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Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
Working Papers (Old Series)
Appointing the median voter of a policy board
Christopher J. Waller
Abstract

A description of a model which demonstrates that delegating monetary policy to an independent policy board with discretionary powers substantially reduces policy uncertainty while maintaining political accountability.


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Christopher J. Waller, Appointing the median voter of a policy board, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Papers (Old Series) 9802, 1998.
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Keywords: Business cycles ; Economic policy
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