Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Opportunity and Inclusive Growth Institute
Optimal Paternalistic Savings Policies
We study optimal savings policies when there is a dual concern about undersaving for retirement and income inequality. Agents differ in present bias and earnings ability, both unobservable to a planner with paternalistic and redistributive motives. We characterize the solution to this two-dimensional screening problem and provide a decentralization using realistic policy instruments: mandatory savings at low incomes but a choice between subsidized savings vehicles at high incomes—resembling Social Security, 401(k), and IRA accounts in the US. Offering more savings choice at higher incomes facilitates redistribution. To solve large-scale versions of this problem numerically, we propose a general, computationally stable, and efficient active-set algorithm. Relative to the current US retirement system, we find significant welfare gains from increasing mandatory savings and limiting savings choice at low incomes.
Cite this item
Christian Moser & Pedro Olea de Souza e Silva, Optimal Paternalistic Savings Policies, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Opportunity and Inclusive Growth Institute, Working Papers 17, 10 Jan 2019.
- E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
Keywords: Optimal taxation; Multidimensional screening; Present bias; Preference heterogeneity; Paternalism; Retirement; Savings; Social Security; Active-set algorithm
This item with handle RePEc:fip:fedmoi:0017
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