Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta
FRB Atlanta Working Paper
Optimal Time-Consistent Taxation with Default
We study optimal time-consistent distortionary taxation when the repayment of government debt is not enforceable. The government taxes labor income or issues noncontingent debt in order to finance an exogenous stream of stochastic government expenditures. The government can repudiate its debt subject to some default costs, thereby introducing some state-contingency to debt. We are motivated by the fact that domestic sovereign default is an empirically relevant phenomenon, as Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) demonstrated. Optimal policy is characterized by two opposing incentives: an incentive to postpone taxes by issuing more debt for the future and an incentive to tax more currently in order to avoid punishing default premia. A generalized Euler equation (GEE) captures these two effects and determines the optimal back-loading or front-loading of tax distortions.
Cite this item
Anastasios G. Karantounias, Optimal Time-Consistent Taxation with Default, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2017-12, 01 Nov 2017.
- D52 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Incomplete Markets
- E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
- E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
Keywords: labor tax; sovereign default; Markov-perfect equilibrium; time-consistency; generalized Euler equation; long-term debt
This item with handle RePEc:fip:fedawp:2017-12
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