Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Optimal disinflation under learning
Highly volatile transition dynamics can emerge when a central bank disinflates while operating without full transparency. In our model, a central bank commits to a Taylor rule whose form is known but whose coefficients are not. Private agents learn about policy parameters via Bayesian updating. Under McCallum’s (1999) timing protocol, temporarily explosive dynamics can arise, making the transition highly volatile. Locally unstable dynamics emerge when there is substantial disagreement between actual and perceived feedback parameters. The central bank can achieve low average inflation, but its ability to adjust reaction coefficients is more limited.
Cite this item
Timothy Cogley & Christian Matthes & Argia M. Sbordone, Optimal disinflation under learning, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Staff Reports 524, 2011, revised 01 May 2014.
Note: For a published version of this report, see Timothy Cogley, Christian Matthes, and Argia M. Sbordone, "Optimal Disinflation under Learning," Review of Economic Studies 82, no. 2 (April 2015): 791-824.
- E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
Keywords: inflation; monetary policy; learning; policy reforms; transitions
This item with handle RePEc:fip:fednsr:524
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