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Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Working Paper Series
Search, self-insurance and job-security provisions
Fernando Alvarez
Marcelo Veracierto
Abstract

We construct a general equilibrium model to evaluate the quantitative effects of severance payments in the presence of contracting and reallocational frictions. Key elements of the model are: 1) establishment level dynamics, 2) imperfect insurance markets, and 3) variable search decisions. Contrary to previous studies that analyzed severance payments in frictionless environments, we find that severance payments reduce unemployment, produce negative insurance effects and improve levels.


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Fernando Alvarez & Marcelo Veracierto, Search, self-insurance and job-security provisions, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Working Paper Series WP-98-2, 1998.
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Keywords: Job security ; Unemployment
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