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Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.)
International Finance Discussion Papers
Domestic Debt and Sovereign Defaults
Enrico Mallucci
Abstract

This paper examines how domestic holdings of government debt affect sovereign default risk and government debt management. I develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with both external and domestic debt that endogenously generates output contraction upon default. Domestic holdings of government debt weaken investors' balance sheets and induce a contraction of credit and output upon default. I calibrate the model to the Argentinean economy and show that the model reproduces key empirical moments. Introducing domestic debt also yields relevant normative implications. While domestic debt is crucial to determining the risk of default, the efficient internal-external composition of debt cannot be achieved without government intervention. Pigouvian subsidies can restore efficiency.


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Enrico Mallucci, Domestic Debt and Sovereign Defaults, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), International Finance Discussion Papers 1153, 18 Dec 2015.
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Keywords: Sovereign Defaults; Domestic Debt; Debt Crises; Credit Market
DOI: 10.17016/IFDP.2015.1153
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