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Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
Globalization Institute Working Papers
Pegging the exchange rate to gain monetary policy credibility
J. Scott Davis
Ippei Fujiwara
Abstract

Central banks that lack credibility often tie their exchange rate to that of a more credible partner in order to “import” credibility. We show in a small open economy model that a central bank that displays “limited credibility” can deliver significant improvements to a social welfare function that contains no role for exchange rate stabilization by maximizing an objective function that places weight on exchange rate stabilization, and thus the central bank with limited credibility will peg their currency to that of a more credible partner. As the central bank’s credibility improves it will place less weight on exchange rate stabilization in its objective function and thus loosen the peg. When the central bank is perfectly credible its objective function and the social welfare function are identical; it places no weight on exchange rate stabilization and allows the currency to freely float. Empirical results using a panel of both developed and developing countries show that as central banks become more independent they tend to allow more currency flexibility.


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J. Scott Davis & Ippei Fujiwara, Pegging the exchange rate to gain monetary policy credibility, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Globalization Institute Working Papers 224, 01 Jan 2015.
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DOI: 10.24149/gwp224
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