Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Economic Policy Review
A reconsideration of the risk sensitivity of U.S. banking organization subordinated debt spreads: a sample selection approach
The authors estimate a sample selection model over three distinct regulatory "regimes" when the treatment of bank bondholders (in the event of bank failures) differed substantially. They then estimate their selection model to test the strength of bond market discipline over these three regulatory regimes, finding that bank bond spreads are positively associated with bank risk measures during all three regimes, even during the too-big-to-fail period.
Cite this item
Daniel M. Covitz & Diana Hancock & Myron L. Kwast, "A reconsideration of the risk sensitivity of U.S. banking organization subordinated debt spreads: a sample selection approach"
, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Economic Policy Review, issue Sep, pages 73-92, 2004.
Keywords: Bank assets ; Debt management ; Banks and banking - Ratio analysis ; Deposit insurance
This item with handle RePEc:fip:fednep:y:2004:i:sep:p:73-92:n:v.10no.2
is also listed on EconPapers
For corrections, contact Amy Farber ()