seasoned issues that have been replaced by newer benchmarks, which are referred to as off-the-run securities. In this post, we review the key results in our paper that uses transaction-level Treasury TRACE data to study how trading activity and liquidity evolve as securities move from on-the-run to off-the-run. We show three main patterns. First, off-the-run notes and bonds rely much more on dealer-to-customer intermediation than benchmark securities. Second, trading activity falls sharply and transaction costs increase as securities age. Third, securities that are cheapest to deliver into Treasury futures are an important exception: they trade more actively than other off-the-run bonds of similar age.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednls/103473</guid>
<dc:creator>Chaboud, Alain P.; Huh, Yesol; Keane, Frank M.; Shachar, Or; Fleming, Michael J.; Correia Golay, Ellen</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-06-30</dc:date>
<dc:subject>Treasury market; market structure; off-the-run; liquidity; trading</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>20260630</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.59576/lse.20260630</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Liberty Street Economics</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>How Resilient Were Emerging Market Economies Through the 2022‑23 U.S. Monetary Tightening Cycle?</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednls/103439</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[The cross-border spillover effects of shifts in U.S. monetary policy have long been a focus of academics and policymakers alike. A common finding in the literature is that changes in the stance of U.S. monetary policy have sizable effects on economic activity and financial markets in emerging market economies (EMEs). In this post, we analyze one specific aspect of these spillovers: how EMEs fared through the U.S. monetary policy tightening cycle of 2022-23 relative to the predictions of a model, which was calibrated to capture empirically relevant features of these economies based on historical data. We find that more vulnerable EMEs fared better in both financial market and growth outcomes than would be expected from our model, while the relatively less vulnerable fared a bit better than the model predictions for financial outcomes but substantially worse for growth outcomes.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednls/103439</guid>
<dc:creator>Akinci, Ozge; Queraltó, Albert; Ahmed, Shaghil</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-06-26</dc:date>
<dc:subject>spillovers; growth-driven U.S. monetary shocks; monetary-driven U.S. monetary shocks; emerging markets; Vulnerabilities</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>20260626</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.59576/lse.20260626</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Liberty Street Economics</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Evolving Market Structure and the Desk’s Role</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednsp/103427</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Remarks at the Fifth Conference on the International Roles of the U.S. Dollar, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington, D.C.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednsp/103427</guid>
<dc:creator>Chung, Lisa</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-06-22</dc:date>
<dc:subject>market structure; Dollar role; monetary policy; financial market infrastructures; digital assets; US dollar</dc:subject>
<bibo:series>Speech</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>The Post‑COVID Decline in the Labor Share</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednls/103426</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[The labor share of income in the U.S. is currently at its lowest-ever level in the post-war period. The labor share measures the fraction of economic output paid to workers as wages and salaries. As such, it is a useful benchmark for wage growth: when the labor share falls, it means that productivity, prices, or both are growing faster than wages. After much-studied drops in the 2000s, the labor share fell sharply again after the COVID pandemic. In this post, we compare the dynamics of the labor share post-COVID to earlier periods to understand whether the recent decline represents the continuation of a trend or a new and distinct phenomenon. We find that both the cyclicality of the labor share and the contribution of reallocation to the labor share post-COVID are similar to earlier periods.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednls/103426</guid>
<dc:creator>Narayanan, Srinidhi; Schuh, Rachel; Audoly, Richard; Guerin, Miles</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-06-24</dc:date>
<dc:subject>labor share; wage growth</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>20260624</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.59576/lse.20260624</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Liberty Street Economics</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Synthetic Stablecoins and Financial Stability</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednls/103415</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[On October 10, 2025, the announcement of a potential additional 100 percent tariff on Chinese goods drove risk-off moves across equities, Treasuries, credit spreads, and digital assets. Digital asset prices fell sharply, trading volumes surged, and liquidity vanished from key exchanges. In this post, we show how the price shock in digital assets was transmitted and amplified through a class of instruments called synthetic stablecoins—crypto assets whose structural design turned an external shock into a self-reinforcing deleveraging spiral within the crypto ecosystem.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednls/103415</guid>
<dc:creator>Garofano, Jeff; Azar, Pablo D.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-06-23</dc:date>
<dc:subject>stablecoins; cryptocurrency; cryptocurrency markets; financial  stability; market liquidity; derivatives markets</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>20260623</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.59576/lse.20260623</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Liberty Street Economics</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>The Unintended Effects of Interest Rate Caps: Credit Reallocation to Safer Borrowers</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednls/103390</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Several states have recently capped consumer loan rates with the stated purpose of protecting borrowers. In a recent Staff Report, we study how these interventions have played out in three states. In our first post about that study, we showed that rate caps lead riskier borrowers to face rationing in the credit market. One question that naturally arises is what lenders do with the credit they used to provide to high-risk borrowers before the caps were imposed. Lenders that lend exclusively to high-risk borrowers (at rates above the cap) may decide to stop lending to high-risk borrowers in that state. Others, however, may try to change their “credit box” by lending more to somewhat safer borrowers. In this post, we will try to understand how lenders reallocate credit after usury limits are implemented.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednls/103390</guid>
<dc:creator>Seltzer, Lee; Morgan, Donald P.; Pham, Thu; Chakrabarti, Rajashri; Leonard, Gabriel</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-06-03</dc:date>
<dc:subject>usury limit; household debt; consumer finance</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>20260603b</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.59576/lse.20260603b</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Liberty Street Economics</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>The Unintended Effects of Interest Rate Caps: Credit Rationing for Risky Borrowers</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednls/103389</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[In imperial China, 3 percent was the maximum legal monthly loan rate; charging more was punishable by 40 to 100 blows with the “light cane.” (Rockoff 2003) Centuries later, many U.S. states are imposing the same cap (without corporal penalties) on alternative credit providers, such as payday, installment, and auto-title lenders, with the goal of lowering credit costs and delinquency for the high-risk borrowers that rely on these funding sources. A concern, however, is that lenders will simply refuse to lend to these borrowers at lower interest rates. Our recent Staff Report studies how interest rate caps have played out in several states that recently adopted them. Using household-level data from a major credit bureau, we find that loan balances for the riskiest borrowers declined substantially relative to counterparts in states without caps. Despite taking on less debt, these borrowers did not experience an improvement in delinquencies.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednls/103389</guid>
<dc:creator>Morgan, Donald P.; Seltzer, Lee; Chakrabarti, Rajashri; Leonard, Gabriel; Pham, Thu</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-06-03</dc:date>
<dc:subject>usury limit; household debt; consumer finance</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>20260603a</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.59576/lse.20260603a</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Liberty Street Economics</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Struggling Regional Small Businesses Deeply Pessimistic About 2026 Prospects</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednls/103353</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[We recently updated the suite of indicators describing the performance of small businesses in the Second District (defined, for the purpose of this study, as New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut) and nationally with data from the 2025 edition of the Small Business Credit Survey (SBCS). In this post, we find that regional small businesses reported severe declines in employment and revenue growth in 2025 and became more pessimistic about growth in 2026. In contrast, small firms in the rest of the nation enjoyed stable revenues and employment in 2025 and, while they also had lower expectations of future growth, the decline was smaller in magnitude. Given the importance of small businesses in employment generation, analyzing such data helps to inform the design of effective monetary policy and to understand trends in the regional economy.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednls/103353</guid>
<dc:creator>Sarkar, Asani; Aarons, Will</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-06-02</dc:date>
<dc:subject>small business performance; Second District</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>20260602</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.59576/lse.20260602</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Liberty Street Economics</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Remote Work Leaves Younger Workers Sidelined</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednls/103346</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Youth unemployment has risen dramatically since the pandemic—as has the prevalence of remote work. Our analysis suggests that these trends are related, with remote work making it more difficult for managers to train and mentor new employees. Accordingly, companies may be reluctant to hire less-experienced workers in distributed work arrangements. We estimate that remote work can explain 64 percent of the recent increase in unemployment among young college graduates. Further, the timing of this surge suggests that remote work—not generative AI—explains the bulk of the rise in youth unemployment.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednls/103346</guid>
<dc:creator>Pallais, Amanda; Emanuel, Natalia; Harrington, Emma</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-06-01</dc:date>
<dc:subject>remote work; unemployment</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>20260601</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.59576/lse.20260601</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Liberty Street Economics</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Productivity Growth and the Challenge of Real-Time Policymaking</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednsp/103325</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Remarks at the Reykjavík Economic Conference, Reykjavík, Iceland.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednsp/103325</guid>
<dc:creator>Williams, John C.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-05-28</dc:date>
<dc:subject>productivity growth; monetary policy; real interest rates; inflation</dc:subject>
<bibo:series>Speech</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>The Regional Side of the Story: K‑Shaped Pattern in Region, Wider Gap in Gas Spending</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednls/103316</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[In this post, we use the inaugural release of our regional consumer spending indicators to ask whether these patterns hold for a significant portion of the Second District, and how regional spending patterns by income have been similar to or different from the national patterns we documented earlier. We find similar K‑shaped patterns in both retail and gas spending in our region as we do in the nation, with the K‑shaped pattern in gasoline in response to the recent gas price shock being more pronounced in the region.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednls/103316</guid>
<dc:creator>Pham, Thu; Pinkovskiy, Maxim L.; Pierce, Beckett; Chakrabarti, Rajashri</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-05-28</dc:date>
<dc:subject>inequality; K-shaped economy; retail spending; Second District; gasoline</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>20260528</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.59576/lse.20260528</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Liberty Street Economics</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Food Insecurity and Consumer Pessimism</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednls/103312</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Current discussions regarding a bifurcated U.S. economy highlight the increasing economic divide between lower- and higher-income Americans in spending and earnings growth and wealth accumulation. While many households are doing fine and economic activity overall has been expanding at a solid pace, large segments of the population are facing high levels of economic insecurity and financial strain, and consumer sentiment on the whole has dropped to low levels. In this post, we use newly collected data from the Survey of Consumer Expectations (SCE) to update our 2020 analysis of disproportionate financial hardship experienced during the early pandemic and to investigate recent changes in food insecurity and broader economic strains. We then examine how food insecurity relates to the increase in consumer pessimism. We find a remarkable increase in food insecurity, particularly among lower-educated and lower-income households and households with young children. We document a contemporaneous increase in pessimism among the same groups, along with a sharp decline in job-finding expectations.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fednls/103312</guid>
<dc:creator>Kosar, Gizem; Mehta, Ishva; Van der Klaauw, Wilbert</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-05-27</dc:date>
<dc:subject>consumer sentiment; food insecurity</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>20260527</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.59576/lse.20260527</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Liberty Street Economics</bibo:series>
</item>
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</rss>