Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
We develop a quantitative equilibrium model of financial crises to assess the interaction between ex-post interventions in credit markets and the buildup of risk ex ante. During a systemic crisis, bailouts relax balance sheet constraints and mitigate the severity of the recession. Ex ante, the anticipation of such bailouts leads to an increase in risk-taking, making the economy more vulnerable to a financial crisis. We find that moral hazard effects are limited if bailouts are systemic and broad-based. If bailouts are idiosyncratic and targeted, however, this makes the economy significantly more exposed to financial crises.
Cite this item
Javier Bianchi, Efficient Bailouts?, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Working Papers 730, 19 Jan 2016.
- E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
- E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
- F40 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - General
- G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
Keywords: Bailouts; Moral hazard; Credit crunch; Financial shocks; Macroprudential policy
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