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Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
Working Papers
Is bank supervision central to central banking?
Joe Peek
Eric S. Rosengren
Geoffrey M. B. Tootell
Abstract

Recently, several central banks have lost their bank supervisory responsibilities, in part because it has not been shown that supervisory authority improves the conduct of monetary policy. This paper finds that confidential bank supervisory information could help the Board staff more accurately forecast important macroeconomic variables and is used by FOMC members to guide monetary policy. These findings suggest that the complementarity between supervisory responsibilities and monetary policy should be an important consideration when evaluating the structure of the central bank.


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Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren & Geoffrey M. B. Tootell, Is bank supervision central to central banking?, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Working Papers 99-7, 1999.
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Subject headings:
Keywords: Bank examination ; Bank supervision ; Banks and banking; Central ; Monetary policy
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Fed-in-Print is the central catalog of publications within the Federal Reserve System. It is managed and hosted by the Economic Research Division, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.

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