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Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
Working Papers
On the inherent instability of private money
Daniel R. Sanches
Abstract

A primary concern in monetary economics is whether a purely private monetary regime is consistent with macroeconomic stability. I show that a competitive regime is inherently unstable due to the properties of endogenously determined limits on private money creation. Precisely, there is a continuum of equilibria characterized by a self-fulfilling collapse of the value of private money and a persistent decline in the demand for money. I associate these equilibrium allocations with self-fulfilling banking crises. It is possible to formulate a fiscal intervention that results in the global determinacy of equilibrium, with the property that the value of private money remains stable. Thus, the goal of monetary stability necessarily requires some form of government intervention.


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Daniel R. Sanches, On the inherent instability of private money, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Working Papers 15-18, 09 Apr 2015.
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Keywords: Private money; Self-fulfilling crises; Macroeconomic stability
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