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Jel Classification:L40 

Working Paper
Beyond "Horizontal" and "Vertical": The Welfare Effects of Complex Integration

We study the welfare impacts of mergers in markets where some firms are already vertically integrated. Our model features logit Bertrand competition downstream and Nash Bargaining upstream. We numerically simulate four merger types: vertical mergers between an unintegrated retailer and an unintegrated wholesaler, downstream "horizontal" mergers between an unintegrated retailer and an integrated retailer/wholesaler, upstream "horizontal" mergers between an unintegrated wholesaler and an integrated retailer/wholesaler, and integrated mergers between two integrated retailer/wholesaler pairs. We ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2023-005

Working Paper
The Impact of Stricter Merger Control on Bank Mergers and Acquisitions. Too-Big-To-Fail and Competition

The effect of regulations on the banking sector is a key question for financial intermediation. This paper provides evidence that merger control regulation, although not directly targeted at the banking sector, has substantial economic effects on bank mergers. Based on an extensive sample of European countries, we show that target announcement premia increased by up to 16 percentage points for mergers involving control shifts after changes in merger legislation, consistent with a market expectation of increased profitability. These effects go hand-in-hand with a reduction in the propensity ...
Working Papers , Paper 16-14R2

Working Paper
Estimating the Competitive Effects of Common Ownership

If managers maximize the payoffs of their shareholders rather than firm profits, then it may be anticompetitive for a shareholder to own competing firms. This is because a manager?s objective function may place weight on profits of competitors who are held by the same shareholder. Recent research found evidence that common ownership by diversified institutional investors is anticompetitive by showing that prices in the airline and banking industries are related to generalized versions of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) that account for common ownership. In this paper we propose an ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2017-029

Working Paper
The Effect of Common Ownership on Profits : Evidence From the U.S. Banking Industry

Theory predicts that "common ownership" (ownership of rivals by a common shareholder) can be anticompetitive because it reduces the weight firms place on their own profits and shifts weight toward rival firms held by common shareholders. In this paper we use accounting data from the banking industry to examine empirically whether shifts in the profit weights are associated with shifts in profits. We present the distribution of a wide range of estimates that vary the specification, sample restrictions, and assumptions used to calculate the profit weights. The distribution of estimates is ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2018-069

Working Paper
Beyond "Horizontal" and "Vertical": The Welfare Effects of Complex Integration

We study the welfare impacts of mergers in markets where some firms are already vertically integrated. Our model features logit Bertrand competition downstream and Nash Bargaining upstream. We numerically simulate four merger types: vertical mergers between an unintegrated retailer and an unintegrated wholesaler, downstream "horizontal" mergers between an unintegrated retailer and an integrated retailer/wholesaler, upstream "horizontal" mergers between an unintegrated wholesaler and an integrated retailer/wholesaler, and integrated mergers between two integrated retailer/wholesaler pairs. We ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2023-005

Working Paper
The Impact of Merger Legislation on Bank Mergers

We find that stricter merger control legislation increases abnormal announcement returns of targets in bank mergers by 7 percentage points. Analyzing potential explanations for this result, we document an increase in the pre-merger profitability of targets, a decrease in the size of acquirers, and a decreasing share of transactions in which banks are acquired by other banks. Other merger properties, including the size and risk profile of targets, the geographic overlap of merging banks, and the stock market response of rivals appear unaffected. The evidence suggests that the strengthening of ...
Working Papers (Old Series) , Paper 1614

Working Paper
The Impact of Merger Legislation on Bank Mergers

We find that stricter merger control legislation increases abnormal announcement returns of targets in bank mergers by 7 percentage points. Analyzing potential explanations for this result, we document an increase in the pre-merger profitability of targets, a decrease in the size of acquirers, and a decreasing share of transactions in which banks are acquired by other banks. Other merger properties, including the size and risk profile of targets, the geographic overlap of merging banks, and the stock market response of rivals appear unaffected. The evidence suggests that the strengthening of ...
Working Papers , Paper 16-14R

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