Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US)
Finance and Economics Discussion Series
Why Are Banks Not Recapitalized During Crises?
I develop a model where the sovereign debt capacity depends on the capitalization of domestic banks. Low-capital banks optimally tilt their government bond portfolio toward domestic securities, linking their destiny to that of the sovereign. If the sovereign risk is sufficiently high, low-capital banks reduce private lending to further increase their holdings of domestic government bonds, lowering sovereign yields and supporting the home sovereign debt capacity. The model rationalizes, in the context of the eurozone periphery, the increase in domestic government bond holdings, the reduction of bank credit supply, and the prolonged fragility of the financial sector.
Cite this item
Matteo Crosignani, Why Are Banks Not Recapitalized During Crises?, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US), Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2017-084, 16 Aug 2017.
- E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
- F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
Keywords: Bank Capital ; Bank Credit ; Government Bonds ; Risk-Shifting ; Sovereign Crises
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