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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Working Papers
Economic models of employee motivation
Joseph A. Ritter
Lowell J. Taylor
Abstract

Workers, being human beings, present employers with a range of tricky problems. Humans, unlike filing cabinets, can be crooked, subversive, surly, or indolent, even if they are paid on time. In this article we explore economists' main models of how compensation is used to address employee motivation and how these models help to explain puzzling features of the labor market.


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Joseph A. Ritter & Lowell J. Taylor, Economic models of employee motivation, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Working Papers 1997-006, 1997.
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Keywords: Wages ; Management ; Labor market
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Fed-in-Print is the central catalog of publications within the Federal Reserve System. It is managed and hosted by the Economic Research Division, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.

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