Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US)
Finance and Economics Discussion Series
Dealers' Insurance, Market Structure, And Liquidity
We develop a parsimonious model to study the equilibrium structure of financial markets and its efficiency properties. We find that regulations aimed at improving market outcomes can cause inefficiencies. The welfare benefit of such regulation stems from endogenously improving market access for some participants, thus boosting competition and lowering prices to the ultimate consumers. Higher competition, however, erodes profits from market activities. This has two effects: it disproportionately hurts more efficient market participants, who earn larger profits, and it reduces the incentives of all market participants to invest ex-ante in efficient technologies. The general equilibrium effect can therefore result in a welfare cost to society. Additionally, this economic mechanism can explain the resistance by some market participants to the introduction of specific regulation which could appear to be unambiguously beneficial.
Cite this item
Francesca Carapella & Cyril Monnet, Dealers' Insurance, Market Structure, And Liquidity, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US), Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2017-119, 15 Dec 2017.
- G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
- G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
Keywords: Insurance ; Central counterparties ; Dealers ; Liquidity
This item with handle RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2017-119
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