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Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.)
International Finance Discussion Papers
Fiscal Stimulus Under Sovereign Risk
Javier Bianchi
Pablo Ottonello
Ignacio Presno
Abstract

The excess procyclicality of fiscal policy is commonly viewed as a central malaise in emerging economies. We document that procyclicality is more pervasive in countries with higher sovereign risk and provide a model of optimal fiscal policy with nominal rigidities and endogenous sovereign default that can account for this empirical pattern. Financing a fiscal stimulus is costly for risky countries and can render countercyclical policies undesirable, even in the presence of large Keynesian stabilization gains. We also show that imposing austerity can backfire by exacerbating the exposure to default, but a well-designed "fiscal forward guidance" can help reduce the excess procyclicality.


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Javier Bianchi & Pablo Ottonello & Ignacio Presno, Fiscal Stimulus Under Sovereign Risk, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), International Finance Discussion Papers 1257, 20 Sep 2019.
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Keywords: Fiscal Stabilization Policy ; Sovereign Default ; Procyclicality
DOI: 10.17016/IFDP.2019.1257
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