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ENDOGENOUS/EXOGENOUS SEGMENTATION IN THE A-IRB FRAMEWORK AND THE PRO-CYCLICALITY OF CAPITAL: AN APPLICATION TO MORTGAGE PORTFOLIOS
This paper investigates the pro-cyclicality of capital in the advanced internal ratings-based (A-IRB) Basel approach for retail portfolios and identifies the fundamental assumptions required for stable A-IRB risk weights over the economic cycle. Specifically, it distinguishes between endogenous and exogenous segmentation risk drivers and, through application to a portfolio of first mortgages, shows that risk weights remain stable over the economic cycle when the segmentation scheme is derived using exogenous risk drivers, while segmentation schemes that include endogenous risk drivers are highly pro cyclical. Also analyzed is the sensitivity of the A-IRB framework to model risk resulting from the selection, at the quantification stage, of a data sample period that does not include a period of significant economic downturn. The analysis illustrates important limitations and sensitivities of the A IRB framework and sheds light on the implicit restrictions embedded in recent regulatory guidance that underscore the importance of rating systems that remain stable over time and throughout business cycles.
Cite this item
Jose J. Canals-Cerda, ENDOGENOUS/EXOGENOUS SEGMENTATION IN THE A-IRB FRAMEWORK AND THE PRO-CYCLICALITY OF CAPITAL: AN APPLICATION TO MORTGAGE PORTFOLIOS, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Working Papers 17-9, 19 Apr 2017.
- G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
Keywords: Basel Accord; credit risk; regulatory capital; mortgages
This item with handle RePEc:fip:fedpwp:17-9
is also listed on EconPapers
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