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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Sovereign Debt Restructurings
Sovereign debt crises involve debt restructurings characterized by a mix of face-value haircuts and maturity extensions. The prevalence of maturity extensions has been hard to reconcile with economic theory. We develop a model of endogenous debt restructuring that captures key facts of sovereign debt and restructuring episodes. While debt dilution pushes for negative maturity extensions, three factors are important in overcoming the effects of dilution and generating maturity extensions upon restructurings: income recovery after default, credit exclusion after restructuring, and regulatory costs of book-value haircuts. We employ dynamic discrete choice methods that allow for smoother decision rules, rendering the problem tractable.
Cite this item
Maximiliano Dvorkin & Juan M. Sanchez & Horacio Sapriza & Emircan Yurdagul, Sovereign Debt Restructurings, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Working Papers 2018-13, 25 Jun 2018, revised 24 Nov 2019.
- F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
- F41 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Open Economy Macroeconomics
- G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets
Keywords: Crises; Default; Sovereign Debt; Restructuring; Rescheduling; Country Risk; Maturity; Dynamic Discrete Choice
This item with handle RePEc:fip:fedlwp:2018-013
is also listed on EconPapers
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