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<title>Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis publications</title>
<description>Economic research and commentary from Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis</description>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/search?facets[]=provider_literal_array:Federal+Reserve+Bank+of+Minneapolis</link>
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<pubDate>Sat, 11 Jul 2026 17:38:30 +0000</pubDate>
<item>
<title>Analyzing Occupational Licensing Across Nations</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedmsr/103496</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Relatively little is known about occupational licensing across nations. We assemble harmonized estimates of licensing prevalence for 44 countries using nationally representative surveys, including new surveys for previously unstudied countries. Licensing ranges from roughly 14 percent of workers in Denmark to more than 40 percent in India and South Africa. Licensed workers earn 6 to 19 percent higher wages than comparable unlicensed workers across specifications. Licensing prevalence is negatively associated with GDP per capita and governance quality, and positively associated with informal employment, suggesting occupational licensing is intertwined with labor market efficiency, formalization, and long-run economic development.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedmsr/103496</guid>
<dc:creator>Kleiner, Morris M.; Hartley, Jonathan S.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-07</dc:date>
<dc:subject>Institutions; Regulation; Economic growth; Wage level and structure; Occupational licensing</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>685</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.21034/sr.685</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Staff Report</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>International Risk-Sharing in a Fragmented World</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedmwp/103478/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[This paper studies how geopolitical risk shapes financial fragmentation and international risk-sharing, using bilateral official lending data from 1910 to 2024. We document that when geopolitical risk is high, bilateral lending increasingly follows geopolitical alignment. Because geopolitically aligned countries experience more synchronized shocks, this fragmentation limits the effectiveness of international risk-sharing. To rationalize these patterns, we introduce geopolitical considerations into a limited-commitment model of sovereign borrowing. The model shows that, even with non-discriminatory default, higher geopolitical tensions redirect international lending toward allied countries and weaken risk-sharing.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedmwp/103478/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Russo, Giovanni; Bianchi, Javier; Horn, Sebastian; Sosa-Padilla, César</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-06-30</dc:date>
<dc:subject>Capital flows; Financial fragmentation; Official lending; Risk-sharing; Sovereign default; Geoeconomics</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>816</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.21034/wp.816</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Working Papers</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>What Quits and Layoffs Reveal About the Business Cycle</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedmoi/103477/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[We introduce monthly CPS series that classify every separation by reason (quit or layoff) and destination (unemployment or non-participation), and use them to confront the workhorse model of labor market flows. The standard model overproduces quits, sends laid-off workers to unemployment when a third of them leave the labor force, and gets the cyclical direction of labor force attachment backwards. Adding selective layoffs and random quits repairs these facts and overturns what labor supply does over the cycle: a recession is partly stabilized from within. Two channels buffer employment and amplify unemployment: (i) labor supply as marginal workers hoard their jobs and the displaced keep searching, and (ii) selection as layoffs shift from marginal toward attached workers. These mechanisms reorganize the drivers of the cycle and sharpen common questions: recessions feature near zero changes in TFP and welfare costs 59% lower than the standard model.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedmoi/103477/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Ellieroth, Kathrin; Michaud, Amanda M.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-07-01</dc:date>
<dc:subject>Business cycles; Unemployment; Quits; Labor supply; Layoffs</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>130</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.21034/iwp.130</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Opportunity and Inclusive Growth Institute Working Papers</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>The Macroeconomic Effects of Neighborhood Policies: A Dynamic Analysis</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedmoi/103476/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[We study the macroeconomic effects of neighborhood-specific policies in a general equilibrium model of a city with endogenous residential sorting and educational investment. A key feature of the model is the presence of endogenous local spillovers that depend on the distribution of families across neighborhoods. We analyze three policies: a housing-voucher policy inspired by the MTO program, which enables poor families to relocate to low-poverty neighborhoods; a place-based transfer (PBT) policy that provides monetary transfers to families in poor neighborhoods; and a place-based investment (PBI) policy that invests resources in local institutions, such as public schools, to directly enhance local spillovers. We find that the MTO policy generates substantial welfare gains for recipient families, but scaling up the program dampens these gains and induces large welfare losses for non-recipients. By contrast, the PBT policy delivers larger average welfare gains but is less effective in reducing inequality and segregation. Finally, the PBI policy produces smaller short-run effects but, over time, resolves the trade-off by raising average welfare while simultaneously reducing inequality, lowering segregation, and improving intergenerational mobility.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedmoi/103476/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Guerrieri, Veronica; Fogli, Alessandra; Prato, Marta; Ponder, Mark</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-06-23</dc:date>
<dc:subject>Local externalities; place-based policies; residential segregation; MTO; Income inequality</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>129</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.21034/iwp.129</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Opportunity and Inclusive Growth Institute Working Papers</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>How Small is Small? Non-linearities in Heterogeneous Agent Models</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedmwp/103410/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[In plausibly calibrated heterogeneous-agent models, marginal propensities to consume (MPCs) are highly non-linear in wealth, falling sharply away from borrowing constraints. As a result, the aggregate consumption response to a fiscal transfer is strongly concave in its size: larger transfers shift households out of high-MPC regions, dampening the consumption response. Across partial- and general-equilibrium settings, linear methods substantially overstate the effects of fiscal stimulus at empirically relevant sizes. Local methods of any order are unlikely to be reliable in settings where a failure of Ricardian equivalence from high MPCs is important.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedmwp/103410/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Kaplan, Greg; Bianchi, Javier</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-06-22</dc:date>
<dc:subject>Heterogeneous agents; non-linearities; HANK</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>815</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.21034/wp.815</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Working Papers</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Reconciling Micro Elasticities with the Macro Decline in Labor Supply</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedmwp/103388/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Micro estimates of the Marshallian elasticity of labor supply are small and typically positive, whereas cross-country and time-series patterns of hours imply a strong negative relationship between wages and hours. I reconcile these two apparently contradictory observations using a single utility specification and taking into account heterogeneity in non-labor income. Micro estimates condition on non-labor income, while macro variation allows capital income to adjust alongside labor income, which strengthens the income effect. A model with heterogeneous households and exogenous capital income yields closed-form expressions in which the distribution of the labor share shapes the gap between the micro and the macro elasticities. A cross-sectional regression of hours on wages that conditions on the labor share recovers the macro elasticity. A dynamic model with heterogeneous households and incomplete asset markets reproduces both elasticities as outcomes when disciplined by joint moments of wages, hours, consumption, and wealth. The income effects that bridge the gap between the two elasticities imply marginal propensities to earn that lie in the range of estimates of micro studies on lottery winners.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedmwp/103388/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Karabarbounis, Loukas</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-06-05</dc:date>
<dc:subject>Marshallian elasticity; Income effects; Macro elasticity; Labor supply</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>814</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.21034/wp.814</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Working Papers</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Macro-Development: Complementarities, Distortions and Policies</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedmqr/103358</link>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedmqr/103358</guid>
<dc:creator>Buera, Francisco J.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-06-01</dc:date>
<bibo:volume>46</bibo:volume>
<bibo:issue>1</bibo:issue>
<identifiers:doi>10.21034/qr.4611</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Quarterly Review</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Trade in AI-Related Products</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedmqr/103359</link>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedmqr/103359</guid>
<dc:creator>Waugh, Michael E.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-06-01</dc:date>
<bibo:volume>46</bibo:volume>
<bibo:issue>1</bibo:issue>
<identifiers:doi>10.21034/qr.4612</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Quarterly Review</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Why Do Americans No Longer Work So Much More Than Non-Americans?</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedmwp/103293/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[In the 1990s, Americans used to work much more than non-Americans. Nowadays, about half of the gap in hours worked has reversed. To evaluate the convergence of working hours, we develop a tractable model of labor supply enriched with multiple sources of heterogeneity across individuals, an extensive margin of participation, multi-member households, and an elaborate system of taxes and benefits upon nonemployment. Using detailed measurements from micro-level and aggregate datasets, we identify model parameters and sources of heterogeneity across individuals for various countries. We run a horse race between competing explanations and find that U.S. hours per person declined after 2000 owing mainly to the rise of government health benefits provided to the non-employed. Non-U.S. countries have generous benefits for the non-employed, but this generosity has not changed as much over time as in the United States, and public health coverage does not depend on employment status or income levels. For these countries, the rise of labor supply is generally accounted for by a mix of factors, such as the rise of wages and the falling disutility of work.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedmwp/103293/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Karabarbounis, Loukas; See, Kurt; Birinci, Serdar</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-03-25</dc:date>
<dc:subject>Wages; Benefits; Hours; Employment</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>813</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.21034/wp.813</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Working Papers</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>The Long-Term Decline of the U.S. Job Ladder</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedmoi/103292/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[We quantify how structural changes in the U.S. labor market have contributed to wage stagnation over the past four decades by weakening the job ladder. Using Current Population Survey microdata from 1982–2023 and a partial-equilibrium job-ladder model, we estimate that employed workers today are about half as likely to receive a better-paying outside offer as they were in the 1980s. This decline is unlikely to reflect less efficient matching, weaker labor demand, or changes in workers’ acceptance behavior. Instead, cross-state variation is consistent with rising employer concentration and the growing use of noncompete agreements having curtailed opportunities for job shopping. In a general equilibrium version of the model, we find that these changes have reduced annual real wage growth by 0.68 percentage points—roughly one-third of the post-1980 slowdown—with about two-thirds of the effect operating through equilibrium wage setting rather than mechanical reallocation.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedmoi/103292/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Baksy, Aniket; Caratelli, Daniele; Engbom, Niklas</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-04-17</dc:date>
<swpo:hasNumber>127</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.21034/iwp.127</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Opportunity and Inclusive Growth Institute Working Papers</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Credit Supply, Firms, and Earnings Inequality</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedmoi/103290/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[We study the distributional consequences of monetary policy-induced credit supply in the German labor market. Firms in relationships with banks that are more exposed to the introduction of negative interest rates in 2014 experience a relative contraction in credit supply, associated with lower average wages. Within firms, initially lower-paid workers are more likely to leave employment, while initially higher-paid workers see a relative decline in wages. Between firms, wages fall by more at initially higher-paying employers. Our results suggest that credit affects the distribution of wages and employment both within and between firms.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedmoi/103290/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Moser, Christian; Wolter, Stefanie; Wirth, Benjamin; Saidi, Farzad</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-05-22</dc:date>
<dc:subject>Wages; Employment; Distribution; Credit supply; Monetary policy; Downward wage rigidity</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>128</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.21034/iwp.128</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Opportunity and Inclusive Growth Institute Working Papers</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Trade in AI-Related Products</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedmsr/103018</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[This paper documents facts about international trade in AI-related products. I develop a large language model (LLM) classification tool that maps HS10 codes in U.S. trade data to products used in the construction and operation of AI infrastructure. AI-related products account for 23 percent of U.S. imports in 2025, and imports of these products have grown by 73 percent since 2023. Over the same period, imports of non-AI-related products have grown by only 3 percent, with the divergence between the two categories beginning in early 2024. Mexico is a key market on both the import and export side, and together with Taiwan these two countries account for about half of all U.S. trade in AI-related products. Trade policy has treated these products lightly with product-level exemptions shielding much of AI-related imports from tariffs. Absent the AI boom, a simple accounting exercise suggests that the U.S. goods trade deficit would have been nearly $200 billion smaller in 2025.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedmsr/103018</guid>
<dc:creator>Waugh, Michael E.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-04-09</dc:date>
<dc:subject>AI; Tariffs; LLM classification; Trade patterns</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>684</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.21034/sr.684</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Staff Report</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Subjective Earnings and Employment Dynamics</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedmoi/103004/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[We develop a new approach to estimating earnings, job, and employment dynamics using subjective expectations data from the NY Fed Survey of Consumer Expectations. These data provide beliefs about future earnings offers and acceptance probabilities, offering direct information on counterfactual outcomes and enabling identification under weaker assumptions. Our framework avoids biases from selection and unobserved heterogeneity that affect models using realized outcomes. First-step fixed-effects regressions identify risk, persistence, and transition effects; second-step GMM recovers the covariance structure of unobserved heterogeneities such as ability, mobility, and match quality. We find lower risk and persistence of the individual productivity component than in prior work, but greater heterogeneity in ability and match quality. Simulations show that reduced-form estimates overstate persistence and volatility on individual-level productivity due to job transitions and sorting. After accounting for heterogeneity, volatility declines and becomes flat across the earnings distribution. These results underscore the value of expectations data.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedmoi/103004/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Arellano, Manuel; Attanasio, Orazio; Borella, Margherita; De Nardi, Mariacristina; Paz-Pardo, Gonzalo</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-04-07</dc:date>
<dc:subject>Subjective expectations; Earnings dynamics models</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>126</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.21034/iwp.126</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Opportunity and Inclusive Growth Institute Working Papers</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>The Macroeconomic Causes and Consequences of Inflation</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedmqr/102912</link>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedmqr/102912</guid>
<dc:creator>Watson, Mark; Kohn, Donald L.; Lorenzoni, Guido; Reichlin, Lucrezia</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2025-03-18</dc:date>
<bibo:volume>45</bibo:volume>
<bibo:issue>4</bibo:issue>
<identifiers:doi>10.21034/qr.4541</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Quarterly Review</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Moving to Fluidity: Regional Growth and Labor Market Churn</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedmoi/102812/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[This paper studies the connection between regional growth trends and labor market dynamics. New data on manufacturing worker flows for U.S. cities 1969-1981 show more new hires and more voluntary quits in growing cities, but more forced layoffs in shrinking cities. Recessions are special in growing cities in that hires and quits drop, whereas in shrinking cities layoffs rise. A quantitative business cycle model with migration and on-the-job search accounts for a large share of variation in growth and worker flows both over time and across space. Growing cities in the South and West had low job creation costs and only gradual in-migration, so tight labor markets encouraged more on-the-job search. In those cities, aggregate job destruction shocks generated recessions with lower labor market churn. In the shrinking cities of the Rust Belt, in contrast, churn was always low and responded little in recessions.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedmoi/102812/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Schneider, Martin; Hoffmann, Eran B.; Piazzesi, Monika</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-02-24</dc:date>
<dc:subject>Quits; Layoffs; Hires; Migration; On-the-job search; Labor market churn</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>125</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.21034/iwp.125</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Opportunity and Inclusive Growth Institute Working Papers</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Why Do Households Save and Work?</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedmoi/102357/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[This paper quantifies why households save and work using a life-cycle model that incorporates wage risk, endogenous labor supply of both spouses, marital transitions, health, medical expenses, mortality, and bequest motives at the death of the first and last household member. We estimate it using PSID and HRS data and conduct counterfactuals to assess the quantitative role of individual mechanisms. Precautionary saving against wage risk is smaller than in models that abstract from labor supply and within-household insurance. Bequest motives and medical expenses remain important drivers of wealth, while marriage and divorce generate large but offsetting effects across household types.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedmoi/102357/original</guid>
<dc:creator>De Nardi, Mariacristina; Torres Chain, Johanna P.; Yang, Fang; Borella, Margherita</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-01-30</dc:date>
<dc:subject>Households; Savings; Working; Precautionary saving</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>124</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.21034/iwp.124</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Opportunity and Inclusive Growth Institute Working Papers</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>A Macroeconomic Perspective on Stock Market Valuation Ratios</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedmsr/102356/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Traditional valuation metrics for the U.S. stock market based on a comparison of the aggregate market value of U.S. corporations to measures of dividends, earnings, output, and the replacement cost of measured capital have been above historical norms for the past 25–30 years. Will they return to their historical means? We use macroeconomic data to argue that the observed decline in labor’s share of corporate output in conjunction with relatively weak corporate investment mechanically generates a persistent rise in the ratio of corporate valuation relative to corporate earnings, even absent any changes in expected returns or growth rates.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedmsr/102356/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Heathcote, Jonathan; Atkeson, Andrew; Perri, Fabrizio</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-01-30</dc:date>
<dc:subject>Earnings; Enterprise value; Free cash flow</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>682</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.21034/sr.682</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Staff Report</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Intergenerational Welfare Assessments</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedmoi/102340/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[This paper studies welfare assessments in economies with rich demographics. We introduce the notion of demographically disconnected economies, those with no date at which all individuals are concurrently alive. We identify the unique class of units that always enables meaningful welfare comparisons in such economies: those based on perpetual consumption, that is, consumption at all dates. Using these units, we uncover a novel possibility: feasible perturbations of Pareto efficient allocations can yield Kaldor-Hicks efficiency gains. We also introduce a decomposition that attributes intertemporal-sharing efficiency gains to financial frictions or demographic differences. These results allow us to derive new insights in three workhorse intergenerational models: (i) Samuelson (1958) two-date-life model, offering a novel rationale for social security; (ii) Diamond (1965) growth model, providing a new theory for capital taxation and capital over-/under-accumulation; and (iii) Samuelson (1958) three-date-life model, decomposing the efficiency gains from intergenerational transfers into frictional and demographic sources.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedmoi/102340/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Barcons, Sergi; Schaab, Andreas; Dávila, Eduardo</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-01-16</dc:date>
<dc:subject>Capital taxation; OLG economies; Intergenerational welfare; Social security; Interpersonal welfare comparisons</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>123</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.21034/iwp.123</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Opportunity and Inclusive Growth Institute Working Papers</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>How Restrictive is U.S. Trade Policy?</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedmsr/102316/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[This short note computes Trade Restrictiveness Index measures for current U.S. trade policy. Building on the ideas of Anderson and Neary (1996, 2005), the Trade Restrictiveness Index is the uniform tariff that leaves the U.S. consumer as well off as under actual policy. As of October 2025, U.S. trade policy is twice as restrictive as headline tariff numbers suggest. The Trade Restrictiveness Index is 23 percent, which stands in contrast to the 11 percent average tariff rate. Trade policy towards Canada and Mexico is two to three times more restrictive than average tariff rates suggest. Sectoral analysis shows that the restrictiveness is concentrated in vehicles, machinery, and electrical equipment.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedmsr/102316/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Waugh, Michael E.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2025-01-09</dc:date>
<dc:subject>Tariffs; Trade Restrictiveness Index; U.S. trade policy</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>681</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.21034/sr.681</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Staff Report</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Default and Interest Rate Shocks: Renegotiation Matters</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedmsr/102198/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[We develop a sovereign default model with debt renegotiation in which interest-rate shocks affect default incentives through two mechanisms. Under the standard mechanism, higher interest rates tighten the government’s budget constraint. Under the renegotiation mechanism, higher rates increase lenders’ opportunity cost of holding delinquent debt, which makes lenders accept larger haircuts and makes default more attractive for the government. We argue that our novel renegotiation mechanism reconciles standard sovereign default models with the narrative that the sharp increase in the real interest rate in the United States was a relevant factor in the defaults of the early 1980s.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedmsr/102198/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Almeida, Victor; Esquivel, Carlos; Kehoe, Timothy J.; Nicolini, Juan Pablo</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2025-12-08</dc:date>
<dc:subject>Renegotiation; Interest rate shocks; Sovereign default</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>679</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.21034/sr.679</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Staff Report</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Official Sovereign Debt</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedmsr/102197/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[This paper studies sovereign debt from official lenders empirically and theoretically. We document that official sovereign debt is more than half of the total sovereign debt in emerging markets and tends to flow in during default episodes. We then develop a model in which a sovereign borrows from official and private lenders, can partially and selectively default on each, and faces bond prices that compensate for default losses. Official debt differs from private debt in that it is of longer duration and more concessional after a default. Default does not preclude borrowing, and episodes end when the sovereign repays accrued obligations and deleverages to sustainable debt levels. A main finding is that longer-duration official debt carries greater debt capacity because it can constrain future governments from borrowing and allows future pledgeable resources to strengthen its repayment incentives. Our model rationalizes the stylized facts, including that official debt flows in during defaults and the sovereign ends the episode with a portfolio of longer-duration official debt. Counterfactuals show that Pareto-improving voluntary swaps exchanging one type of debt for another can be feasible and provide guidance for the contractual design of official debt.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedmsr/102197/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Arellano, Cristina; Barreto, Leonardo</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2025-12-05</dc:date>
<dc:subject>Debt maturity; Default; Bilateral and multilateral lending; Emerging markets; Debt swaps</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>678</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.21034/sr.678</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Staff Report</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Economists Should Be Studying Monopoly Much More Extensively: How Our Interest in Monopoly Waned After We Began Thinking About Monopoly All Wrong</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedmsr/102182/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Our forebears --- including Adam Smith, Anne Robert Jacques Turgot, William Stanley Jevons, Frank A. Fetter, Lionel Robbins, Jacob Viner, Henry Simons and Thurman Arnold --- understood there were many types of groups or organizations that develop into monopolies, including trade associations, cartels, unions, cooperatives and professional associations. They also emphasized that it's difficult to know the full extent of monopolization, as many monopolies were informally organized, while others, perhaps the majority, were alliances of monopolies, making both types hard to detect. Our forebears also understood that monopolies took many types of harmful actions, such as destroying substitutes for their products and services, typically those purchased by low income families. They saw monopolies as the major cause of inequality. But after 1950, our profession simply ignored our forebears' great knowledge. At this time, we adopted the definition of monopoly we have used for the last 75 years --- "A monopoly is a firm that is a single seller with no close substitutes." This obviously presents a very narrow view of the organizations that develop into monopolies and the type of harmful actions they take. Under such a view, Harberger (1954) found that the social costs of monopoly were trivial. Our profession's interest in monopoly subsequently waned (see, e.g., Krugman (2015)). But our views about monopoly should not be driven by Harberger (1954), rather we should look to our great forebears. Moreover, a recent literature conducting research in the "spirit" of our forebears (reviewed in Schmitz (2020)) has essentially rediscovered our forebears' findings but for our current period. Our profession should be studying monopoly much more extensively.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedmsr/102182/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Schmitz, James A.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2025-11-26</dc:date>
<swpo:hasNumber>677</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.21034/sr.677</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Staff Report</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Income and Wealth Inequality in the United States: An Update Including the 2022 Wave</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedmqr/102181</link>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedmqr/102181</guid>
<dc:creator>Ríos-Rull, José-Víctor; Kuhn, Moritz</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2025-11-25</dc:date>
<bibo:volume>45</bibo:volume>
<bibo:issue>3</bibo:issue>
<identifiers:doi>10.21034/qr.4532</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Quarterly Review</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Ramsey Plan for Calvo’s Model</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedmqr/102180</link>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedmqr/102180</guid>
<dc:creator>Sargent, Thomas J.; Yang, Ziyue</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2025-11-25</dc:date>
<bibo:volume>45</bibo:volume>
<bibo:issue>3</bibo:issue>
<identifiers:doi>10.21034/qr.4531</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Quarterly Review</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Cohabitation, Child Development, and College Costs</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedmoi/102177/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[US college-educated couples with children marry at higher rates than those without a college degree. We argue that marriage, which entails lower separation risk and more equitable asset division if separation occurs, provides insurance to the lower-earning spouse, facilitating child investment. Investing in children is more valuable for college-educated couples, who are more likely to send their children to college. Using an OLG model of marriage, cohabitation, wealth accumulation, and educational investments where college is costly and completion is risky, we find that high college costs reduce incentives to marry among couples without a college degree. These differences in union choice by education heighten differences in children’s educational attainment and reduce intergenerational mobility.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedmoi/102177/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Obermeier, Tim; Adamopoulou, Effrosyni; Hannusch, Anne; Kopecky, Karen A.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2025-11-26</dc:date>
<dc:subject>Intergenerational mobility; college costs; human capital accumulation; cohabitation; Marriage; child development</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>122</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.21034/iwp.122</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Opportunity and Inclusive Growth Institute Working Papers</bibo:series>
</item>
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</rss>