On December 12, 2019, Fed in Print will introduce its new platform for discovering content. Please direct your questions to Anna Oates

Home About Latest Browse RSS Advanced Search

Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
Working Papers
Meeting technologies and optimal trading mechanisms in competitive search markets
Benjamin Lester
Ludo Visschers
Ronald Wolthoff
Abstract

In a market in which sellers compete by posting mechanisms, we allow for a general meeting technology and show that its properties crucially affect the mechanism that sellers select in equilibrium. In general, it is optimal for sellers to post an auction without a reserve price but with a fee, paid by all buyers who meet with the seller. However, we define a novel condition on meeting technologies, which we call invariance, and show that meeting fees are equal to zero if and only if this condition is satisfied. Finally, we discuss how invariance is related to other properties of meeting technologies identified in the literature.


Download Full text
Cite this item
Benjamin Lester & Ludo Visschers & Ronald Wolthoff, Meeting technologies and optimal trading mechanisms in competitive search markets, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Working Papers 14-15, 23 Apr 2014.
More from this series
JEL Classification:
Subject headings:
Keywords: Search frictions; Matching function; Meeting technology; Competing mechanisms
For corrections, contact Beth Paul ()
Fed-in-Print is the central catalog of publications within the Federal Reserve System. It is managed and hosted by the Economic Research Division, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.

Privacy Legal