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Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
Working Paper Series
Offshore financial centers: parasites or symbionts?
Andrew K. Rose
Mark M. Spiegel
Abstract

This paper analyzes the causes and consequences of offshore financial centers (OFCs). Since OFCs are likely to be tax havens and money launderers, they encourage bad behavior in source countries. Nevertheless, OFCs may also have unintended positive consequences for their neighbors, since they act as a competitive fringe for the domestic banking sector. We derive and simulate a model of a home country monopoly bank facing a representative competitive OFC which offers tax advantages attained by moving assets offshore at a cost that is increasing in distance between the OFC and the source. Our model predicts that proximity to an OFC is likely to have pro-competitive implications for the domestic banking sector, although the overall effect on welfare is ambiguous. We test and confirm the predictions empirically. Proximity to an OFC is associated with a more competitive domestic banking system and greater overall financial depth.


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Andrew K. Rose & Mark M. Spiegel, Offshore financial centers: parasites or symbionts?, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Working Paper Series 2005-05, 2005.
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Keywords: Banks and banking; International ; Competition ; Bank supervision
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