Home About Latest Browse RSS Advanced Search

Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
Working Papers
Competitive incentives: working harder or working smarter?
Anat Bracha
Chaim Fershtman
Abstract

Almost all jobs require a combination of cognitive effort and labor effort. This paper focuses on the effect that competitive incentive schemes have on the chosen combination of these two types of efforts. We use an experimental approach to show that competitive incentives may induce agents to work harder but not necessarily smarter. This effect was stronger for women.


Download Full text
Download Full text
Cite this item
Anat Bracha & Chaim Fershtman, Competitive incentives: working harder or working smarter?, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Working Papers 12-12, 2012.
More from this series
JEL Classification:
Subject headings:
Keywords: Competition
For corrections, contact Catherine Spozio ()
Fed-in-Print is the central catalog of publications within the Federal Reserve System. It is managed and hosted by the Economic Research Division, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.

Privacy Legal