Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
Credit Ratings, Private Information, and Bank Monitoring Ability
In this paper, we use credit rating data from two large Swedish banks to elicit evidence on banks' loan monitoring ability. For these banks, our tests reveal that banks' internal credit ratings indeed include valuable private information from monitoring, as theory suggests. Banks' private information increases with the size of loans.
Cite this item
Leonard I. Nakamura & Kasper Roszbach, Credit Ratings, Private Information, and Bank Monitoring Ability, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Working Papers 16-14, 16 Jun 2016.
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
Keywords: Monitoring; Banks; Credit Bureau; Private Information; Public Information; Ratings; Regulation; Supervision; Overconfidence
This item with handle RePEc:fip:fedpwp:16-14
is also listed on EconPapers
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