Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
Working Papers (Old Series)
The FDICIA and bank CEOs' pay-performance relationship: an empirical investigation
A look at how the FDICIA changes the relationship between pay and performance for bank CEOs. It finds that the legislation improves healthy banks’ growth opportunities, making their CEOs’ total compensation less sensitive to performance. For unhealthy banks, total compensation becomes more performance-sensitive.
Cite this item
Ying Yan, The FDICIA and bank CEOs' pay-performance relationship: an empirical investigation, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Papers (Old Series) 9805, 1998.
Keywords: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 ; Executives - Salaries
This item with handle RePEc:fip:fedcwp:9805
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