Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.)
International Finance Discussion Papers
Efficient Public Good Provision in Networks : Revisiting the Lindahl Solution
The provision of public goods in developing countries is a central challenge. This paper studies a model where each agent’s effort provides heterogeneous benefits to the others, inducing a network of opportunities for favor-trading. We focus on a classical efficient benchmark – the Lindahl solution – that can be derived from a bargaining game. Does the optimistic assumption that agents use an efficient mechanism (rather than succumbing to the tragedy of the commons) imply incentives for efficient investment in the technology that is used to produce the public goods? To show that the answer is no in general, we give comparative statics of the Lindahl solution which have natural network interpretations. We then suggest some welfare-improving interventions.
Cite this item
Anil K. Jain, Efficient Public Good Provision in Networks : Revisiting the Lindahl Solution, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), International Finance Discussion Papers 1210, 28 Jul 2017.
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth
- D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
Keywords: Networks ; Public goods ; β-core ; Repeated games ; Coalitional deviations ; Institutions ; Centrality ; Lindahl equilibrium
This item with handle RePEc:fip:fedgif:1210
is also listed on EconPapers
For corrections, contact Ryan Wolfslayer ()