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<title>Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago publications</title>
<description>Economic research and commentary from Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago</description>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/search?facets[]=provider_literal_array:Federal+Reserve+Bank+of+Chicago</link>
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<pubDate>Wed, 11 Mar 2026 03:56:00 +0000</pubDate>
<item>
<title>Firms and the Gender Wage Gap: A Comparison of Eleven Countries</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedhwp/102275/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[We quantify the role of gender-specific firm wage premiums in explaining the private-sector gender gap in hourly wages using a harmonized research design across 11 matched employer-employee datasets—ten European countries and Washington state, USA. These premiums contribute to the gender wage gap through two channels: women’s concentration in lower-paying firms (sorting) and women receiving lower premiums than men within the same firm (pay-setting). We find that firm wage premiums account for 10 to 30 percent of the gender wage gap. While both mechanisms matter, sorting is the predominant driver of the firm contribution to the gender wage gap in most countries. We document three patterns that are broadly consistent across countries: (1) women’s sorting into lower-paying firms increases with age; (2) women are more concentrated in low-paying firms with a high share of part-time workers; and (3) women receive about 90 percent of the rents that men receive from firm surplus gains.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedhwp/102275/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Nordström Skans, Oskar; Lochner, Benjamin; Gulumser, Dogan; Lombardi, Stefano; Lattanzio, Salvatore; Lassen, Anne Sophie; Lachowska, Marta; Meekes, Jordy; Bertheau, Antoine; Hijzen, Alexander; Muraközy, Balázs; Palladino, Marco; Kunze, Astrid; Barreto, César</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2025-12-08</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>88</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>Gender wage gap; Firms; Cross country comparison</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>WP 2025-24</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.21033/wp-2025-24</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Working Paper Series</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Financial life after the death of a spouse</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedhle/92800</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[The death of a spouse results in a considerable decline in average income for the surviving spouse. The Social Security survivors benefits program compensates the surviving spouse, most often a woman, for almost all of the lost income, allowing them to work less, but many widows who are not yet eligible for the program struggle to meet their financial needs.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedhle/92800</guid>
<dc:creator>Ramnath, Shanthi; Camner McKay, Lisa; Tong, Patricia K.; Fadlon, Itzik</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2020-05-19</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>5</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>household behavior; family economics; allocative efficiency; cost-benefit analysis; health; demand and supply of labor</dc:subject>
<bibo:issue>438</bibo:issue>
<bibo:series>Chicago Fed Letter</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Medicaid-ing Uninsurance? The Impact of the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid Expansion on Uninsurance Spells</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedhwp/97421/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[We study the effect of the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion on coverage dynamics following the sudden loss of coverage from an employer plan. This analysis leverages novel administrative data capturing monthly health insurance coverage for the U.S. population. Using these data, we develop several stylized facts describing the post-separation coverage dynamics. In addition, we use a difference-in-differences model to estimate the causal effect of Medicaid expansion on the duration of uninsurance following a separation from an employer plan. We find that Medicaid expansion increases the likelihood of finding coverage by 16% and reduces the duration of uninsurance by 12%.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedhwp/97421/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Patel, Elena; Heim, Bradley T.; Ramnath, Shanthi</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2023-11</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>47</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>Health insurance; Unemployment; Medicaid expansion</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>WP 2023-41</swpo:hasNumber>
<bibo:series>Working Paper Series</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>How the U.S. Treasury Futures Market and the Basis Trade Could Be Affected by the Treasury Clearing Mandate: Part 2—The Possible Role of Cross-Margining</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedhle/102807</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[In part 2 of this Chicago Fed Letter series, I delve further into the implications of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) recent mandate requiring transactions for both U.S. Treasury cash securities and repurchase agreements (repos) to be cleared and settled through an authorized central counterparty (CCP). In part 1, I provided a primer on the Treasury futures market and the Treasury cash–futures basis trade and touched on the possible impact of the SEC mandate on both. Here, I explain in greater detail how the mandate could affect the cost and functioning of the basis trade. In addition, I examine the possible role of CCP cross-margining programs—which recognize offsetting exposures to similar risks across the Treasury futures and repo markets—in mitigating the mandate’s impact on the amounts of collateral, or initial margin (IM), that clearing members (or their clients) will need to post at CCPs.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedhle/102807</guid>
<dc:creator>Patel, Ketan B.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-01</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>8</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>Treasury securities; Treasury futures; Treasury repo rate; basis trades; Leverage; Central clearing; Nonbank financial institutions; Nonbank Financial Institutions (NBFIs); pension funds; Government Policy and Regulation; Interest rates</dc:subject>
<bibo:volume>517</bibo:volume>
<bibo:series>Chicago Fed Letter</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>How the U.S. Treasury Futures Market and the Basis Trade Could Be Affected by the Treasury Clearing Mandate: Part 1—A Primer</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedhle/102806</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[A recent mandate by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) aims to improve the resilience and transparency of markets for U.S. Treasury cash securities and repurchase agreements (repos) by requiring transactions for both be cleared and settled through an authorized central counterparty (CCP). I explore the implications of this mandate for Treasury markets and central clearing in a two-part Chicago Fed Letter series. Part 1 is a primer on Treasury futures and the Treasury cash–futures basis trade—two key features of the Treasury markets that could also be affected by the mandate.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedhle/102806</guid>
<dc:creator>Patel, Ketan B.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-01</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>8</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>Treasury futures; Treasury securities; Treasury repo rate; basis trades; Leverage; Central clearing; Nonbank financial institutions; Nonbank Financial Institutions (NBFIs); Asset pricing; Trading volume; pension funds</dc:subject>
<bibo:volume>516</bibo:volume>
<bibo:series>Chicago Fed Letter</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Marriage, Labor Supply, and the Dynamics of the Social Safety Net</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedhwp/102278/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[The 1996 U.S. welfare reform introduced time limits on welfare receipt. We use quasi-experimental evidence and a rich life cycle model to understand the impact of time limits on different margins of behavior and well-being. We stress the impact of marital status and marital transitions on mitigating the cost and impact of time limits. Time limits cause women to defer claiming in anticipation of future needs and to work more, effects that depend on the probabilities of marriage and divorce. They also cause an increase in employment among single mothers and reduce divorce, but their introduction costs women 0.7% of lifetime consumption, gross of the redistribution of government savings.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedhwp/102278/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Voena, Alessandra; Pistaferri, Luigi; Low, Hamish W.; Meghir, Costas</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2025-12-19</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>98</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>Welfare; Welfare reform; Limited commitment</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>WP 2025-27</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.21033/wp-2025-27</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Working Paper Series</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Fertility and Family Labor Supply</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedhwp/102277/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[We study how fertility decisions interact with labor supply and human capital accumulation of men and women. First, we use longitudinal Danish register data and tax reforms to show that increases in wages of women decrease fertility while increases in wages of men increase fertility. Second, we estimate a life-cycle model to quantify the importance of fertility adjustments for labor supply and long-run gender inequality. Wage elasticities of women are more than 10% lower if fertility cannot be adjusted. Finally, we show that the long-term consequences of human capital depreciation around childbirth are an important driver of the long-run gender wage gap in the model.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedhwp/102277/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Jorgensen, Thomas H.; Low, Hamish W.; Jakobsen, Katrine M.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2025-12-19</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>127</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>Fertility; Labor supply; human capital accumulation; Gender inequality; Tax reform</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>WP 2025-26</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.21033/wp-2025-26</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Working Paper Series</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Joint Child Custody and Interstate Migration</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedhwp/102276/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Joint custody following divorce is widespread, yet the implementation of joint custody is costly when individuals live in different states, so it affects interstate mobility. Migration of divorced fathers has fallen significantly more than that of married fathers. We show the causal effect of joint custody using two strategies. First, we survey divorced parents to elicit beliefs about the likelihood of interstate moves. Second, we use the staggered adoption of joint custody laws across U.S. states, and show a reduction in actual migration of 11 percentage points for fathers. For mothers, there is no impact on mobility from the adoption of joint custody, though there is suggestive evidence of beneficial labor market outcomes.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedhwp/102276/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Adams, Abi; Jorgensen, Thomas H.; Voena, Alessandra; Low, Hamish W.; Bayraktar, Oğuz</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2025-12-02</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>41</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>Migration; Divorce</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>WP 2025-25</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.21033/wp-2025-25</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Working Paper Series</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Expenditures, Earnings, and Net Worth of the Comédie Française, 1723–1793</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedhwp/102274/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[I study the expenditures of the Comédie française from 1759 to 1793 and the company’s debt from 1723 to 1793. Expenditures were well controlled and changes in venues account for their increase over time. The debt, however, was less controlled, because of the company’s partnership structure and the incentives it created for actors to compensate with debt any shortfall in income due to low tickets sales or delayed payments from the king. I analyze the debt instruments used and the social background of the lenders. I also study the total income of individual actors and the earnings profile over their career. A government intervention in 1759 provided only long-term financial relief but imposed better debt management. The company was in a fragile position when the Revolution broke out, but the hyperinflation of 1795–96 wiped out a large part of the debt.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedhwp/102274/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Velde, Francois R.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2025-10-29</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>49</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>Entertainment industry; history of theater; Oligopoly; France</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>WP 2025-22</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.21033/wp-2025-22</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Working Paper Series</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>One Fed, Many Voices: Coordinated Communication vs. Transparent Debate</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedhwp/102273/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[We analyze 481 speeches by FOMC members since 2007, excluding official press conferences. Combining high-frequency financial data with text analysis, we identify monetary policy surprises and measure each speech’s similarity to the Chair’s press conference preceding it. On average, monetary surprises around these speeches have no significant effect on inflation expectations or stock prices. Yet, speeches closely aligned with the Chair’s press conference amplify policy transmission, while less coordinated remarks dilute earlier effects on yields, inflation expectations, and equities. A general equilibrium model with incomplete information rationalizes these findings.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedhwp/102273/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Melosi, Leonardo; Villa, Alessandro; Ferroni, Filippo; Djourelova, Milena</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2025-11-20</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>40</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>monetary policy communication; FOMC; Text Analysis; Central bank; Market expectations</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>WP 2025-23</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.21033/wp-2025-23</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Working Paper Series</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Britain’s Debt Restructuring, 1717–22</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedhwp/102270/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Britain’s debt was nil in 1688 and 60% of GDP in 1717. From 1717 to 1722 the debt was restructured, including through the South Sea operation of 1720. I discuss the reasons for the restructuring and the tensions it revealed between taxpayers and creditors. The South Sea bubble turned the operation into an ex-post Ponzi scheme and redistributed among creditors, from late to early entrants, and from creditors to taxpayers. Parliament intervened to redistribute among creditors (but far less than was feasible) and, very reluctantly, from taxpayers to creditors. Commitment to honor the debt was still weak thirty-five years after the Glorious Revolution.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedhwp/102270/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Velde, Francois R.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2025-10-29</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>55</rdau:hasExtent>
<swpo:hasNumber>WP 2025-21</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.21033/wp-2025-21</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Working Paper Series</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>An Institutional Investor in 18th-Century Britain</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedhwp/102249/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Queen Anne’s Bounty was a corporation created in 1704 to redistribute income within the Anglican clergy. Structurally a saver needing a liquid asset, the corporation pursued a conservative strategy of investing in the dominant form of government debt, adapting as the market changed. It was involved in the South Sea Bubble but only made losses and steered clear from corporate equity and bonds thereafter.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedhwp/102249/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Velde, Francois R.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2025-09-19</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>23</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>investors; Bubble; Public debt</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>WP 2025-20</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.21033/wp-2025-20</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Working Paper Series</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>The Inherent Nonlinearity in Learning: Implications for Understanding Stock Returns</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedhwp/102246/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Financial markets (and more generally the real economy) display a wide range of important nonlinearities. This paper focuses on stock returns, which are skewed left– generating crashes– and have volatility that moves over time, is itself skewed, is strongly related to the level of prices, and displays long memory. This paper shows that such behavior is actually almost inevitable when prices are formed by investors acquiring information about the true, but latent, value of stocks. It studies a general model of filtering in which agents receive signals about the fundamental value of the stock market and dynamically update their beliefs (potentially with biases). When those beliefs are non-normal and investors believe crashes can happen, prices generically display the range of nonlinearities observed in the data. While the model does not explain where crashes come from, it shows that investors believing that prices can crash is sufficient to generate the rich higher-order dynamics observed empirically. In a simple calibration with iid shocks to fundamentals, the model fits well quantitatively, and regression-based tests support the model’s mechanism.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedhwp/102246/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Molavi, Pooya; Giglio, Stefano; Dew-Becker, Ian</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2025-08-27</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>50</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>Skewness; crashes; Tail risk; Learning</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>WP 2025-16</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.21033/wp-2025-16</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Working Paper Series</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>The Decline of the Variance Risk Premium: Evidence from Traded and Synthetic Options</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedhwp/101806/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Equity index options historically displayed sharply negative returns and CAPM alphas. This could reflect investor risk preferences or intermediary frictions. We document that over the past 15 years, option alphas have become indistinguishable from zero. We also introduce synthetic options, that, under some conditions, reflect risk preferences of the average equity investor, independent of option-market frictions. Synthetic options never, over the last 100 years, had negative alpha, indicating that equity investors never required high compensation for market downturns. An intermediary-based model explains the patterns in both synthetic and traded options, including the recent decline in the variance risk premium.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedhwp/101806/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Dew-Becker, Ian; Giglio, Stefano</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2025-09</dc:date>
<dc:subject>Options; Tail risk; Financial friction</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>WP 2025-17</swpo:hasNumber>
<bibo:series>Working Paper Series</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Skewness and Time-Varying Second Moments in a Nonlinear Production Network: Theory and Evidence</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedhwp/101805/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[This paper studies asymmetry in economic activity in a multisector model with shocks to productivity and labor wedges. Complementarity across inputs—creating nonlinear intersectoral interactions—creates negative skewness. The analysis generates additional predictions—skewness is smaller at the sector than aggregate level, sector-specific shocks are unskewed, and sector centrality rises following negative shocks—and finds empirical support for them. Skewness arising out of intersector interactions helps reconcile differences in skewness at the micro and macro level. Finally, we show the model’s ability to match the data comes from the wedge shocks, rather than variation in productivity.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedhwp/101805/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Dew-Becker, Ian; Vedolin, Andrea</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2025-09-04</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>70</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>GDP; Skewness; Employent; Network</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>WP 2025-18</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.21033/wp-2025-18</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Working Paper Series</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Computing Aggregate Fluctuations of Economies with Private Information</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedhwp/101803/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[This paper introduces a general method for computing aggregate fluctuations in economies with private information. Instead of the cross-sectional distribution of agents across individual states, the method uses as a state variable a vector of spline coefficients describing a long history of past individual decision rules. The model is then linearized with respect to that vector. Applying the computational method to a Mirrlees RBC economy with known analytical solution recovers the solution perfectly well. This test provides significant confidence on the accuracy of the method.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedhwp/101803/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Veracierto, Marcelo</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2025-08</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>65</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>Computational methods; Heterogeneous agent; Business cycle; Private information</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>WP 2025-19</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.21033/wp-2025-19</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Working Paper Series</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>What Can We Learn About the Costs and Benefits of Tariffs from a Trade Model?</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedhle/101738</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[In this article, we quantify the costs and benefits of tariffs based on a modern trade model. This model predicts that in the case of unilateral tariffs set by the U.S., a modest across-the-board increase in tariff rates can generate a net positive effect on consumption. This occurs when the tariff revenue collected exceeds the output losses caused by resulting distortions and higher domestic prices. The model predicts a peak net gain in consumption equivalent to 0.3% of real gross domestic product (GDP) with a 19.7% unilateral tariff increase, under the assumption that trade partners to the U.S. will not retaliate. However, if foreign countries respond with retaliatory tariffs, the resulting decline in demand for U.S. exports causes an output loss that outweighs the revenue gains. In the long run, as firms and workers reallocate resources across sectors, the model predicts that both the positive and negative effects of tariffs are lower.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedhle/101738</guid>
<dc:creator>Hillier, Caydn; Zhang, Jing; Royal, Jim; Hobijn, Bart</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2025-09</dc:date>
<dc:subject>Tariff; International trade; Macroeconomics</dc:subject>
<bibo:volume>512</bibo:volume>
<bibo:series>Chicago Fed Letter</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Perspectives of Small Business Intermediaries in Chicago: A Snapshot from Spring 2025</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/h00003/101737</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[The small business ecosystem in the greater Chicagoland area includes over 130 business service organizations (BSOs) that offer advice, training, and workshops to entrepreneurs at various stages of business development. Small businesses make an important contribution to the U.S. economy, and they are often up against tremendous odds to survive. BSOs are a good source for identifying the concerns of the small businesses that they work with, and as the economic and policy environment evolves, BSOs themselves are facing a growing number of issues.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/h00003/101737</guid>
<dc:creator>Kelley, Garvester; Newberger, Robin G.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2025-08</dc:date>
<ebucore:publicationChannel>
</ebucore:publicationChannel>
</item>
<item>
<title>Technology Providers and Financial Stability: Overview of Risks and Regulatory Frameworks</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedhwp/101721/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Technology-focused Third-Party Service Providers (TPSPs) have become important players in the operations of financial institutions and the financial markets. This paper summarizes micro- and macro-prudential regulatory frameworks in place to address risks that TPSPs pose to the financial system. The key takeaways are as follows: First, in the U.S., TPSPs operate under limited comprehensive prudential regulatory oversight, aimed primarily at ensuring that their products are safe and resilient on an ongoing basis. Second, while banks rely on multiple TPSPs and hundreds of their services daily for their core banking businesses, U.S. banking supervisors have limited direct visibility into these activities and risks they may pose. Third, although the existing U.S. regulatory framework has some systemic risk considerations, there is no macroprudential structure in place for TPSP risks. Official bodies in other jurisdictions have developed macroprudential frameworks or high-level guidance to address TPSP risks, but their implementation in major economies is nascent at best. Finally, TPSPs are likely an important source of systemic vulnerability for financial institutions and financial markets, although vulnerabilities may be difficult to discern due to a need to assess the criticality of each activity performed by TPSPs and the concentration of TPSPs within that activity.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedhwp/101721/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Amromin, Gene; Anadu, Kenechukwu E.; Solimine, Brett; Sanders, Siobhan; Bräuning, Falk; Hull, Cindy E.; Weiss, Emma; Chapel, Amy; Garza, Lorenzo; Chmielewski, Rebecca; Schulhofer-Wohl, Sam; Cowperthwait, Patricia K.; Cho, Meeoak</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2025-06-23</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>14</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>Financial stablity; third-party service providers; cyber risks</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>WP 2025-08</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.21033/wp-2025-08</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Working Paper Series</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>The 2025 U.S. Debt Limit Through the Lens of Financial Markets</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedhwp/101720/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[We examine the 2025 U.S. debt limit episode through the lens of financial markets. First, we document an increase in trading activity in the U.S. sovereign CDS market, and we infer a probability of default from CDS premiums. We find that default risk reached 1% by the November 6 Presidential election, fell quickly after that, and progressively climbed back up in subsequent months to the current 1.1% level. Overall, these estimates are well below the default risk estimates for the debt-limit episodes of 2011, 2013, and 2023, which range from 4% to 6%. Second, so far we only find small distortions in the market for Treasury bills that mature around the “X-date,” when Treasury is expected to extinguish its existing resources, and thus would be most affected by a hypothetical default. This is in contrast with the 2023 episode, when bills maturing around the X-date traded with a yield that was about 1% higher than those maturing in other months. Third, we discuss the broader consequences that debt-limit events can have for the level of bank reserves at the Federal Reserve, and their implications for money markets liquidity.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedhwp/101720/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Benzoni, Luca; Wernick, Marisa</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2025-05-27</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>33</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>U.S. Default; Default probability; CDS; Debt limit</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>WP 2025-07</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.21033/wp-2025-07</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Working Paper Series</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Human Capital in a Time of Low Real Rates</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedhwp/101718/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[We argue that a long-term low real rate environment can increase labor income inequality, amplify the emergence of the working rich, and reduce intergenerational mobility. We provide a simple model with endogenous human capital accumulation and credit constraints to demonstrate this causal link. The mechanism operates through a tilting of the human capital gradient: wealthy households, more so than poor households, will increase human capital investment in response to low rates. Normatively, these tilting responses to low rates are inefficient, but higher capital taxes are not an ideal response. We find empirical support for our tilting mechanism over the last 60 years in the U.S. Quantitatively, we show that the endogenous human capital investment response to low interest rates can account for a 17% rise in cross-sectional labor income variance (higher inequality) and a 7% higher parent-child labor income intergenerational elasticity (lower mobility).]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedhwp/101718/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Khorrami, Paymon; Sakong, Jung</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2025-08-08</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>51</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>Human capital; Income inequality; intergenerational mobility; working rich; Low interest rates; Borrowing constraints</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>WP 2025-15</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.21033/wp-2025-15</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Working Paper Series</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Composition-Adjusted Wage Growth: A Robust Measure from Microdata</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedhwp/101717/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[Wage growth is a key indicator of labor market conditions, but common measures often conflate individual wage changes with shifts in workforce composition. This paper develops a composition-adjusted measure of wage growth using nonparametric decomposition and program evaluation methods. The adjusted measure tracks unadjusted growth in stable periods but diverges during disruptions: during the Covid-19 pandemic, wage growth falls from 12% to 6% after adjustment. The method accommodates rich covariates, is robust to data quality issues such as rounding, heaping and top-coding, and enables distributional and subgroup analysis using micro data, offering more accurate views of underlying wage dynamics.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedhwp/101717/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Hu, Luojia; Honore, Bo E.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2025-07</dc:date>
<dc:subject>Wage growth; Selection; Decomposition</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>WP 2025-14</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.21033/wp-2025-14</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Working Paper Series</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Optimal Fiscal Policy Under Endogenous Disaster Risk: How to Avoid Wars?</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedhwp/101716/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[We examine the role of government investment in defense capital as a deterrence tool. Using an optimal fiscal policy framework with endogenous disaster risk, we allow for an endogenous determination of geopolitical risk and defense capacity, which we discipline using the Geopolitical Risk Index. We show both analytically and quantitatively that financing defense primarily through debt, rather than taxation, is optimal. Debt issuance mitigates present tax distortions but exacerbates them in the future, especially in wartime. However, since additional defense capital deters future wars, the expected tax distortions decline as well, making debt financing a welfare-improving strategy. Quantitatively, the optimal defense financing in the presence of heightened risk involves a twice higher share of debt and backloading of tax distortions compared to other types of government spending.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedhwp/101716/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Valaitis, Vytautas; Villa, Alessandro</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2025-03</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>59</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>Optimal fiscal policy; Incomplete markets; endogenous disaster risk</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>WP 2025-13</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.21033/wp-2025-13</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Working Paper Series</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>www.LaborMarketUpdate.net: Real-Time Research-Based Analyses of the State of the U.S. Labor Market</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedhwp/101715/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[This paper introduces www.labormarketupdate.net, a new website that delivers real-time analyses of the U.S. labor market grounded in our applied macro-labor research agenda. We explain how the site’s resources can be used to track labor market developments through the lens of a stylized labor-market cycle.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedhwp/101715/original</guid>
<dc:creator>Hobijn, Bart; Sahin, Aysegul</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2025-08-01</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>13</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>Real-time analysis; Labor market</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>WP 2025-12</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.21033/wp-2025-12</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Working Paper Series</bibo:series>
</item>
<item>
<title>Artificial Intelligence in the Office and the Factory: Evidence from Administrative Software Registry Data</title>
<link>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedhwp/101714/original</link>
<description>
<![CDATA[I use administrative data on artificial intelligence (AI) software created in Brazil to study its effects on the labor market. Owing to a unique copyright system, Brazilian firms have registered their software with the government since the 1980s, creating a detailed record of nearly all commercial AI applications developed in the country. Drawing on this registry, I show that AI is widely used not only in administrative tasks but also in production settings, where it primarily supports process optimization and quality control. Using an instrument based on variation in software development costs, I find that AI affects administrative and production workers differently. Among office workers, AI reduces employment and wages, particularly for middle-wage earners. Among production workers, it increases employment of low-skilled and young workers operating machinery. These results suggest that AI displaces routine office tasks while making machines more productive and easier to operate, leading to a net increase in employment.]]>
</description>
<guid>https://fedinprint.org/item/fedhwp/101714/original</guid>
<dc:creator>de Souza, Gustavo</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2025-07-21</dc:date>
<rdau:hasExtent>99</rdau:hasExtent>
<dc:subject>Artificial intelligence; Automation; software; inequality</dc:subject>
<swpo:hasNumber>WP 2025-11</swpo:hasNumber>
<identifiers:doi>10.21033/wp-2025-11</identifiers:doi>
<bibo:series>Working Paper Series</bibo:series>
</item>
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