Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
Globalization Institute Working Papers
Adverse Selection, Lemons Shocks and Business Cycles
Asymmetric information is crucial for understanding the disruption of the supply of credit. This paper studies a dynamic economy featuring asymmetric information and resulting adverse selection in credit markets. Entrepreneurs seek loans from banks for projects, but asymmetric information about entrepreneurs' riskiness causes a lemons problem: relatively safe entrepreneurs do not get funded. An increase in the riskiness of some entrepreneurs raises interest rate spreads, aggravates adverse selection, and shrinks the supply of bank credit. The model calibrated to the U.S. economy generates significant business fluctuations including severe recessions comparable to the Great Recession of 2007-09.
Cite this item
Daisuke Ikeda, Adverse Selection, Lemons Shocks and Business Cycles, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Globalization Institute Working Papers 361, 01 Apr 2019.
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
- E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
Keywords: Adverse selection; Mechanism design approach; separating contract
This item with handle RePEc:fip:feddgw:361
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