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Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
Working Papers (Old Series)
Dynamic commitment and imperfect policy rules
Joseph G. Haubrich
Joseph A. Ritter
Abstract

An examination of the dynamics of commitment, showing that because the decision regarding rules versus discretion occurs in real time, opting for discretion is often the better choice, since it leaves open the possibility of adopting rules later on.


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Joseph G. Haubrich & Joseph A. Ritter, Dynamic commitment and imperfect policy rules, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Papers (Old Series) 9601, 1996.
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Keywords: Monetary policy
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