Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta
FRB Atlanta Working Paper
Agency Conflicts in Residential Mortgage Securitization: What Does the Empirical Literature Tell Us?
The agency conflicts inherent in securitization are viewed by many as having been a key contributor to the recent financial crisis, despite the presence of various legal and economic constructs to mitigate them. A review of recent empirical research for the U.S. home mortgage market suggests that securitization itself may not have been a problem, but rather the origination and distribution of observably riskier loans. Low-documentation mortgages, for which asymmetric information problems are acute, performed especially poorly during the crisis. Securitized low-documentation mortgages performed better when included in deals where security issuers were affiliated with lenders or had significant reputational capital at stake and investors priced the risk of low-documentation loans via larger required equity tranches and/or higher security yields.
Cite this item
W. Scott Frame, Agency Conflicts in Residential Mortgage Securitization: What Does the Empirical Literature Tell Us?, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2017-1, 01 Mar 2017.
- G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
Keywords: mortgages; banks; securitization; financial crisis
This item with handle RePEc:fip:fedawp:2017-01
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