Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta
FRB Atlanta Working Paper
What we learn from China's rising shadow banking: exploring the nexus of monetary tightening and banks' role in entrusted lending
We argue that China's rising shadow banking was inextricably linked to potential balance-sheet risks in the banking system. We substantiate this argument with three didactic findings: (1) commercial banks in general were prone to engage in channeling risky entrusted loans; (2) shadow banking through entrusted lending masked small banks' exposure to balance-sheet risks; and (3) two well-intended regulations and institutional asymmetry between large and small banks combined to give small banks an incentive to exploit regulatory arbitrage by bringing off-balance-sheet risks into the balance sheet. We reveal these findings by constructing a comprehensive transaction-based loan dataset, providing robust empirical evidence, and developing a theoretical framework to explain the linkages between monetary policy, shadow banking, and traditional banking (the banking system) in China.
Cite this item
Kaiji Chen & Jue Ren & Tao Zha, What we learn from China's rising shadow banking: exploring the nexus of monetary tightening and banks' role in entrusted lending, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2016-1, 01 Jan 2016.
- E02 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - Institutions and the Macroeconomy
- E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
- G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
- G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
Keywords: Regulatory arbitrage; asset pricing; institutional asymmetry; entrusted loans; risk taking; shadow loans; bank loans; nonloan investment; nonbank trustees; small banks; large banks; balance sheet; optimal decisions
This item with handle RePEc:fip:fedawp:2016-01
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