Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Macroprudential Policy with Leakages
The outreach of macroprudential policies is likely limited in practice by imperfect regulation enforcement, whether due to shadow banking, regulatory arbitrage, or other regulation circumvention schemes. We study how such concerns affect the design of optimal regulatory policy in a workhorse model in which pecuniary externalities call for macroprudential taxes on debt, but with the addition of a novel constraint that financial regulators lack the ability to enforce taxes on a subset of agents. While regulated agents reduce risk taking in response to debt taxes, unregulated agents react to the safer environment by taking on more risk. These leakages undermine the effectiveness of macroprudential taxes but do not necessarily call for weaker interventions. A quantitative analysis of the model suggests that aggregate welfare gains and reductions in the severity and frequency of financial crises remain, on average, largely unaffected by even significant leakages.
Cite this item
Julien Bengui & Javier Bianchi, Macroprudential Policy with Leakages, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Working Papers 754, 11 Sep 2018.
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
- E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
- F32 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Current Account Adjustment; Short-term Capital Movements
- F41 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Open Economy Macroeconomics
Keywords: Macroprudential policy; Regulatory arbitrage; Financial crises; Limited regulation enforcement
This item with handle RePEc:fip:fedmwp:754
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