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Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
Working Papers (Old Series)
The FDICIA and bank CEOs' pay-performance relationship: an empirical investigation
Ying Yan
Abstract

A look at how the FDICIA changes the relationship between pay and performance for bank CEOs. It finds that the legislation improves healthy banks’ growth opportunities, making their CEOs’ total compensation less sensitive to performance. For unhealthy banks, total compensation becomes more performance-sensitive.


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Ying Yan, The FDICIA and bank CEOs' pay-performance relationship: an empirical investigation, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Papers (Old Series) 9805, 1998.
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Keywords: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 ; Executives - Salaries
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Fed-in-Print is the central catalog of publications within the Federal Reserve System. It is managed and hosted by the Economic Research Division, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.

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