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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Working Papers
Terms-of-Trade and Counterterrorism Externalities
Subhayu Bandyopadhyay
Todd Sandler
Javed Younas
Abstract

This paper investigates the interplay of trade and terrorism externalities under free trade between a developed nation that exports a manufactured good to and imports a primary product from a developing nation. A terrorist organization targets both nations and reduces its attacks in response to a nation’s defensive counterterrorism efforts, while transferring some of its attacks abroad. Terms-of-trade considerations lead the developed nation to raise its counterterrorism level beyond the “small-country” level, thus compounding its over provision of these measures. By contrast, the developing nation limits its defensive countermeasures below that of the small-country level. The analysis is extended to include proactive countermeasures to weaken the terrorist group. Again, the developed country raises its efforts owing to the terms-of-trade externality, which now opposes the under provision associated with proactive efforts. A second extension allows for several developing country exporters of the primary product.


Download https://doi.org/10.20955/wp.2017.017
Cite this item
Subhayu Bandyopadhyay & Todd Sandler & Javed Younas, Terms-of-Trade and Counterterrorism Externalities, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Working Papers 2017-17, 01 Jun 2017.
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Subject headings:
Keywords: Terms-of-trade externalities; transference externalities; terrorism; defensive counterterrorism; proactive counterterrorism
DOI: 10.20955/wp.2017.017
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