On December 12, 2019, Fed in Print will introduce its new platform for discovering content. Please direct your questions to Anna Oates
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Credit markets, limited commitment, and government debt
A dynamic model with credit under limited commitment is constructed, in which limited memory can weaken the effects of punishment for default. This creates an endogenous role for government debt in credit markets, and the economy can be non-Ricardian. Default can occur in equilibrium, and government debt essentially plays a role as collateral and thus improves borrowers’ incentives. The provision of government debt acts to discourage default, whether default occurs in equilibrium or not.
Cite this item
Stephen D. Williamson & Francesca Carapella, Credit markets, limited commitment, and government debt, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Working Papers 2014-10, 24 Feb 2014.
- E4 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates
- E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
- E6 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook
This item with handle RePEc:fip:fedlwp:2014-010
is also listed on EconPapers
For corrections, contact Anna Oates ()