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Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US)
Finance and Economics Discussion Series
Conservatism and Liquidity Traps
Appointing Rogoff's (1985) conservative central banker improves welfare if the economy is subject to large contractionary shocks and the policy rate occasionally falls to the zero lower bound (ZLB). In an economy with occasionally binding ZLB constraints, the anticipation of future ZLB episodes creates a trade-off between inflation and output stabilization. As a consequence, inflation systematically falls below target even when the policy rate is above zero. A conservative central banker mitigates this deflationary bias away from the ZLB, improving allocations both at and away from the ZLB through expectations.
Cite this item
Taisuke Nakata & Sebastian Schmidt, Conservatism and Liquidity Traps, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US), Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2014-105, 12 Nov 2014.
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
- E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
Keywords: Discretion; inflation conservatism; inflation targeting; liquidity traps; zero lower bound
This item with handle RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2014-105
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